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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Condition data Data describing the physical conditions and state of an infrastructure. 
  
Consequence A result or effect of an action or inaction. 
  
Criteria A standard of judgment, or principle for evaluating or testing 
something. 
  
Critical assets Assets or infrastructure whose failure would cause considerable 
system impact or severe loss (financial, integrity, trust, etc.) to a 
transportation agency. 
  
Criticality Relative importance of a corridor or an asset within a pool of other 
alternatives. 
  
Decision maker Person or organizational unit who defines directions in relation to 
achieving system or organizational objectives and goals. 
  
Exposure Number of system users who would potentially be exposed to an 
impending threat or hazard. 
  
Hazard A pending condition or physical situation that can potentially result in 
an unwanted outcome, such as road closures or delays. 
  
Risk The effect of uncertainty on expected outcomes (IIMM, 2011).  
Measured as a combination of the probability of an uncertain event 
and its consequences. 
  
Risk elements Variables used to characterize a risk event. 
  
Surrogate Something that serves as a substitute for another measure under 
specific conditions.  
  
Threat A situation likely to cause harm to a transportation system or 
organization. 
  
Uncertainty Randomness in events that cannot be predicted by 
statistical probability (Lofstedt and Boholm, 2009) 
  







GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AADT Average Annual Daily Traffic 
AASHTO American Association of State and Highway Transportation Officials 
ADT   Average Daily Traffic 
AHA   Ancillary Highway Asset 
ATC   Australian Transport Council 
CJCSM  Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Manual 
CSAH   County State-Aid Highways 
DA   Decision Analysis 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
DOT   Department of Transportation 
DSS   Decision-support System 
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency 
ERS   Earth Retaining Structure 
FEMA   Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FHWA  Federal Highway Administration 
GIS   Geographic Information System 




HARM  Highway Assets Risk Management 
HPMS   Highway Performance Management System 
ICM   Integrated Corridor Management 
IIMM   International Infrastructure Management Manual 
ISM   Integrated System Management 
ISO   International Organization for Standards 
LOS   Level of Service 
MAP-21  Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21
st
 Century 
MCDA  Multi-criteria Decision Analysis 
MnDOT  Minnesota Department of Transportation 
NBI   National Bridge Inventory 
NCHRP  National Cooperative Highway Research Program 
NHPP   National Highway Performance Program 
NHS   National Highway System 
NYSDOT  New York State Department of Transportation 
OAM   Office of Asset Management 




PBP   Performance-Based Planning 
TAM   Transportation Asset Management 
TAMS   Transportation Asset Management System 
TTP   Truck Traffic Percentage  
SAW   Simple Additive Weighting 
SoS   System-of-systems 
SR   Sensitivity Ratio 
USDHS  United States Department of Homeland Security 
USDOT  United State Department of Transportation 
USMS   Unstable Slope Management System 







Risk assessment is an essential part of an effective transportation asset management program.  
The 2012 surface transportation bill, Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century, requires 
state departments of transportation (DOTs) to establish risk- and performance-based asset 
management programs for the National Highway System.  While the bill’s provisions include 
requirements only for pavement and bridge assets, they also recommend that DOTs consider 
other ancillary highway assets such as culverts and earth retaining structures, and hazards such as 
rockfalls and landslides.  This research introduces an integrated risk framework with supporting 
algorithms to provide for the integration of ancillary assets and hazards into existing 
transportation asset management systems, and facilitate budget planning and resource allocation.  
The framework, Highway Assets Risk Management Decision-Support System (HARM-DSS), 
adopts a system-of systems perspective in defining and evaluating performance, and analyzing 
and addressing risk.  The algorithms are developed using multi-criteria decision analysis 
(MCDA) and risk analysis methods; value functions are applied to scale performance attributes, 
and additive weighting to integrate multiple risk criteria.  The methodology is applied at the 
corridor-level to analyze three different case studies using data with notable variability from 
New York, Minnesota and Oregon.  The cases demonstrate the process for developing 
descriptive and visual information on multi-asset/hazard corridors, with sparse to medium data, 
in order to identify corridors that are vulnerable to failure, as well as exhibit high risk of failure 
within a transportation network.  The results demonstrate that HARM-DSS can be applied across 
competing corridors or alternatives to produce descriptive and intuitive results that decision 
makers can use in budget planning and resource allocation.  This research extends the risk-based 




analytical platform that considers multiple non-homogenous assets and hazards simultaneously.  
It identifies data deficiencies and offers recommendations on the requisite data collection on 
asset inventory and condition to improve objectivity in the analytical process and confidence in 
the analysis results.  In addition, it offers recommendations on the appropriate use of expert 
knowledge in supplementing existing data deficiencies in the interim.  This work is potentially 
useful to decision makers involved in distributing resources to preserve the reliability and 
resiliency of transportation systems, as well as meet the existing performance- and risk-based 










Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of Transportation Asset Management 
Over the past several decades, owners of infrastructure assets (and liabilities), such as 
transportation agencies, have applied Transportation Asset Management (TAM) principles as a 
decision-support tool for transportation planning and investment decision making over the 
lifecycles of infrastructure facilities and systems (Cambridge Systematics et al., 2002, AASHTO, 
January 2011).  Broadly, asset management can occur at all levels of an organization.  Generally, 
a transportation agency’s assets include the physical transportation infrastructure (e.g., 
pavements, bridges, culverts, and all other roadway appurtenances) and other resources that add 
value to the agency (e.g., human resources, data, etc.).  The definition of asset management has 
evolved throughout the years.  However, the core purpose of a formalized and structured 
approach to maintaining and preserving our transportation infrastructure remains.   
 The AASHTO Transportation Asset Management Guide Volume 1 defines TAM as “a 
strategic and systematic process of operating, maintaining, upgrading, and expanding physical 
assets effectively throughout their lifecycle” (Cambridge Systematics et al., 2002).  The 2012 
surface transportation bill—Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21
st
 century (MAP-21)—defines 
TAM as “a strategic and systematic process of operating, maintaining, and improving physical 
assets, with a focus on engineering and economic analysis based upon quality information, to 
identify a structured sequence of maintenance, preservation, repair, rehabilitation, and 
replacement actions that will achieve and sustain a desired state of good repair over the lifecycle 




The AASHTO definition of TAM focuses on a Department of Transportation’s (DOT) 
business process for resource allocation and utilization with the objective of better decision 
making based upon quality information and well-defined objectives (Cambridge Systematics et 
al., 2002).  In the same way, MAP-21 bridges the concepts of performance, risk, and asset 
management in making informed decisions.  Asset management, in addition to being applied as a 
system-based decision-support tool, is also identified as a way of doing business through the 
incorporation of the key functions of a transportation agency, including planning, engineering, 
finance, programming, construction, maintenance, and information systems (Cambridge 
Systematics et al., 2002).  Accordingly, asset managers employ asset management principles to 
minimize the total cost of designing, acquiring, operating, maintaining, replacing, and disposing 
capital transportation assets over their useful lives while maintaining desirable performance 
targets.  The main impetuses of the development of formal asset management programs are the 
need to meet legislative mandates, demand for increased financial accountability for publicly-
owned assets, aging infrastructure, and a growing need for better allocation and utilization of 
limited or declining resources.   
Figure 1.1 presents the FHWA overview of transportation asset management as outlined 
in the “Asset Management Primer” report.  Another framework, Figure 1.2, is adopted from 
Volume 1 of the AASHTO Transportation Asset Management Guide.  The frameworks illustrate 
resource allocation and utilization processes in asset management.  The flexibility of the 
framework presented in Figure 1.2 allows for modifications to meet the needs of organizations 
with dissimilar policy, institutional, organizational, technological, and financial settings 





Figure 1.1Overview of an Asset Management Framework 





Figure 1.2 Transportation Asset Management: Resource Allocation and Utilization 
(Cambridge Systematics et al., 2002)  
Increasingly, the effects of aging infrastructure, increasing maintenance and replacement 
costs, and limited or declining funds motivate transportation agencies and decision makers to 
seek more proactive and efficient ways to manage their assets and potential hazards (threats).   
Asset management, therefore, presents an opportunity that facilitates an agency’s decisions in 
resource allocation and utilization in managing its transportation infrastructure (Cambridge 




methods and criteria on current policy guidelines.  In addition, asset management tools enable 
asset managers to consider a range of alternatives while they focus on the outcomes of decisions 
and apply more objective and consistent information to decisions.   
In 2005, United States transportation professionals performed an international review of 
asset management practices in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and they 
identified several asset management tools that these countries have successfully applied in their 
decision processes (Geiger et al., 2005).  At a time of declining or limited resources, these 
system-based management practices can help agencies make informed-decisions and also 
provide the general public with a convenient, safe, and reliable transportation network.  
Traditionally, in the United States, the practice of TAM has mainly involved “larger” 
transportation assets, or infrastructure, such as pavements and bridges.  This trend is gradually 
evolving as various agencies have started data gathering on their other assets (Hawkins & Smadi, 
2013).  Even so, historical trends have seen rapid developments of maturing systems for the 
management of pavements and bridges.  Currently, many DOTs have in place a pavement or a 
bridge management system, with different maturity levels (Markow & Hyman, 2009, FHWA, 
2011).  To some extent, one can attribute this development to the existence of formal Federal, 
state, or local mandates that essentially require DOTs to develop, implement, and maintain these 
management systems.  The literature reveals many success stories through the use of asset 
management systems in decision making (EPA et al., 2009; FHWA, 2005).   
 An effective asset management system entails three main principles: strategic, analysis, 
and decision making (Cambridge Systematics et al., 2002).  Asset management is strategic 
because it focuses on asset performance and cost while aligning with the policy goals and 




analysis and decision making.  Aligning with these principles and making sound business 
decisions that benefit the taxpayer and accomplish organizational goals require complete, 
current, and quality information on transportation infrastructure.  In addition, asset managers can 
employ strong analytical capabilities while making use of suitable and practical information 
collection and storage capabilities.  Finally, as a business process, asset management involves 
tradeoff analyses across competing and conflicting alternatives together with organizational 
goals, policies, budget, and asset performance.  Thus, through the application of available data 
and the elicitation of expert knowledge and engineering judgment, all levels of the organization 
contribute to effective communication that addresses the needs of asset management.   
 Furthermore, with this information in hand, decision makers can allocate and utilize their 
resources effectively and efficiently, while monitoring and evaluating system performance.  
Consequently, decision makers can make adjustments or changes with the aim of attaining set 
performance targets and achieving organizational goals.  These processes facilitate an effective 
asset management program that enables transportation agencies to plan, build, operate, preserve, 
and improve the performance of their facilities more cost-effectively.  These actions enables 
decision makers to make the best use of limited resources, enhance agency credibility and 
accountability, meet legislative mandates and requirements, and contribute to the long-term 
economic vitality of communities. 
1.2 Research Motivation and Problem Description 
The literature reveals that TAM has evolved over the past two decades.  Indeed, transportation 
agencies and asset managers have successfully developed systems for managing their pavement 
and bridge assets.  Admittedly, many of these activities have been facilitated by Federal, state, or 




categories of assets, such as culverts, and hazards, such as rockfalls, the management of these 
assets is usually left to the discretion of a transportation agency.  Basically, decision makers face 
the challenge of identifying which asset categories must be prioritized and incorporated into their 
asset management system, where there are limited budgets.   
 International transportation agencies have explored the application of risk management in 
TAM.  In the United States, with the passage of MAP-21, risk management continues to gain 
much recognition in TAM.  Similarly, other industries in the United States, such as the financial 
and the insurance industries, and transportation agencies in other countries have made 
considerable progress in applying risk management principles to improve their business 
practices.  As such, U.S. transportation decision makers can capitalize on the opportunities 
MAP-21 offers as well as documented experiences and benefits to integrate risk decision-support 
tools into their existing TAM plans.  In addition, decision makers can augment risk principles 
with existing TAM systems to collectively and effectively manage critical assets or potential 
hazards that threaten the successful operation of the transportation system and their agencies.  In 
resource allocation and utilization decision making, these asset categories or hazards compete for 
the same limited funding or resources; therefore, decision makers require systematic and 
replicable approaches that fit within the existing context of their asset management programs to 
make informed decisions that address organizational goals.   
  While risk management is widely practiced by financial and other profit-oriented 
organizations in United States and around the world, the public sector, particularly the 
transportation asset management sector, has not fully utilized risk principles at the strategic, 
operational-, or programming-level of decision making.  Although some decision makers assert 




claims remain unsubstantiated and unknown because of the lack of documentation to 
characterize their practices.  In transportation network operations, stakeholders (including system 
users) want structurally-sufficient bridges and smooth pavement ride.  Primarily, asset managers 
and decision makers have a keen need to offer taxpayers quality system standards and also 
eliminate performance variability.  As such, one cannot discuss a reliable transportation system 
without an understanding, analysis, and treatment of system uncertainties and risks associated 
with the presence of ancillary highway assets and potential hazards. This research seeks to 
address these issues and bridge existing gaps. 
 Precisely, the following observations motivate this dissertation research: 
 Aging transportation infrastructure: A majority of the transportation infrastructure has 
reached or is approaching its useful service life.  Accordingly, decision makers and asset 
managers need better proactive strategies that address risk in an integrated manner. 
 Increasing rate of ancillary highway asset failure: Transportation agencies continue to 
experience asset failures that interrupt network reliability.  Although many of these 
failures receive public or media attention, some have gone unnoticed because of their 
relative impact (i.e., lack of injuries and fatalities).  In particular, performance failures 
that are non-catastrophic tend not to receive as much public or media attention relative to 
catastrophic failures. 
 Demands of legislative mandates: MAP-21 requires all DOTs to establish a risk-based 
asset management framework for the National Highway System (NHS), and a 
comprehensive asset management plan cannot emerge without looking beyond the 




 Potential benefits risk management offers: As demonstrated by some private and 
international organizations, risk management as a decision support tool can similarly help 
US transportation organizations (i.e., Federal, State, and Local DOTs) to utilize their 
limited resources more effectively. 
Overall, these observations give rise to the following research questions: 
1. What is the extent of adoption of risk and asset management principles in making 
investment decisions regarding ancillary highway assets in the context of the overall 
transportation system? 
2. What decision-support tools (framework and analytical models) do decision makers and 
analysts use in supporting their risk programs? 
3. What are the potential benefits in integrating ancillary highway assets within existing 
asset management systems to conduct corridor-level analysis, and how can this be done? 
1.3 Research Objectives 
To answer these research questions and help agencies and asset managers integrate ancillary 
assets and hazards into their existing asset management frameworks for formal management, this 
research proposes to achieve the following objectives: 
 Develop an integrated risk framework to help agencies phase in critical ancillary highway 
assets and potential hazards into existing management systems 
 Develop a risk decision-support system to help agencies implement the risk framework 
within the context of their organization: 
o Assess the risk-level of each asset category with respect to the agency’s strategic 





o Assess the relative risk of individual assets within a given asset category taking 
into consideration the age and useful life of the asset (i.e., vulnerability to failure) 
and road characteristics (i.e., criticality) along which the asset is located 
o Assess the relative risk of each corridor within a given network by integrating 
results from the previous two models  
 Offer recommendations/guidelines that will enable practitioners exploit the full potential 
of this proposed method 
1.4 Research Methodology 
To accomplish these objectives, this dissertation adopts a multi-stage approach.  Figure 1.3 
illustrates the sequence of the three stages with which the dissertation proceeds.  In fact, it is 
important to acknowledge that the approach is not necessarily linear since some latter work can 
prompt further review of the initial steps.  As such, the methodology is best classified as an 
iterative process.  Narratively, the stages include: 
1. Defining the scope of the study and subsequently reviewing relevant literature  
2. Developing a conceptual framework with complementary decision-support system for 
practical application 





Figure 1.3 Research Methodology  
  The first task involves scoping and defining the context of the study and, subsequently, 
reviewing relevant literature.  The context definition basically involves establishing the risk level 
the framework will be targeting and the type of infrastructure or asset categories or hazards that 
will be covered in the study.  As part of the literature review, the research looks at the state of 
practice of managing ancillary assets, and identifies states with best practices to incorporate these 
states in the case studies.  The research also reviewed how decision makers use risk management 
principles to influence decision making.  Since transportation decision makers have not used risk 
principles extensively in program-risk management, this task reviewed the five-series of risk 
reports released by the FHWA Office of Asset Management to develop some guiding principles. 
 The second task involves identifying and reviewing different types of risk frameworks, 
different risk characterization methods or some risk modeling techniques that risk analysts and 
managers use in assessing risk.  Risk characterization or modeling is one of the most important 
steps in risk management.  As such, it is imperative that the research identifies the most 
applicable framework and plausible modeling techniques in assessing risks, in this research 
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context.  If risks are not properly assessed, it can lead to ineffective utilization of resources, 
underperformance of the transportation system, as well as legal liabilities.  Some of the 
techniques employed by risk managers in the Homeland Security sector were reviewed because 
this sector shares similar characteristics, such as the lack of historic data on events or threats. 
 In addition, this task concentrated on developing an integrated risk framework that 
supports the strategic objectives of selected case study DOTs.  The dissertation research further 
developed a framework that is capable of evaluating the risks case study agencies face and is 
able to fit into existing asset management strategies within the organization.  Furthermore, as 
part of this task, the dissertation developed a risk decision-support system that DOTs can use to 
evaluate and address risk in their budget planning and allocation efforts.  This system can also 
help agencies monitor and improve their risk management programs. 
 The third and final task was to apply the framework to selected case studies and develop 
conclusions and recommendations.  Eventually, conclusions are drawn based on the research 
outcomes.  These conclusions involve the usefulness and applicability of the framework within 
any transportation decision-making process.  The recommendations provide guidance to agencies 
or decision makers who apply the framework in their decision-making processes.  The 
recommendations also address, how an agency can successfully implement this framework 
within its particular decision making process.      
1.5 Scope 
Both engineering and business practitioners use the term risk in various contexts.  It is important 
for both asset managers and decision makers to make a clear distinction of the context within 
which one is applying the term.  The FHWA has published a series of risk documents that offer 




asset management (FHWA, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d).  This dissertation focuses on corridor-
level risks associated with ancillary highway assets or hazards—typically internal threats—that 
can affect organizations’ planned program budget goals (strategic or programming risk).   
These threats can cause decision makers to scramble for unbudgeted resources for 
emergency and unplanned infrastructure repairs, or introduce setbacks in meeting required 
system performance.  In addition, this dissertation addresses economic, safety, and delay threats 
(operational risks) associated with potential hazards along a given corridor.  This categorization 
of risk provides context to the proposed framework presented in this dissertation (chapter 4).  
The framework also provides flexibility for decision makers to incorporate additional risks 
deemed important to the successful operation of their transportation system or organization as a 
whole.  Specifically, this framework focuses on addressing inherent risks across multiple asset 
categories or hazards on the corridor level -- for a transportation highway system.  
1.6 Expected Results and Contributions 
As a result of the literature reviewed, the work performed, and the motivation and objectives of 
this dissertation, the following results were expected as products of this work: 
a) An applicable unified risk framework that enables asset managers to prioritize critical 
ancillary highway assets and hazards into existing management systems to allow for a 
corridor-level risk analysis 
b) A risk decision-support tool to help asset managers implement the risk framework within 
the context of their organization 
c) Recommendations on how DOTs can adopt and incorporate the framework successfully 




Eventually, it is expected that organizations adopting this unified approach in managing their 
transportation system can benefit from reducing system disruptions as well as increasing or 
maintaining system performance attributed to ancillary highway assets. 
 In addition, this research is expected to contribute to the state-of-practice and the body of 
knowledge of risk-based transportation asset management.  To be precise, this work is expected 
to offer the following contributions: 
a) Provide an integrated framework and modified methodological approach for budget 
planning, prioritization, and resource allocation and utilization.  This framework allows 
for risks to be weighed and prioritized for non-homogenous assets and hazards in 
transportation decision making. 
b) Allow DOTs to make effective use of existing ancillary asset data 
c) Bridge the gap between the management of core assets and ancillary assets and hazards 
d) Provide a practical tool for DOTs striving to meet the requirements of MAP-21 
e) Enable DOTs to effectively plan, improve, and monitor network risk 
1.7 Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is organized and presented in six chapters.   Chapter 1 presents the background, 
motivation, research questions, objectives, scope, and expected results and contributions of the 
study.  The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:  
 Chapter 2 provides a synthesis of the literature reviewed.  This chapter gives an overview 
of ancillary highway assets including their modes of failure and some notable failures in 
the United States.  Furthermore, this chapter covers the state-of-practice of managing 
ancillary highway assets (AHA) and hazards among state DOTs.  In addition, chapter 2 




frameworks as well as the state of application of risk management in transportation asset 
management.  The chapter concludes with a concise presentation of the gaps identified in 
the literature. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the underlying concepts to system-of-systems approach to corridor 
level infrastructure management.   
 Chapter 4 entails an in-depth discussion of the proposed conceptual framework and the 
methodological approach developed in this work.  The discussions include a step-by-step 
analysis of each component of the framework, the analytical concepts behind the 
proposed method, and how these concepts are used in seeking a solution to the research 
problem.   
 Chapter 5 brings together the developed framework and method and implements the 
process in three different case studies.  This chapter also discusses the results and 
practical implications of the results from the case studies.  
 Chapter 6 presents the conclusions drawn from the study and recommendations to 
improve the potential benefits that can be derived from the framework and model.  










Chapter 2 ANCILLARY HIGHWAY ASSETS AND RISK-BASED DECISION 
MAKING 
To plan for and manage the risks associated with the failure of ancillary highway assets (AHA) 
and the occurrence of hazards, one needs to know what types of asset constitute this group of 
transportation highway infrastructure.  Furthermore, one has to be familiar with their modes of 
failure, and how the failure of these assets has affected the reliability and operation of a 
transportation network.  In addition, having a good knowledge of how DOTs deal with these 
categories of assets can inform asset managers and decision makers in developing practical 
management strategies for these asset categories.  Finally, if one is going to apply the principles 
of risk as a decision-support tool, it is imperative that one becomes well-versed with the basic 
concepts of risk and the extent to which DOTs or decision makers have adopted these concepts 
in their decision making processes.  Accordingly, this chapter discusses all of these topics 
extensively.  Three broad areas of literature were reviewed to inform the development of the 
framework.  The TAM literature was reviewed to offer a comprehensive overview of the state-
of-practice of TAM, with special reference to the management of ancillary highway assets.  Risk 
applications in infrastructure decision making and supporting frameworks were also reviewed to 
characterize the nature of risk application in TAM.  In addition, literature on the system-of-
systems approach to infrastructure management was also reviewed to characterize infrastructure 
performance from a broader system-of-systems perspective for the transportation network.  
Chapter 2 discusses the first two areas of the literature (i.e., TAM and risk application in 




2.1 Overview of Ancillary Highway Assets and Hazards 
In the initial years of TAM, requirements focused on pavement and bridge management 
(Cambridge Systematics et al., 2002).  Recently, however, various organizations (both state 
DOTs and local agencies) have increasingly expanded their asset management activities to 
include the management of other categories of highway transportation assets such as pavement 
markings, sidewalks and curbs, street lighting, traffic signals, traffic signs, utilities and 
manholes, and earth retaining structures (FHWA, 2005; Li & Madanu, 2008; Hawkins & Smadi, 
2013; Akofio-Sowah et al., 2014), with sidewalks and utilities and manholes predominantly 
managed at the local level.  In addition to managing these categories of assets, a few DOTs have 
expanded their TAM programs to address other categories of hazards, such as sinkholes, 
rockfalls, and/or landslides commonly called unstable slopes.  Appendix A shows examples of 
ancillary assets and hazards.  
The collective management of these asset categories and hazards does not only account 
for accountability and good stewardship but these actions can also contribute to a safe and 
efficient operation of a transportation network.  Generally, most of these asset categories are 
referred to as roadway safety hardware.  Therefore, it is logical to expect that the systematic 
management of these asset categories can improve operational-safety conditions as well as 
address other functional needs.  One way of improving these conditions and preserving this 
valuable stock of transportation infrastructure is to efficiently allocate and utilize limited 
resources (e.g., monetary and/or human resources, and time).  Indeed, identifying high-risk asset 
or hazard categories and determining appropriate mitigation strategies are ways of managing 




Such expansion of TAM activities to include AHA and hazards requires additional 
resources (i.e., monetary, man power, and time) for gathering and managing data and, in some 
cases, developing analytical tools.  Given that transportation agencies or asset owners are usually 
resource constrained, these categories of ancillary assets and hazards will compete for formalized 
asset management programs or activities; and will likely benefit from logical and systematic 
prioritization procedures.  Making a business case for managing various categories of assets and 
addressing potential categories of hazards can help transportation agencies prioritize the 
management of the assets and the hazards that yield the highest returns and minimize risks in the 
levels of service provided to system users (i.e., both in performance (i.e., non-catastrophic) and 
catastrophic failures).  Employing risk analysis to identify opportunities also allows for decision 
makers to undertake tradeoff analysis among available policy options.  
According to the FHWA, over 160 million sq. ft. of permanent earth retaining structures 
(ERSs) are constructed in the United States each year, and hundreds of millions of dollars are 
expended installing, repairing, upgrading, and replacing AHA (safety hardware) (Brutus & 
Tauber, 2009).  The FHWA estimates that about 40 percent of these ERSs are on public projects 
(Brutus & Tauber, 2009).  However, asset managers give relatively less attention to these critical 
components of the surface transportation system.  Studies have identified that most DOTs 
allocate their safety hardware management program budgets according to sample condition 
assessment and expert opinion (Li & Madanu, 2008).  However, at the time of increasing 
highway travel demand, aging infrastructure, and declining/insufficient transportation funds, 





  In fact, understanding the important role these asset categories play in the geometric 
design and operation of highways, incentives exist to warrant appropriate and practical 
management procedures.  As transportation agencies and asset managers expand their 
management activities to include AHA, they may benefit from procedures that enable them to 
prioritize the different categories of assets for formal inclusion in their systems.  This will mean 
that resource allocation for the management of AHA must be aligned with asset condition data 
(i.e., asset performance and vulnerability to failure), the risk of asset failure (i.e., probability and 
consequence of failure), and the agency’s management/strategic objectives. 
2.1.1 State of Practice of Ancillary Highway Asset and Hazard Management 
The successful operation of a road segment, corridor, or transportation network requires 
the effective management and operation of more than two categories of assets: pavements and 
bridges.  Nonetheless, over the years, these two asset categories have had an overwhelming 
emphasis in TAM due to supporting mandates and requirements.  Examples of other tangible 
assets that contribute to the successful operation of a transportation network include all the 
categories of AHA mentioned earlier, which include, but are not limited to, culverts, signs, 
guardrails, overhead sign structures, ERS, and traffic signals.  In addition to these asset 
categories, the transportation network faces potential hazards such as sinkholes and 
rockfalls/landslides (i.e., unstable slope locations) that are not tangible assets per say, but whose 
occurrence can be detrimental to the successful operation of a road segment, corridor, or the 
transportation network at large.  Furthermore, the occurrence of these natural or manmade 
hazards can also result in both environmental and legal liabilities to an agency.  Recognizing 
these negative impacts, some DOTs are systematically integrating these threats into their TAM 




the Washington State DOT (WSDOT).  WSDOT manages extensive highway facilities that 
traverse varying terrains with different geological characteristics.  Appendix B shows the 
locations of unstable and mitigated slopes along state routes in Washington State.    
Some complex geological environment surrounding some of their highways makes 
WSDOT highly vulnerable to the occurrence of rockfalls or landslides.  The occurrence of such 
threats can raise the safety risk to system users, pose strategic risks to WSDOT, as well as affect 
commerce in the region.  Accordingly, in 1995, through their highway preservation asset 
management program, WSDOT developed the Unstable Slope Management System (USMS) to 
address unstable slopes along the highways they maintain.  Basically, the USMS addresses risks 
by prioritizing highly vulnerable unstable slope locations along the highway for proactive 
mitigation.  Through these efforts, as of 2010, WSDOT has successfully mitigated over 228 
high-risk unstable slopes (WSDOT, 2010).  The overarching goal of WSDOT is to mitigate all 
identified high- and moderate- risk unstable slopes on interstate highways, principal arterials, and 
other roadways with moderate to high traffic volumes by the year 2020.       
While asset managers can boast much about the existence of matured management 
systems (i.e., existence of deterioration models and extensive condition data) for pavements and 
bridges, relatively less can be said about the existence of decision-support systems for the 
management of AHA and hazards.  This is not to suggest that asset managers strive to manage 
AHA and these natural hazards independently of pavements and bridges.  Ultimately, a 
comprehensive TAM system involves the integrated management of the core transportation 
assets (i.e., pavements and bridges) and ancillary assets that make up the system.  Evidently, the 
reasons for this shortcoming are the lack of resources and mandates that require DOTs to 




number of agencies have been taking proactive steps in gathering and maintaining inventory for 
some categories of AHA and hazards.  Indeed, over the years, the literature reveals a steady 
growth of DOTs gathering data on some categories of ancillary highway assets (Amekudzi, et 
al., 2011; Hawkins & Smadi, 2013).   
In the absence of mandates for the systematic management of AHA, the practice is not 
uniform (i.e., setting performance targets, collecting data, or assessing conditions) among 
transportation agencies.  However, the literature reveals that consistent improvements continue 
to occur in the management of AHA (Hawkins & Smadi, 2013).  Although it is challenging to 
document the benefits of practicing AHA management, many agencies have taken a practical 
approach to gather inventory data on some asset categories (Amekudzi et al., 2011).  A National 
Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) synthesis shows that 70 percent of the 43 
responding agencies (State DOTs) indicated that they gather data for some categories of AHA 
(Hawkins & Smadi, 2013).  Nonetheless, only 50 percent [of the 70 percent] indicated that they 
conduct condition assessments to allocate resources (Hawkins & Smadi, 2013).  The study did 
not address the reason why the agencies selected those particular categories of AHA for data 
gathering.  Often, these types of decisions are executive decisions based on limited inputs from 
experts.  For instance, in WSDOT, senior executives decided against spending resources to 
create a formal collection and condition assessment program for retaining walls
1
.  This decision 
was taken in 1994 when WSDOT explored the need to establish this system and found little 
history on failure rate and the need to have a formal preservation system for ERSs or retaining 
walls. 
                                                          
1
 Operations & Asset Management, Office of Capital Program Development and Management, Washington State 




In 2010, Akofio-Sowah et al. conducted a study on the state of practice of ancillary 
transportation asset management. The study involved a survey of selected state DOTs and local 
agencies and focused on the following categories of AHA: ERS, culverts, traffic signs, pavement 
markings, traffic signals, street lighting, sidewalks and curbs, mitigation features, and utilities 
and manholes.  The results from the survey showed that the practice of AHA management is 
dynamic among agencies, depending on the maturity level of their entire TAM program (Akofio-
Sowah et al., 2014).  
The study results further showed that 50 percent of the responding agencies indicated 
they had systems in place for six different categories of AHA.  On the other hand, none of the 
responding agencies indicated that they had a system for all the 10 different categories of 
ancillary highway assets the study considered.  This latter finding is motivating because it sets a 
premise for this research.  The challenging question agencies may want to answer, as they phase-
in different assets into their existing formal asset management systems is which categories of 
AHAs ought to be prioritized?  When it comes to AHAs, the most persuasive approach to justify 
their management to decision makers is to consider their risk of failure, i.e., both the probability 
and consequence of failure and the impact on organizational objectives. 
2.1.2 Failure Modes of Ancillary Highway Assets 
Ancillary highway assets, similar to any transportation infrastructure, can fail either 
catastrophically or non-catastrophically (performance failure).  Failure is termed catastrophic if a 
system or a structure suddenly fails beyond the point of its usage.  When this failure occurs, 
recovery is not possible.  As such, this form of failure automatically requires a rebuild or 




An example of a catastrophic failure is the sudden collapse of a section of an ERS in hilly 
northern Manhattan onto the Henry Hudson Parkway in 2005.  On the other hand, non-
catastrophic failure, also known as performance failure, occurs when the service level of a 
system or infrastructure falls below a performance target that asset managers or decision makers 
have predetermined.  This type of failure can be restored by the asset manager, through the 
undertaking of a specific maintenance or rehabilitation procedure to restore the required level of 
service.  The cost of such restoration procedures is relatively cheaper than rebuilding the system 
or infrastructure.  However, a prolonged or unattended performance failure can lead to a 
catastrophic failure that requires complete replacement of a system or infrastructure.  On the 
contrary, unstable slopes (rockfalls or landslides) usually fail catastrophically due to their natural 
characteristics.  The consequences of occurrence of a rockfall or landslide depend on the extent 
of failure and their impact on the surrounding infrastructure, system users and surrounding 
communities.  Although their occurrence can be unpredictable, assessing their impact upon 
failure and instituting proactive mitigation strategies can reduce the probability and 
consequences of occurrence.      
2.1.3 Examples of Notable Failures of Ancillary Highway Assets 
Although the failure and occurrence rate of ancillary assets and hazards are relatively 
low, their consequences can sometimes be fatal, in addition to the consequential economic 
(direct and indirect) burden they present to asset managers and the system users.  Due to the low 
costs of these assets, usually, very few receive public or media attention when they fail, unless 
the failure involves fatalities or significant delay to system users.  Typically, the failure of these 
types of assets rarely results in safety concerns (i.e., injuries or fatalities).  However, the 




has to bear the cost of replacing or repairing the failed asset or clearing a roadway of debris 
resulting from a rockfall or landslide.  Usually, these repairs constitute emergency costs that are 
typically higher than routine or strategic programming cost (Anderson & Rivers, 2013).  
Similarly, indirect costs (i.e., costs to system users associated with delays and congestion) 
resulting from an asset failure or the occurrence of a rockfall or landslide become a burden to the 
taxpayer.  Ultimately, because ancillary assets occur in high volumes, accumulation of their 
failure impact over time can have significant impacts on an agency’s ability to achieve its 
strategic objectives.  This section presents some examples of asset and slope failures that had 
significant impacts enough to warrant public and media attention.  Figure 2.1 through Figure 2.7 
show examples of catastrophic or performance failure of a culvert, an ERS, cantilever sign 
structure, guardrail, sign, landslide, and rockfall hazard.   
Figure 2.1 is a result of a failed culvert on a portion of Interstate-88 in New York, in 
2006.  The failure resulted in two fatalities, loss of all four lanes and the entire median.  Figure 
2.2 shows the collapse of a section of an ERS in hilly northern Manhattan onto the Henry 
Hudson Parkway.  This failure occurred in 2005, and sent tons of dirt, rocks, and trees onto the 
roadway, stopping traffic for miles, and leading to the evacuation of nearby buildings.  Figure 
2.6 shows a rockfall incident on I-70 in Colorado, which created a hole in a bridge deck and 
caused the bridge to be closed down, causing 200 miles of detour affecting about 250,000 
vehicles a day (Anderson & Rivers, 2013).  In addition to these failures, Table 2.1 shows the 
documentation of a few culvert failures within the United States and their associated 





Figure 2.1Culvert failure on Interstate-88 in New York 






Figure 2.2 Failed ERS along Riverside Drive near Manhattan in New York 
(The New York Times, May 13, 2005)   
  
 
Figure 2.3 A Failed Cantilever Overhead-Sign Structure 





Figure 2.4 Underperforming Guardrails 
(Kim, et al., 2009) 
 
 





Figure 2.6 Rockfall in Glenwood Canyon, Colorado 
(Anderson & Rivers, 2013) 
 
 





Table 2.1 Examples of Culvert Failures and Consequences in the United States  







2.1.4 The Importance of Managing Ancillary Highway Assets 
Integrating AHA decision-support systems into TAM decision-making frameworks 
directly or indirectly offers beneficial returns to stakeholders (both owners and users).  Research 
suggests that the incremental benefits of asset management are difficult to measure explicitly.  
However, researchers have documented beneficial experiences of DOTs with matured asset 
management systems (EPA et al., 2009).  The primary reason for managing AHA is to reduce the 
costs associated with keeping these assets in a state-of-good repair, over their service lives.  
Another important reason for asset managers to systematically manage their ancillary 
assets is to reduce the risks associated with the failure of these assets, causing road closures, 
reducing capacity, and degrading the level of service (LOS).  Although AHA, in general, do not 
provide the primary service required of a transportation network, they, however, provide 
complementary services that affect the ultimate performance of a transportation network.  As 
such, the failure of ancillary assets can lead to the failure, or underperformance, of an entire road 
segment, corridor, or a network.  On the other hand, the better management of these asset 
categories can offer benefits as well.  Conversely, the underperformance (functional or 
condition) of ancillary assets presents potential risks liabilities to decision makers or 
transportation network users.  Examples of these risks are the inability for an agency to meet 
system performance/operational goals (e.g., safety or congestion goals) and strategic or 
organizational goals (e.g., avoiding emergency repair costs or legal liabilities, meeting federal 
requirements, or gaining public trust).  
2.2 Risk Management and Infrastructure Investment Decision Making 
Over the years, risk managers and decision makers have employed risk analysis as a decision aid.  




practitioners and decision makers consider risk a fundamental component of management.  
Certainly, risk applications for resource allocation and other functions can be found in the 
management of geographically-distributed critical infrastructure, such as transportation, waste 
water, and water infrastructure.  Indeed, several transportation agencies, both domestic and 
international, have acknowledged the significance of incorporating risk in their decision-making 
processes of budget planning and allocation, and project prioritization (Brutus & Tauber, 2009).  
In addition, the number of transportation agencies considering risk applications to enhance their 
TAM programs continues to increase (FHWA, 2005).  In the following subsections, the 
dissertation discusses risk decision making in general and explains some terminologies in risk 
decision making.  
2.2.1 Overview of Risk-based Decision Making 
Many organizations, or fields, have defined risk in diverse ways.  For example, the 
International Organization for Standards’ (ISO) 31000, which provides principles and generic 
guidelines on risk management, defines risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives (IIMM, 
2011).  Accordingly, on one hand, risk can be generally defined to include any event that can 
hinder an organization from achieving its goals.  When defined in this manner, risk is, therefore, 
categorized as only negative outcomes.  However, risk can also be classified as positive risk, in 
which case opportunities exist.  When opportunities are identified in the risk decision-making 
process, the practice presents prospects for decision makers to perform tradeoff analysis.  In this 
scenario, decision makers can conceptualize the benefits to their system if a performance target 
is lowered, and this can help them to think about their preferences in complex situations.  As 
such, decision makers can capitalize on the savings made for not undertaking a particular 




2.3 Key Terminologies of Risk 
In order for decision makers to address the risks inherent in the operation of their systems and in 
their business functions, they must understand the basic concepts and key terms that characterize 
the principles of risk.  As such, this dissertation provides the following definitions, as applied in 
this thesis.  Although there are no universally-accepted definitions for these terms, the 
clarification of the concepts and terminologies presented in this research is useful; therefore, the 
following discussion serves to provide a common vocabulary for this research to eliminate 
possible ambiguities. 
2.3.1 Hazard 
In general, a hazard is anything, active or inactive, that can cause harm to a person, an 
entity, or a system.  In our social everyday life, we deal with hazards consciously or 
unconsciously.  Fortunately, through experience, we are trained to deal with the hazards we 
encounter.  For example, crossing a major intersection is a hazard; however, we are trained to 
look in both directions of the road, to ensure that there are no approaching vehicles, and can thus 
mitigate or eliminate the impending hazard.  We can identify many of such examples in our 
everyday activities.  Similarly, in engineering and scientific systems, hazards exist.  Engineering 
systems, such as transportation, water, or nuclear systems, encounter many hazards.  System 
hazards can be natural or manmade.  Examples of natural hazards are earthquakes, hurricanes, 
rockfalls, landslides, or floods.  Manmade hazards can include failure to maintain systems to 
function properly or failure to implement an intervention at the appropriate time.  Generally, a 
transportation system is vulnerable to both natural and manmade hazards that need to be 




While manmade hazards can be easily identified and mitigated, natural hazards on the 
other hand are difficult to plan against.  Nonetheless, better assessment and preparation can help 
reduce the impacts and recovery time when natural hazards do occur.  Whether the hazard is 
voluntary or involuntary, there is the need to address it (i.e., identify and mitigate or eliminate 
the hazard).  To address potential hazards, risk analysts have to understand the magnitude of the 
hazards upon occurrence.  The magnitude of a hazard can be estimated by understanding the 
harm or the immediate danger it may cause and the extent to which the hazard will affect a 
system or users of a system when it occurs. 
2.3.2 Vulnerability 
A person or system’s inability to resist a hazard is the person or system’s measure of 
vulnerability.  In other words, vulnerability measures how a person or a system can withstand a 
potential hazard upon occurrence.  A system’s vulnerability to failure depends on many factors, 
such as the age of the system, the type of engineering design, or historical maintenance activities.  
Primarily, vulnerability of an asset to failure focuses on the assets’ conditions (Meyer, et al., 
2014).  Generally, through vulnerability assessment, one is able to identify which systems or 
assets are highly susceptible to failure.  Following this identification, decision makers can 
develop and institute the necessary mitigation procedures to ameliorate the situation.  For 
example, a culvert will be able to carry more storm-water to prevent flooding of a highway if 
preventive maintenance of the culvert is effective.  Accordingly, the culvert can be said to be less 
vulnerable to failure during a rain storm.     
Similarly, a rockfall may not reach the main travel lanes of a highway if an appropriate 
catchment area is designed.  Other examples also include building higher elevation bridges to 




several other situations that decrease or increase the vulnerability of a system to failure.  Systems 
engineers can identify such situations, so that they are well-informed in planning and 
programming to prevent disasters, reduce failure risks, or avoid unnecessary costs.  A vulnerable 
system can lead to loss of benefits, economic, social, or political.   
2.3.3 Uncertainty 
As a result of sparse data and incomplete knowledge of a system in the decision-making 
process, uncertainty arises (Harrrison, 2005).  Uncertainty also exists as a result of the inherent 
randomness associated with systems and events (Harrrison, 2005).  Three different types of 
errors contribute to uncertainty in risk-based decision making in infrastructure planning or 
management: data errors, modeling errors, and forecasting errors.  Decision makers make 
decisions using suitable available data by extrapolation.  The outcome of such extrapolations 
depends on the uncertainties surrounding the information that decision makers use.  For example, 
Amekudzi and McNeil demonstrate the impact of data and model uncertainties associated with 
highway investment needs analysis (Amekudzi & McNeil, 2000).  That is, how do these 
uncertainties impact the optimal solution?   
Other studies have also shown that making small adjustments to input parameters can 
significantly impact the optimal decisions of maintenance programs (Helton & Burnmaster, 
1996).  In fact, the level of confidence in the decisions made from the use of these outputs 
depends on the quality and accuracy of the input data.  Although practitioners can reduce these 
errors through the use of statistical models, it must be noted that the extent of reduction of these 
errors is limited.  Pate-Cornell discusses when and why a full uncertainty analysis is justified 
because of the complexity and cost involved (Pate-Cornell, 1996).  That is, decision makers can 




pending analysis.  Regardless of the cost, the process of reducing uncertainty helps to represent 
risks with increasing levels of confidence. 
2.3.4 Probability of Occurrence 
The probability of occurrence of an event or a hazard is a measure of the likelihood that 
the event or hazard will occur.  This likelihood can be measured either on a nominal or ordinal 
scale.  Depending on data availability, the probability of occurrence of some imminent event or 
hazard can sometimes be calculated precisely with no uncertainty.  On the other hand, the 
probability of occurrence of other rare hazards or events, however, are forecasted or predicted 
with a considerable amount of uncertainty, using sparse data or engineering judgment and expert 
knowledge.   
The ability of systems engineers to accurately estimate the likelihood of an event or a 
hazard leads to proper preparation or mitigation procedures to limit the negative impact and the 
extent of the event or hazard.  This process contributes to or ensures the reliability of a system.  
The reliability of a system is defined as the ability of the system to perform its design functions 
under designated operating or environmental conditions for a specified time period (Ayyub, 
2003).  In other words, the reliability of a system can be estimated from the system’s ability to 
perform in the face of the event or hazard occurring and disrupting the functions of the systems. 
As such, the reliability of a system can be represented as: 
Reliability= 1- Probability of occurrence/failure. 
2.3.5 Event Consequence 
The consequences of an event can be negative or positive.  The value of the consequence 
depends on the magnitude and extent of the loss or gain resulting from the event or hazard.  




engineering or systems operation, decision makers are mostly interested in identifying negative 
consequences since society does not condemn gains.  However, for budget planning and resource 
allocation utilization purposes, positive consequences or opportunities are critical for decision 
makers to evaluate tradeoffs.   
To facilitate effective risk analysis, it is imperative that decision makers quantify the 
consequences in terms of a measurable quantity (i.e., quantitative or qualitative).  Systems 
engineers or decision makers can accomplish this process by employing failure-consequence 
severities using relative or absolute measures for various types of consequences (Ayyub, 2003).  
This consequence quantification process is data intensive if decision makers use absolute 
measures to accomplish the task.  On the other hand, if data is sparse or limited, decision makers 
can quantify event consequences using relative measures. For the most part, the relative measure 
approach requires elicitation of expert knowledge and engineering judgments.  
2.3.6 Risks 
The potential for negative or positive events and consequences constitute opportunities 
for risk.  In the context of safety, risk is viewed as a negative consequence.  Thus, in a safety 
context, the focus of addressing risk is to mitigate the negative consequences.  As mentioned 
earlier, risk can be defined in various ways depending on context.  Despite the variations in all 
the definitions, they all acknowledge two main characteristics related to uncertainty and 
consequences.  The Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines risk as the chance of loss, the 
degree of probability of loss, the amount of possible loss, or the type of loss that an insurance 
policy covers.   
In the literature, the definition of risk usually makes reference to an uncertain cause that 




a risk event or threat.  In other words, risk exists only because there is uncertainty.  Therefore, 
one can characterize risk as a measure of some future uncertainties in achieving program 
performance goals and objectives, or fulfilling organizational business functions.  As such, once 
the uncertainty [or threat] is addressed, the risk due to the identified hazard or event seizes to 
exist.  Therefore, one cannot define the risk of a historical event or an event currently happening 
(Ayyub, 2003).  In risk decision making, decision makers are confronted with two types of 
threats that can result in negative risk situations.  Figure 2.8 shows a hierarchical structure of risk 
and threats as applied in infrastructure risk decision making.  Essentially, decision makers can 
categorize inherent threats as internal or external.  Primarily, internal threats result from events 
that can be controlled or influenced by the deliberate actions or inactions of decision makers.  In 
other words, decision makers or organizations have the capability to identify, address, or mitigate 
the effects of risks resulting from internal threats.  For instance, a timely maintenance 
intervention on transportation infrastructure can prevent failure (performance or catastrophic).  
On the other hand, a delayed intervention can result in infrastructure failure leading to unwanted 
risks.  
Conversely, decision makers or organizations have limited control on risks resulting from 
external threats.  That is, external threat events have actors that are beyond the control of 
organizations or decision makers.  Examples of external threats on transportation infrastructure 
are earthquake, flooding, and other natural disasters.  Other external threats also include actions 
and inactions of external agencies that work as partners or contractors with a primary 
organization or decision maker.  Although decision makers have limited control in mitigating 
external threats, better preparation to mitigate risks resulting from external threats can help 




Figure 2.8 Classification of Risks and Threats 
In the context of technical risk analysis, a numerical value is assigned to the risk (Lofsted 
& Boholm, 2009).  This value is obtained by multiplying the probability of the risk event by the 
consequence of the event, as illustrated by equation 2.1.  As an illustration, consider n potential 
consequences resulting from n potential likelihoods of future events.  Then, risk can be defined 
quantitatively as a collection of n pairs. 
Risk= {(L1,O1),……………………, (Ln,On)},…..equation 2.1 
where On and Ln denote the consequences (i.e., outcomes) of n and its likelihood, respectively.  
However, the formulation of risk in this form for decision making fails to incorporate the societal 
dimensions of risk (i.e., the political and ethical dimensions of risk are not taken into account) 
(Lofsted & Boholm, 2009).   
 Ultimately, a good risk program should address the potential variations that may result 
between the planned approach and the expected outcome.  This characterization of risk, 
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therefore, involves both positive and negative dimensions of the planning processes.  Since 
opportunities contribute to better outcomes whereas negative dimensions take away from the 
possibility of achieving possible goals, programs tend to suffer mostly from the negative effects; 
hence, decision makers and program managers are usually more concerned with the negative 
effects for better operations. 
2.3.7 Risk Appetite and Tolerance  
Risk appetite is a fundamental consideration in any risk management approach.  The risk 
appetite of an individual or an organization measures the nature and the extent of the significant 
risk an individual or an organization is willing to accept to achieve its strategic and operational 
objectives.  Guide 73 of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO, 2002) defines 
risk appetite as the “amount and type of risk that an organization is willing to pursue or retain.”  
Basically, the risk appetite of a decision maker or an entity defines the boundaries or thresholds 
of risk and the type of treatment (mitigation procedure) to apply.  Risk appetite can vary among 
or within an organization, as well as decision makers.  Risk appetite tends to be dynamic in 
nature, developing from the existing situation of the organization in terms of achieving its 
strategic and operational objectives.  Depending on the risk appetite of an entity, risk managers 
or decision makers can be classified into three categories of risk takers:  risk seeking, risk averse, 
or risk neutral. 
While risk appetite defines or deals with identifying which risks a decision maker or an 
organization treats and how to treat the risk, on the other hand, risk tolerance determines the 
magnitude of risks that an organization or a decision maker is willing to deal with.  Decision 
makers or risk analysts express risk tolerance in absolute values, with respect to a performance 




tolerance as: “we will not accept more than x% speed reduction below the posted speed limit 
during peak hours.”  Without a well-defined and measurable risk tolerance level, the risk 
management process becomes ineffective.  Although risk tolerance is practically difficult to set, 
the literature offers decision makers and risk managers some guiding principles to accomplish 
this process (Anderson R. , 2011).  The concepts of risk appetite and tolerance, and performance 
measures are interrelated in risk management and decision making.   
Although system analysts and decision makers are usually comfortable in setting 
performance targets, these professionals find it very challenging in doing the same for the other 
two variables: risk appetite and risk tolerance.  This challenge is due to the fact that decision 
makers, especially in the public sector, are unwilling to accept legal liabilities in choosing and 
documenting such measures knowing that some adverse events may occur where the safety and 
the welfare of the general public is at stake.  Unlike the public sector, the private sector is able to 
select and document appropriate risk appetite and risk tolerance levels because their decisions 
are driven by profit.  Figure 2.9 to Figure 2.13 explain the relationships among these concepts 
(Anderson R. , 2011).  Figure 2.11illustrates the risk universe of an organization; defined as the 
full range of risks which could impact, either positively or negatively, on the ability of the 















Figure 2.11 Agency Risk Universe Level 
 
 






Figure 2.13 Agency Risk Appetite Level 
2.4 Types of Risk Analysis Levels 
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) and FHWA recognize that risk 
management is critical to the transportation asset management programs DOTs have (FHWA, 
August 2012).  The purpose of addressing risk in the planning, construction, operation, and 
maintenance phases of transportation infrastructure is to help ensure decision makers allocate 
and utilize resources effectively to meet strategic and operational objectives of their organization 
over the life cycle of their assets.  The process also helps decision makers to communicate to 
stakeholders (including system users) the procedure of uncovering, determining the scope of, and 
managing all the levels of uncertainties.   
Since risk can be associated with all aspects of an agency’s activities, it is important to 
distinguish the different levels of risk management to help decision makers in addressing 
uncertainties.  In fact, the objectives and events a decision maker considers during the risk 
assessment determine the scope or level of risk under consideration.  For instance, in dealing 




categories of risk an organization can deal with: strategic, operational, and institutional (USDHS, 
2011).  Table 2.2 defines and describes all these categories of risk.  Similarly, in infrastructure 
management, decision makers deal with risk at the project, system/operational, program, and 
enterprise/strategic level.  To effectively manage these types of risk, decision makers must scope 
and understand the level they are dealing with and how the level of uncertainties impact the 
activities of their agency.  
Project risk analysis, which is the lowest form of risk analysis, deals with the risk 
associated with different projects.  Examples of risks that decision makers or risk managers 
encounter include the risk of cost overrun, scheduling, or safety at the job site. 
System/operational risk analysis involves risk associated with performance, condition, or failure 
of the physical infrastructure or the network as an entity.  Enterprise risk analysis, which is the 
highest form of risk analysis, on the other hand, deals with risk associated with an entire 
organization and its business practices.   
Examples that illustrate enterprise risk include the risk of losing experienced personnel 
with no immediate replacement, the risk of not meeting legislative mandates, or the risk of 
change in a politically-elected official who supports a direction the agency has embarked.  
Enterprise-risk management recognizes the fundamental importance of proper management of 
risks associated with a transportation agency’s functions and activities.  In-between these two is 





Table 2.2 DHS Categorization of Risk 
(USDHS, 2011)  
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position itself to 
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procedures that enable 
an organization to 
achieve its mission 
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These risks are less 
obvious and typically 
come from within an 
organization.  
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2.5 Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
Risks associated with the failure of AHA (operational risk), or the risks associated with an 
agency’s inability to meet legislative mandates or budget (strategic/enterprise risk) can be 
managed effectively only if the risks are assessed correctly.  The meaning of the term 
management may vary in many ways depending on the discipline and/or context in which it is 
used (Haimes, 2009).  Risk assessment and risk management, which remain essential 




risk management is sometimes used to describe both the risk assessment and risk management 
processes (Haimes, 2009).  Risk assessment refers to the scientific process of measuring risks in 
a quantitative and practical manner.   
 Kaplan and Garrick describe the risk assessment process as an attempt to answer a set of 
three questions: What can go wrong, what is the likelihood that it would go wrong, and what are 
the consequences?  (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981).  Through these three questions, the inherent risks 
are identified, measured, quantified, and evaluated, and subsequently, their consequences and 
impacts established.  Effectively, the risk assessment process objectively accomplishes an 
assessment to foresee negative effects or hazards and to identify opportunities.  Subsequently, 
risk managers and decision makers can use this information to minimize adverse consequences 
while they also capitalize on rising opportunities.  The assessment process identifies a single 
event or a sequence of events that can lead to these adverse consequences or otherwise.  These 
single events or sequences of events are called scenarios.   
 Examples of such events, in terms of systems operational risk, could be the failure of a 
traffic signal, the failure of a pavement marking, the failure of a sign, the occurrence of a 
sinkhole, rockfall/landslide, or the failure of a culvert.  Any of these events can lead to 
consequences: higher costs of repair, reduction in segment capacity, reduction in corridor or 
network mobility, fatalities, or delay in travel time.  The risk assessment process is dependent on 
data quality, the views, the knowledge, and the experience of individuals or experts. 
 Unlike risk assessment, risk management is a qualitative process that involves the 
selection and implementation of a risk mitigation strategy that alleviates or accepts the specific 
risk under consideration (Haimes, 2009).  As such, a risk management process requires risk 




uncertainties in a proactive manner in order to minimize threats, maximize opportunities, and 
optimize achievement of objectives, is a proper platform for solving critical infrastructure 
preservation tasks.  That is, risk management is performed within an economic framework, so 
that decision makers can optimize their resource allocation and utilization decision-making 
process (Ayyub, 2003).   
 In addition, the risk management process attempts to answer three main questions 
(Haimes, 2009): What are the available options, what are the associated tradeoffs, and what are 
the impacts of current decisions on future options?  These questions build up from the risk 
assessment process.  The last question, which evaluates the impacts of current decisions on 
future options, is the most critical of all the three questions, for managerial decision making 
(Haimes & Jiang, 2001).   
 In order to believe that a decision made is optimal or reflects the desired tradeoffs of 
decision makers and their stakeholders, policy makers would have to ascertain that they have 
reasonably optimized the benefits of current decisions with respect to future options.  This is 
achieved by weighing the negative and positive effects of current decisions on future decisions.  
In the context of transportation asset management, AASHTO defines risk management as “a 
process of identifying sources of risk, evaluating them, and integrating mitigation actions and 
strategies into routine business functions of the agency” (AASHTO, 2011).  This definition 
implies that risk management is an ongoing process that continues throughout the existence of an 
organization.    
2.6 Risk Management Plan 
In the previous sections, risk and risk management have been carefully discussed.  Risk is an 




or objectives.  Risk Management is the process of identifying, assessing, responding to, 
monitoring and controlling, and reporting risks.  The success of every program within an 
organization depends on the plan in place for the execution of the program.  Similarly, for a risk 
management program to produce any meaningful results, decision makers will have to establish a 
well-defined plan that guides the process.  Thus, a risk management plan defines how the risks 
associated with an organization or a program will be identified, analyzed, and managed.  The 
main purpose of a risk management plan is to outline how an organization performs, records, and 
monitors all risk management activities throughout the organization.  A risk plan also provides 
decision makers and risk managers with procedures for prioritizing risks.  Essentially, a risk 
management plan documents the practices, responsibilities, tools, and procedures that decision 
makers or risk managers will use to manage and control those events that can impact (positive or 
negative) the goals and objectives of an organization. 
 In the process of developing a risk management plan, there exists a variety of standards 
that one can use as a guide.  Usually, the guide one adopts depends on the background or field of 
the practitioner.  However, in infrastructure management, there are some authoritative documents 
that provide useful guidelines for developing a risk management plan: the international 
infrastructure management manual and ISO 31000.  These documents enable one to build a 
systematic risk process capable of transforming an organization’s goals into reality while 
reducing their risks.  For an organization to experience the full benefits of its risk management 
program, risks related to the organization and its infrastructure must be properly identified and 
documented based on a systematic methodology within proper and workable guidelines.  With 
the help of these guidelines or risk management plan, decision makers or risk managers can take 




ameliorate business and operational risks.  Indeed, decision makers or risk managers can prevent 
small events from evolving into major issues or emergencies by developing an effective risk 
management plan.  Ultimately, a risk management plan can help decision makers in dealing with 
adverse situations when they arise and, hopefully, identify and deal with these situations before 
they occur.  Over the long term, transportation practitioners can benefit from developing 
practical risk management plans for their transportation systems.  Fortunately, MAP-21 
establishes a provision that requires State DOTs to institute this obligation. 
2.7 Risk Management Framework 
A risk management framework is a set of components that support and sustain risk management 
throughout an organization (ISO, 2009).  These components range from identification of a 
problem to mitigation practices.  The structure of a risk management framework is illustrated in a 
variety of ways in the literature.  However, these structures often share common steps, although 
sometimes different terminologies are used to describe the same step.  That is, even though these 
risk frameworks can be different terminologically, they are similar in functional elements and 
process.  This situation arises as a result of different fields adopting different languages.  One can 
be certain that the type of structure or terms one uses in developing a risk management 
framework is influenced by many different international standards, such as the Canadian risk 
standards, Australian-New Zealand risk standards, or the ISO standards.  There are some other 
agency standards that have emerged and influenced the way decision makers structure their risk 
frameworks.  Examples of these agencies include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), 
and other agencies.  Figure 2.14 illustrates a typical FHWA risk management framework.  





Figure 2.14 Typical Risk Management Framework 
 (AASHTO, 2011) 
 
This framework outlines the typical seven-step process of managing risk.  This outline is a 
generic structure which does not include specific steps that will be relevant only to specific 
applications.  However, the outlined steps cover all the necessary steps relevant for undertaking 
any risk management task.  In this scenario, the risk management process refers to the initial step 
of establishing context through to the mitigation and monitoring processes.  It is important to 
note that the directional arrows do not necessary imply the process is a unidirectional process but 
rather an iterative procedure.  As such, a task one undertakes or information one acquires now is 
capable of informing a prior task and hence influencing a change in practice at that level or step.  
That is, each activity one undertakes at each step is an opportunity to improve or inform other 
steps and, eventually, the entire risk management process.   
2.8 Risk Quantification Methods 
Within a risk framework exists the risk assessment step that basically involves the process of 
quantifying, classifying, and evaluating the risk.  The process of quantifying risk remains 
challenging to infrastructure managers especially when data is scarce, when dealing with multi-
dimensional risks, or when one cannot assign exact value to an outcome.  Traditionally, analysts 




consequences of the event as it occurs.  However, this form of risk quantification and other 
methods, such as the Monte Carlo simulation, require specific intensive data (e.g., monetary 
values and probability functions) associated with the risk event.  For one to employ this approach 
of quantifying risk, one must be in a better position of assessing statistical/historic data as well as 
defining a probability distribution that characterizes the event.  However, with continual 
advances in decision making, the need to consider risk in novel areas of decision making, and the 
lack of specific data have rendered this approach of quantifying risk less practical.   
For example, the needs to consider risk as a multifaceted problem and in other decision 
quarters, that have limited data, have led to other novel approaches in risk quantification.  
Although some of the emerging techniques are less quantitative-based, analysts are developing 
more robust techniques that combine both qualitative and limited quantitative information to 
make the decision process more objective.  These efforts come as a result of the increasing 
pressure for more quantitative risk assessment practices.  In determining the appropriate 
technique to adopt in the estimation process, researchers or practitioners can use the following 
guiding questions (Hubbard, 2010):  1) what are the parts of the problem one is uncertain about?  
2) How has the problem been treated previously by others?  3) How do the “observables” 
identified lend themselves to measurements?  4) How much do we really need to measure?  5) 
What are the sources of error?  6) What instrument (survey, test, etc.) do we select?  In the 
following sections, the dissertation discusses two most common risk methods analysts are 
employing to quantify risk; especially, in transportation asset management and other areas, such 




2.8.1 Expert Opinion 
The use of expert opinion in decision analysis has been around for a long time.  The 
benefits of such a tool in decision analysis and policy development are capable of transforming 
the risk quantification process of risk management.  In fact, expert opinion is an extremely useful 
tool in risk assessment if employed and used cautiously.  This type of approach to risk 
quantification is even more pertinent when data relevant for assessing the elements of risk are 
not available, limited, or scarce.  For example, when one is starting to manage the risk of failure 
for a category of transportation infrastructure that does not have any inventory or condition data, 
the best approach is to start by soliciting expert opinion on the conditions, probability, and 
consequences of failure until such data has been fully collected as the process matures.   
Until complete and quality data becomes available, experts’ preferences are the only 
source of quantifying or assessing these variables (Hubbard, 2010).  One set-back to this 
approach is that the information one gathers from the experts are usually agency specific.  As 
such, using this data in different geographic regions will require additional efforts to validate the 
opinions with the experts in the particular organization of interest.  In gathering expert opinion, 
practitioners can choose from a diverse number of methods depending on some known 
influencing factors, such as accessibility of experts, time, and monetary resources.  Examples of 
opinion gathering techniques include brainstorming, risk workshops, or the Delphi method (see 
Chapter 4).  
2.8.2 Risk Matrix 
Risk matrices have become one of the most widely used tools in risk quantification, 
especially, when decision makers are dealing with qualitative or semi-quantitative data.  This 




infrastructure management, and natural disaster management fields.  The common form of a risk 
matrix is a two-dimensional figure that combines these two dimensions to categorize each risk 
event.  Typically, the probability and consequences of occurrence of the risk event under 
consideration make up the dimensions of the matrix.  Recent practice, however, has seen an 
evolution of the risk matrix into a multi-dimensional (i.e., more than two dimensions) figure, as 
decision makers continue to consider other facets of risk events.  Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16 
illustrate two typical structures of risk matrices.   
The use of nominal and ordinal categorization and risk matrix in risk estimation is very 
straightforward and simple making it increasingly attractive to risk analysts and modelers.  
However, the risk matrix’s penetration into the risk field comes with many criticisms from risk 
practitioners.  While some critique the risk matrix approach to risk quantification as fallacious, 
others believe that its shortcomings are compensated for by its simplicity.  It is important for 
analysts to note that the strength of a risk matrix is only for comparative ranking.  That is, the 
risk matrix alone cannot offer decision makers enough information about a risk event except by 
indicating which risk event is really bad and which one is less so.  Making an informed-decision 
will require more information the risk matrix provides.  Information such as the causes of the 
risk event and the current mitigation actions in place at the organization will help decision 






Figure 2.15 A Two-dimensional Risk Matrix 
 
 
Figure 2.16 A Multi-dimensional Risk Matrix 
 (Major & O'Grady, 2010) 
2.9 Evolution of Department of Homeland Security Risk Assessment 
After the 2001 terrorists attack in the United States, risk assessment and management to 
safeguard US interests against future attacks escalated to an unprecedented level.  This change 




DHS involve the identification of threats resulting from terrorists’ attacks, assessment of risk, 
and communication of the information for decision making and resource allocation to cities.  
That is, information from the assessment process goes to inform the Homeland Security Grant 
Program (HSGP).  The HSGP is a grant allocation program that provides funding assistance to 
state and local agencies to strengthen security within their jurisdictions.  The duties of the DHS 
go beyond the prevention of terrorism to include natural disasters and pandemics.  However, 
most of the Department’s work is heavily directed towards terrorism [against cities and critical 
infrastructure].  In the early years of the DHS’ risk assessment process, very limited data was 
available to risk analysts.  Throughout the years though, the risk assessment methods of the DHS 
have evolved.  Specifically, this process has gone through three main changes.   
The first stage of the method basically characterizes risk as a function of population.  The 
second stage of risk method involves three criteria; threat, criticality, and population density.  
The current methodology, which focuses mostly on critical infrastructure risks, classifies risk as 
a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence.  That is, the risk associated with the failure 
of a critical infrastructure is given as a product of the three criteria (𝑅 = 𝑇 ∗ 𝑉 ∗ 𝐶).  Again, the 
most challenging aspect for DHS implementing these methodologies is the lack of historic data.  
However, these challenges are overcome by the use of other techniques, such as subject matter 
estimates (SME) (CRDHSA and NRC, 2010).  Figure 2.17 shows a timeline evolution of DHS 





Figure 2.17 Timeline of DHS Risk Assessment Methodologies  
(CRDHSA and NRC, 2010) 
2.10 Application of Risk Management in Transportation Asset Management 
In the literature, practitioners and researchers have applied risk concepts in managing and 
preserving transportation infrastructure.  In fact, practitioners and researchers have applied risk 
in diverse ways pertaining to the management of the physical transportation infrastructure: in 
climate change adaptation and asset management (Meyer et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2010).  
Largely, researchers have used these concepts in managing bridges and pavements.  For 
example, Queensland, Australia assesses the risk (product of probability of failure and 
consequence of failure) posed by a bridge, using a model called Whichbridge.  The model 
computes a numerical value for each bridge using variables such as the condition of the bridge 
components, environmental impacts, component materials, design standards, and traffic volume.  
The probability of failure is expressed as a function of such variables as loading, resistance, 




using variables such as human factors, environmental, traffic access, economic, road 
significance, and industry.  Using these variables, the system relatively ranks each asset on risk 
exposure and safety conditions.  This implies that each asset’s risk is not absolute, but relative to 
the other alternatives in the selection pool (FHWA, 2005).   
Similarly, Perrone et al. (1998) developed a model that accounts for the variability in life 
cycle cost analysis of pavement projects, as a measure of risk for each project alternative 
(Perrone et al., 1998).  In their paper, the authors discuss the development of life cycle cost 
analysis procedure that accounts for the variability in the input variables and their effects on the 
life cycle costs of pavement treatment alternatives.  The authors argue that there exists some 
variability among the factors used for life cycle cost analysis.  As such, using historical data and 
expert judgment, one can estimate a distribution for these factors over the life cycle of a 
pavement.  Consequently, one can adopt these distributions as input variables for the analysis.  
Essentially, the risk of each alternative project is measured to be proportional to the standard 
deviation of the distribution of total life cycle cost.  Effectively, a higher standard deviation 
corresponds to higher uncertainty about the actual cost value, and hence higher risk. 
In addition, in the application of risk in transportation decision making, VanDyke et al. 
(2014) developed a model that estimates risk profiles for Georgia’s Interstate Highway System.  
The developed approach employs condition and performance data on pavements and bridges and 
economic impact assessment for the Interstate to characterize risk.  This two dimensional 
approach of risk estimation provides insight to Georgia Department of Transportation asset 
management decision making process.  The authors focus on internal risks.  These include risks 
that can be mitigated through proactive maintenance activities, and therefore known as 




asset’s vulnerability to performance failure.  Each asset is assessed on a scale of 0 to 1, and 
higher scores are assigned higher priority.  The economic dimension of the framework captures 
the consequences resulting from the failure of an asset.  Each asset is assessed on a scale of 0 to 
100.  Higher scores indicate larger impact assets and assigned higher priority.  A risk matrix is 
then used to combine these two risk dimensions to estimate an overall risk score for each asset.  
This approach allows GDOT to rank each asset on three preservation priority scales (i.e., low, 
medium, or high).  The following paragraphs present some additional findings on risk 
applications in TAM as reported by Boadi (2011).  
Furthermore, Li et al. (2009) also proposed an uncertainty-based methodology that 
incorporates certainty, risk, and uncertainty inherent in input factors such as highway agency 
cost, traffic growth rates, and discount rates used in the computation of highway project-level 
lifecycle benefit or cost.  The methodology, therefore, addresses a limitation that existing 
project-level lifecycle cost analysis approaches encounter.  The study found significant 
differences between scenarios with and without uncertainty considerations.  As a result of the 
large data requirements, the application of the methodology could be limited to only state and 
large-scale local transportation agencies because of the amount and level of historical data they 
maintain.  
Likewise, Dicdican and Haimes’ (2004) study on highway infrastructure develops a 
systematic risk-based asset management methodology to manage the maintenance of highway 
infrastructure systems.  The decision-making methodology developed can enable the 
harmonization and coordination of actions of different units and levels in a hierarchical 
organization.  The framework uses a multiobjective decision tree for analysis to validate the 




distinguish actions in the present from those in the future.   The systemic methodology also 
enables organizations to prioritize assets for maintenance while addressing the potential for 
extreme events.  The costs, benefits, and risks of maintenance and inspection policies are 
balanced by the methodology and applied to the various types of assets.  The methodology 
suggested by this paper adopts three objective functions in the options and strategies evaluation 
process: minimizing short-term cost, minimizing long-term cost, and maximizing the remaining 
service life of highway assets.  The researchers used a constraint function, which enables the 
method to eliminate infeasible options by coordinating the remaining service life across assets.  
The methodology is not only applicable to highway infrastructure systems, but it can also be 
applied to the management of large-scale dynamic systems that exhibit similar characteristics as 
those of highway systems.   
In addition to these studies, Salgado et al. (2010) reviewed some approaches to 
developing a model based on expert opinion for critical infrastructure risks assessment and 
vulnerability analysis.  The researchers addressed the challenges (i.e., obtaining estimates for the 
probabilities of the initiating events as well as obtaining values for the associated consequences) 
in performing quantitative risk assessment of very rare events by reviewing Dempster-Shafer and 
Fuzzy approaches to elicit expert opinions.   
Furthermore, Parsons Brinckerhoff et al. (2009) developed the Highway Agency’s 
Adaptation Framework Model (HAAFM), which provides a seven-stage process that identifies 
activities that will be affected by a changing climate, determines associated risks and 
opportunities, and identifies preferred options for mitigating them.  The researchers identified 
over 80 highway agency activities or vulnerabilities that may be affected by climate change.  The 




expected to be materially affected by current predicted levels of climate change within their 
relevant asset life or activity time horizon.  Another finding of the study by Parsons Brinckerhoff 
et al. is that the risk appraisal enabled vulnerabilities to be prioritized for attention based upon 
several criteria including their potential to disrupt the operation of the strategic road network.  
Mainly, prior efforts in risk-based transportation asset management have been limited to bridges 
and pavements, as well as treated in silo systems.  
 Recently though, practitioners and researchers have been investigating and applying these 
risk concepts in resource allocation and utilization to manage and preserve other pertinent 
highway infrastructure and hazards, such as culverts, guardrails, signals, and unstable slope 
(rockfall and landslides) locations.  The early work in this area has primarily focused on 
developing and establishing applicable risk frameworks capable of phasing in this infrastructure 
or hazards into an agency’s systematic management system.  For instance, Amekudzi et al. 
developed a risk-based cost-benefit framework to help asset managers make a business case to 
decision makers the need for a comprehensive asset management; i.e., to prioritize other assets 
for inclusion in formal asset management programs (Amekudzi et al., 2011).   
Likewise, NCHRP report 08-36 (2014) provides guidance on the application of asset 
management to selected ancillary assets.  This research provides DOTs with a classification 
hierarchy methodology to enable asset managers to prioritize ancillary highway assets and 
establish inventories and management systems for these assets.  The authors report that there are 
no industry standards for asset management of ancillary assets.  In addition, most DOTs 
managed their ancillary assets at the lowest maintainable unit.  As such, there is very little 




2.11 Overview of Federal Authorization Risk-based Asset Management 
Requirement  
The 2012 surface transportation bill (Map-21), over the long term, is going to impact the 
practices of transportation asset management in many diverse areas.  In fact, the bill introduces 
some key programmatic structural changes, one of which is the National Highway Performance 
Program (NHPP), which requires State DOTs to have a risk-based asset management plan to 
monitor the performance of their NHS.  The critical part of the bill is the penalty that comes with 
a failure to meet this provision.  As part of these provisions, State DOTs are required to develop 
a risk-based asset management plan that at a minimum includes bridges and pavements, with 
clear objectives and measures that allow for performance gap identification, lifecycle cost and 
risk management analysis that will inform a DOT’s financial plan and strategies.  The provisions 
also recommend that DOTs include other highway assets beyond pavements and bridges.  These 
requirements will undoubtedly require DOTs to develop practical, flexible, and effective risk 
assessment methods that will enable these required analyses.  This situation, therefore, creates 
gaps that researchers will need to bridge.     
2.12 Gap Analysis 
Based on the existing literature and practices, one can conclude that there is progress and 
evolution in the application of risk management in TAM.  However, there is lack of research in 
developing methods or tools that focus on an integrated approach to risk assessment in managing 
AHA and hazards.  In fact, the review of the literature revealed a significant number of studies 
that show a vertical (i.e., within a group of assets) risk management process, and mostly limited 
to the management of bridges and pavements with a few studies involving AHA.  Indeed, very 




different asset classes) decision-support framework for asset prioritization.  In essence, the 
literature review revealed a degree of risk management application in transportation asset 
management.  However, most of the studies focused on asset specific risk analysis and treatment, 
rather than an integrated corridor-level risk-based decision making.  Hence, novel approaches are 
required to bridge this gap and provide decision makers with decision-support tools that enable 
them to make a better use of the limited resources, preserve these assets, and improve system 
performance, while mitigating imminent risks.  Table 2.3 presents additional gaps that MAP-21 
presents and the way this research proposes to address the identified gaps. 
Table 2.3 MAP-21 Gaps and Research Remedies 
MAP-21 Requirement Shortcoming/Gap Research Remedy 
Develop performance- and 
risk-based planning for NHS: 
Only requires bridge and 
pavement infrastructure and 
recommends other 
infrastructure  
Provides no directions or 
guiding procedures in 
selecting which other assets 
to include  
Provides a risk-based 
systematic approach within 
the context of an agency to 
identify other high-risk 
assets  
Establish separate targets for 
each management system 
Encourages silo-form of 
systems management: 
Ineffective and inefficient 
approach 
Provides an integrated 
framework that allows asset 
managers to consider and 
monitor the performance of 












Chapter 3 CORRIDOR-LEVEL ASSET-SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Hierarchy of Transportation System Planning 
Federal, State, local, and private organizations that own large, complex, and geographically 
distributed infrastructure systems are always investigating efficient and effective ways to manage 
their assets.  The common practice has involved localized and standalone strategies in managing 
different asset categories.  That is, most management activities have focused on individual 
management of different asset categories through stand-alone systems management.  However, 
since these assets do not operate in isolation, this management practice (silo, stovepipe, or 
standalone systems management) becomes practically inefficient to strategize and allocate 
resources without considering integrated system management (ISM).   
ISM or planning enables an organization to holistically and comprehensively preserve 
infrastructure conditions as well as meet and improve both agency goals and customer 
expectations.  ISM applied in asset management planning reinforces integrated management 
practices, improves interagency sharing of information, and facilitates better communication of 
risk.  An integrated system-level approach to asset management provides a robust planning 
framework for decision makers.  Moreover, it allows decision makers to identify high-risk 
locations, highly vulnerable asset categories, and strategically prioritize and budget for projects 
or programs to mitigate inherent variability and risks. 
 In practice, one can identify a hierarchy in transportation system planning.  Typically, 
there are four levels in this hierarchy of system management in transportation planning.  Figure 
3.1 shows the levels and capacity at each level.  Network-level planning constitutes the highest 




interconnected streets, railways, transit lines, and pedestrian or bicycle infrastructure, or any 
structure that enables the movement of people and goods.  In network-level planning, 
transportation planning organizations (i.e., State, county, city DOTs, etc.) consider all routes 
(single or multi-modes) that provide inter-connected pathways between multiple locations.   
The next level at which transportation planning occurs is at the corridor level.  “A 
corridor is a defined section of the transportation pathway (right-of-way) that traverses and 
crosses natural and manufactured obstacles and provides for economic vitality by allowing for 
the safe and efficient movement of people and goods” (Anderson & Rivers, 2013).  At the 
corridor-level of systems management, a planning organization only considers parallel, possible 
competing routes (and modes if applicable) between locations, such as intersections, mile posts, 
monuments, or cities.  Similarly, route-level planning considers a single physical infrastructure 
pathway (e.g., highway, transit route, or bicycle route) that connects two defined locations or 
destinations.  Finally, project-level planning, which is the lowest level in transportation systems 
planning only deals with discrete initiatives that are geographically localized to an area (ATC, 
2006).  At each planning level, opportunities exist for decision makers to undertake ISM.  That 






Figure 3.1 Transportation Systems Planning Hierarchy 
Corridor-level treatment of a transportation system is not a new concept among 
transportation practitioners and decision makers.  In fact, in traffic management and operations, 
analysts have benefited from programming signals in a coordinated format to benefit an entire 
corridor.  Knowing that an underperforming signal, intersection, or link within a corridor can 
deteriorate the entire performance of a corridor, independent of how well all the other signals 
perform, traffic operations managers and analysts have successfully integrated corridor 
operations activities to implement integrated corridor-level traffic operations (Yang & Yagar, 
1994).   
Acknowledging that the reliability of traffic operations within a corridor is as strong as 
the weakest activity in the corridor, it is imperative that decision makers and analysts take a 
holistic and comprehensive approach in managing all systems, operational activities, or 
operational features that affect the performance of a transportation route, corridor, or network.  
In fact, transportation agencies and researchers are investigating integrated systems (i.e., multi-










(Krile, 2012).  Often, these efforts are targeted at reducing congestion, improving the movement 
of goods and services (i.e., considering multi-modal systems), and improving air quality.     
Similarly, in TAM, the performance of a road segment/route, corridor, or network is as 
reliable as the failure rate of the most vulnerable infrastructure or the probability of occurrence 
of the most imminent hazard.  As such, ensuring that all critical infrastructure or imminent 
hazards are considered in management procedures over a given corridor can help decision 
makers identify corridors that are highly vulnerable to failure, through the identification of these 
vulnerable categories of assets and imminent hazards.  Integrating these critical asset categories 
and potential hazards in corridor management offers better coordination of decisions horizontally 
and vertically across an agency.  This practice is known as an integrated corridor management 
(ICM).  In fact, ICM also creates opportunities for decision makers to target limited resources to 
areas of the highway network that really need improvement to mitigate or eliminate agency 
liabilities.  Essentially, corridor-level strategies help to achieve specific system and agency 
objectives, identify performance levels—i.e., current and anticipated—system challenges, and 
mitigation strategies to alleviate extreme consequences.    
3.2 Reliable Transportation Network 
DOTs (Federal, State, and county) and decision makers are responsible for delivering a safe, 
efficient, effective, accessible, and reliable transportation network to their customers or network 
users.  A reliable transportation network can be defined as one that is able to meet its goals 
without unexpected loss, or little loss in operational efficiency.  Essentially, a reliable 
transportation network is fundamental to the economic competitiveness of a nation, region, or 
community.  In addition, local governments and agencies rely on the performance of their 




transportation network encourages economic development and growth as well as reduces the 
risks (e.g., safety and mobility risks) associated with the failure of a network.  Ensuring such 
reliability requires that decision makers consider the synergistic effects among constituents of the 
network as a whole.   
For a transportation network that experiences a continual growth in demand while the 
majority of the infrastructure is approaching, has reached, or exceeded its service life, it is 
imperative that decision makers work towards minimizing the rate of network failures targeting 
highly vulnerable assets and highly critical corridors.  Providing a reliable transportation network 
means decision makers ensure that a transportation network performs at an acceptable minimum 
LOS.  This practice also means that enough redundancy is built into the transportation network to 
ensure that minimal failure points exist within the network to improve network resiliency; that is, 
to ensure that detour routes are functional to reduce total network breakdown.  The availability of 
these redundant routes provides the transportation network with an inherent ability to 
compensate for corridor failures.  Achieving this task basically requires a better understanding of 
the network, which means gathering additional and quality data on network components or 
infrastructure.  These practices offer good information for a risk assessment process.  
Arguably, it is not practical or affordable to build a 100 percent reliable, or zero-risk 
transportation network.  However, decision makers can define practical and acceptable reliability 
levels that are cost effective with positive return on investment (Fischhoff et al., 1980).  Studies 
show that an increasing number of agencies are currently gathering complete data on the 
networks they manage (Hawkins & Smadi, 2013).  However, not all of this data is used as part of 
agencies’ resource allocation decision-making process.  Most often, the data is for inventory 




data.  Accordingly, decision makers can make conscious decisions to improve their data 
gathering practices.  This initiative, if undertaken properly, will aid in improving the reliability 
of the transportation network as well as enabling decision makers to gain the trust and 
confidence of taxpayers and network users.  Finally, in dealing with network reliability, there are 
many factors that decision makers can consider.  For example, the number of elements that go 
into the definition of transportation network reliability depends on the objectives and goals of a 
DOT.  For instance, one may be interested in reliable flow of trucks in freight corridors because 
the agency may be interested in economic growth.  On the other hand, one may rather be 
interested in asset preservation, in which case the focus will be on ensuring that the entire 
infrastructure performs at or above a minimum LOS.  
3.3 Corridor-level Performance Assessment 
In corridor-level performance assessment, the focus is on the performance of respective corridors 
as a function of asset classes and hazards (management systems/threats) that exist on these 
corridors or the program types an agency maintains as part of their strategic management process 
(i.e., safety, mobility, or asset preservation programs).  Particularly, a major consideration in 
corridor performance assessment includes gathering quality quantitative condition data on 
infrastructure and the frequency of hazard occurrence data as well as operational performance 
data on programs.  Effectively, decision makers can define the reliability of a corridor based on 
the performance (conditions of physical infrastructure and hazards and operational performance 
of programs) of the corridor.   
For example, one can say that a corridor is highly reliable if none of the components 
(management systems or programs) of the corridor falls below a minimum performance level 




corridor will perform well in the future.  Figure 3.2 illustrates the three levels at which one can 
assess the performance of a corridor.  Program-level corridor assessment is implemented using 
all or critical strategic management programs, such as safety, mobility, air quality, congestion 
mitigation, asset preservation, etc., in assessing the performance of a corridor.  Specifically, 
program-level assessment involves the use of different management systems to assess the 
performance of a corridor.  Similarly, at the system level of corridor assessment, decision makers 
assess the performance of a corridor based on respective asset or hazard systems (e.g., culvert, 
unstable slopes, or guardrail management systems).  Finally, for a project-level corridor 
assessment, decision makers consider projects from respective management systems that fall 
within a corridor.  The ability of these projects to meet their respective systems’ goals offers an 
indication of the level of performance of the study corridor.     
  









Primarily, performance measures allow decision makers to quantify the consequences of 
their decisions.  In fact, the performance level of a corridor gives a measure of accomplishment 
relative to an agency’s objectives and goals.  Performance measures are applicable to all levels of 
transportation decision making: enterprise, network, corridor, route, and project.  Consequently, 
decision makers can rely on performance measures in corridor-level planning to identify 
alternatives for further analysis (risk analysis) or prioritization.  Corridor-level performance 
measures in asset management can encompass wider measures (program-level decision making) 
and core measures (system-level decision making) that reflect economic, social, or 
environmental issues.  For example, one can assess the performance of a corridor on respective 
systems (i.e., system-level decision making) or among systems (i.e., program-level decision 
making): safety, congestion, accessibility, or asset preservation.  Ultimately, decision makers can 
evaluate the performance of a corridor at different levels.  Decision makers can develop 
measures to assess all these areas of performance.  In asset preservation, examples of corridor 
measures may include, but are not limited to, slope stability, structural deficiency of culverts, 
pavement roughness, etc.  Considering all these facets of performance and associated uncertainty 
allows decision makers to identify plausible alternatives, plan appropriate budgets, and hence 
reduce their liability for risks.   
 Generally, corridors have different functional characteristics (i.e., Interstate highway, 
non-Interstate highway, NHS, or arterial) and, therefore, it is possible for decision makers to 
assess corridor performance based on different standards.  The functional importance of a 
corridor will define the level of assessment applicable.  That is, a rural corridor will not have the 
same level of priority as an urban corridor.  Primarily, performance measures may vary between 




corridors A and B.  If corridor A serves a high percentage of truck volume traffic and it is an 
essential link to a commercial or industry area, decision makers will expect such a corridor to 
perform highly or efficiently when assessed on economic performance than route B, which has 
only few truck traffic and only serves rural traffic.  Fundamentally, high-priority corridors are 
expected to perform relatively better than low-priority corridors.  By asserting individual levels 
of performance measures for corridors of different or similar characteristics, decision makers are 
able to identify and gain insight to locations that will yield relatively better returns if resources 
are invested.  Ultimately, the performance assessment process an agency adopts must align with 
the goals and objectives of the organization.     
3.4 System-of-Systems (SoS) Approach 
“A system-of-systems is a set or arrangement of interdependent systems that are related or 
connected to provide a given capability.  The loss of any part of the system will degrade the 
performance or capabilities of the whole” (CJCSM, 2004).  A transportation network is an 
example of a SoS.  Typically, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, a transportation network may consist of 
subsystems such as bridges, roadway pavement, traffic signals, and other supporting systems 
such as guardrail, pavement markings, signs, retaining walls, and culverts.  Although these 
individual systems serve particular purposes, a reduction in performance or loss of one 
subsystem can adversely impact the ultimate performance of the entire transportation network.  
Typically, DOTs maintain separate (silo) management systems for each subsystem.  In other 
words, the performance of a transportation network depends on how well the individual 
subsystems perform.  Primarily, unmanaged subsystem component failures are the likely risk 
sources.  Particularly, as the condition of assets deteriorates due to usage and aging, with no 




and reliability decreases.  Reversing these negative impacts, therefore, requires decision makers 
to choose strategies pertaining to an SoS framework. 
 
Figure 3.3 System-of-systems Tools for Transportation Infrastructure Management 
Systems 
One can describe a transportation network as a chain consisting of separate links.  Each 
link represents a corridor or segment of roadway and the strength of each link represents the 
collective effect or performance of all the programs within the corridor.  However, the programs 
include major subsystems, pavements and bridges, which are the core components of each link.  
As such, one can conclude that a transportation network with well-performing pavements and 
bridges can offer an acceptable reliable service to its users.  Fortunately, most often, these 
subsystems are not arranged in a series format.  Accordingly, a failure in one subsystem does not 
result in automatic failure of an entire segment, link, corridor, or network.  For instance, consider 
a transportation network with excellent pavement conditions but poor-conditioned guardrail 




pavement condition, the safety risks that exist within the network provide setbacks with respect 
to the safety objective or goal of the agency.  Accordingly, an ICM or SoS approach to a risk-
based asset management is one approach decision makers can use to effectively and efficiently 
distribute limited resources among programs, systems, or projects.   
Largely, this approach allows decision makers to consider all critical sub management 
systems in their asset management plan.  In addition, an integrated SoS approach to asset 
management facilitates coordinated maintenance procedures, which reduce system interruptions 
due to scheduled maintenance.  For agencies to efficiently utilize their limited resources, 
improve their planning efforts as well as optimize the performance of their systems, a SoS view 
of management systems is an effective way forward.  However, this approach should not be seen 
as a replacement to subsystem, standalone, or silo management; rather these approaches should 
complement one other to enhance the risk management plan of an organization.  That is, both 
horizontal and vertical systems management are equally important.  Indeed, an SoS approach in 
management helps in identifying, quantifying, and evaluating risks, uncertainties, and variability 
within the decision-making process (Haimes, 2009).  Although this approach offers great 
benefits, the lack of good data on some of these subsystems can be discouraging.  As such, 
decision makers, practitioners, and analysts can make use of expert opinion and understand this 
process is not static but should evolve over time as individual subsystems mature and the overall 
level of integration increases, as additional data becomes available. 
The level of system integration or SoS management depends on diverse factors: resources 
limitation, criticality of asset category to agency goals and objectives, or return on investment the 
asset category offers.  Due to varying agency size, difference in fundamental goals and 




a different level of criticality.  In fact, it is possible to find different regions within an agency, 
typically larger agencies, that may treat different categories of assets with different levels of 
priority.  For example, consider a DOT with different geographic characteristics.  That is, one 
region or district may be dealing with roads along the mountains and will, therefore, be 
interested in ensuring that rockfall or landslide locations are stable, or the integrity of all 
guardrails along these corridors are high.  On the other hand, another region or district may be 
battling with roadway flooding during rainy season, and so will be interested in improving the 
flow performance of their culverts.  In effect, as an agency considers an SoS management 
approach, it is important that they contextualize the approach in different geopolitical regions as 
not all regions or districts within the agency may have the same challenges.   
3.5 Challenges in Implementing SoS Management 
Although an SoS approach to asset management offers unlimited benefits, there also arise 
common challenges that may include both technical intricacy and business procedures.  A variety 
of challenges may arise as agencies make efforts to implement a SoS risk analysis or 
management.  In fact, as an agency moves towards a SoS risk management, data integration will 
be one procedure vital to the success of this management style.  The Data Integration Primer 
defines data integration as “the method by which multiple data sets from a variety of sources can 
be combined or linked to provide a more unified picture of what the data means and how they 
can be applied to solve problems and make informed decisions that relate to the stewardship of 
transportation infrastructure assets” (OAM, et al., 1999).  Accomplishing complete or useful data 
integration involves a myriad of challenges one needs to overcome.  These challenges, as stated 
earlier, can be cultural and/or technical.  The Data Integration Primer outlines a few familiar 




early stages of the process can offer many incentives in the long term.  Currently, since most of 
the transportation subsystems are managed in the silo form, it is possible to find different 
categories of asset systems housed with different database systems that are built in-house or 
purchased from different systems developers.   
This common practice has led to a lack of uniformity among the systems currently 
available in DOTs.  Some of these standalone database systems may be incompatible with each 
other.  Others may as well be outdated technologies that do not meet the expanding needs of 
modern technology.  Addressing this challenge and moving towards a compatible future will 
require decision makers to make several adjustments in building future database systems.  For 
one, decision makers, analysts, and asset managers can build responsive database systems.  
These systems support existing applications while remaining responsive to future changes.  
Adopting this strategy will increase an agency’s long-term enterprise productivity.  As agencies 
invest in gathering data, they must make effective use of the data resources available.  In fact, 
Matheus et al., (1993), observed that organizational data is still largely unrecognized, 
inaccessible, and underutilized.  Therefore, systems managers can develop strategic data 
modeling and enterprise database designs that offer analysts the capacity to manage and utilize 
available data.  
Moreover, since SoS risk analysis involves experts with different backgrounds, there is 
the propensity to have different perspectives in defining system objectives, concerns, and expert 
preferences.  Although perspectives can be equally valid, the resulting competing and conflicting 
views can influence the selection of model variables, problem formulation, and preference 
setting.  Generally, these challenges may seem to be a setback.  However, experts’ different 




system, resulting in a more robust characterization of the system.  Hartfield and Hipel observed 
that, by explicitly stating the differences between assumptions influencing models, these models 
can help stakeholders uncover and resolve any controversy (Hatfield & Hipel, 2002).  
Eventually, this exercise enables decision makers to make informed decisions concerning a 
system.   
3.6 Spatial Analysis and Corridor-level or Integrated Asset Management 
Spatial analysis provides a set of techniques for analyzing spatial data.  The results of spatial 
analysis are dependent on the relative locations of the objects being analyzed.  Software that 
implements spatial analysis techniques requires access to both the locations of objects and their 
attributes.  In corridor-level planning or integrated asset management, location identification is 
very critical.  The ability of analysts to align all categories of asset within a corridor enhances 
their ability to assess the performance of the corridor in its entirety.  A Geographic Information 
System, GIS, is a typical spatial analysis tool employed in asset management that allows decision 
makers to spatially analyze data and visualize them concurrently.  Tools, such as ArcView GIS, 
offer decision makers and analysts a unique opportunity to undertake corridor-level planning or 
integrated asset management with more efficient and effective data collection, analysis, and 
alternative evaluation.  The ability of analysts to present visualized data allows them to 
communicate easily and effectively with decision makers.  Further, spatial analyses allow 
analysts to perform quick spatial or attribute selection for further investigation.  Analysts can 
also use spatial analysis to determine correlations among factors, such as route locations and risk 
levels, or route vulnerability and geographic locations.  
 Admittedly, GIS can play a functional role in decision making related to corridor-level 




approach to data collection involves the use of GIS applications.  However, since there are no 
current standards in the collection of data, a variety of datasets with varying attributes currently 
exists.  The completeness of a geographic database of assets complements a corridor-level 
planning or analysis.  As such, decision makers or asset managers can perceive the need to 
develop appropriate databases that enhance spatial analysis as an incentive to developing an 
integrated asset management framework.  Spatial analyses offer decision makers the ability to 
evaluate alternatives considering multiple criteria that may not necessarily be built into 
systematic algorithms.  For instance, visualizing the proximity of scheduled projects or programs 
to each other can enable decision makers to schedule these projects or programs simultaneously 
to limit network interruptions due to road closures for maintenance or rehabilitation purposes.   
Ultimately, spatially enabled datasets can support data analysis based on geographic 
location, such as representing data on maps in various spatial or geographic contexts, and 
determining proximity, adjacency, and other location-based relationships among infrastructure, 
corridors, and regions.  For example, decision makers are able to visually ascertain the 
distribution of problem areas—high risk locations, geographic regions with vast numbers of 
vulnerable corridors or asset classes—and prioritize projects or programs accordingly.  In 
addition, spatial analysis in corridor-level planning helps in dealing with the problem of equity -- 
that is, selecting projects and distributing resources such that certain regions are not at a 
disadvantage.  Visualizing assets, routes, corridors, and regional boundaries in a single view 
offers decision makers a broader view to manage the diverse demographic patterns within their 
jurisdictions and prioritize projects accordingly to address resources distribution equity. 
 Finally, as mentioned earlier, corridor-level asset management planning must be 




have access to complete spatial data.  It is, therefore, imperative that asset managers develop 
spatial data-collection strategies, in conjunction with condition data, for each sub-category of 
assets that is critical to the objectives and goals of the concerned organization.  By combining 
spatial analysis with SoS corridor-level asset management practices, decision makers will be able 
to efficiently utilize limited resources as well as reduce inherent risks.  In fact, knowing the 
relative spatial relationships among assets, routes, and corridors improves risk decision making, 
from coordinated maintenance and repair activities, toward the elimination of impending risks, to 
reduced system interruption.  Without a doubt, spatial analysis in asset management is not a new 
concept; however, combining the capabilities of spatial analysis with SoS corridor-level 
management offers a new form of value to asset managers, analysts, and decision makers in 
evaluating and selecting alternatives that reduce the risk of an agency as well as offer better 
returns on investment.  
3.7 Selecting Alternatives 
The process of selecting alternatives has been an old-age challenge that decision makers have 
been dealing with in resource allocation and utilization.  This problem is even exacerbated in the 
wake of the dwindling and uncertain funding environment.  Likewise, in transportation decision 
making, this is not a new challenge for decision makers.  So it is common for transportation 
decision makers and practitioners to evaluate and select optimal alternative(s).  The selection of 
alternatives becomes even more complicated when a large number of stakeholders with multiple 
objectives are involved in the decision process.  These challenges, therefore, require logical 
guidelines in making a selection.  Consequently, it is important to ensure that these logical 




 In the case of selecting alternatives, decision makers and analysts use qualitative, 
quantitative, and semi-quantitative methods in achieving their goals.  These methods cover both 
heuristics and operations research methodologies.  The mathematically complexity of some of 
these methods may sometimes require specific expertise from analysts and practitioners.  Most 
often, DOTs and decision makers will want to avoid these complexities and rely on simpler 
methods in the decision process.  As such, this dissertation provides a user-friendly decision 
framework and methodology that decision makers can employ in their alternative selection 
process.  Chapter four outlines the proposed framework and the necessary supporting models.  





Chapter 4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
The conceptual framework and methodological approach presented in this chapter form the basis 
for the analysis used in the case study implementation.  In chapter 2, this dissertation discussed 
the types and formats of risk frameworks decision makers and analysts employ in their risk 
assessment and management practices.  The framework developed in this work follows similar 
principles of generic risk frameworks but moves beyond these to provide a platform for 
integrating non-homogeneous assets and hazards in a risk assessment.  The purpose of this 
framework (Highway Assets Risk Management) is to provide a guiding approach within which 
decision makers can assess risk and systematically integrate risk information into their decision-
making process.  The Highway Assets Risk Management (HARM) framework offers decision 
makers and analysts a practical approach to individually and collectively 1) assess risk 
consequences and impact of asset conditions, 2) assess vulnerability of asset or corridor to 
failure, and 3) develop practical solutions to mitigate inherent risks.  The HARM framework 
offers adequate flexibility that allows practitioners to tackle a diversity of problems by 
replicating the HARM process using preferences that may be specific to the challenges 
practitioners face.   
4.1 Proposed Framework 
Previous risk frameworks for TAM have been limited to individual categories of asset classes 
(i.e., asset-level management, or silo-approach); specifically bridges and pavements.  Currently, 
researchers are developing route-, corridor-, and network-level frameworks to address 
transportation infrastructure risk.  Other areas such as climate change impact on transportation 
infrastructure have also seen the development of adaptive risk frameworks at the network level.  




information to decision makers resulting in suboptimal decisions.  Developing a framework that 
systematically incorporates different categories of infrastructure and assesses and prioritizes risk 
on a corridor level will enable decision makers to make improved decisions, perform tradeoff 
analysis, and optimize the performance of their transportation systems.   
This dissertation draws from the experiences garnered from prior work on risk in asset 
management and develops an integrated risk framework that offers decision makers the 
flexibility to undertake both individual and collective risk analysis of their asset categories and 
assess their impact on corridor performance and agency’s strategic goals.  As illustrated in 
Figure 2.14, within the risk management framework lies the risk assessment phase.  Completing 
the risk assessment phase requires systematic guiding principles.  As such, this dissertation 
provides a systematic flow diagram as a guiding framework.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the proposed 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) and risk assessment framework referred to in this 
dissertation as the Highway Assets Risk Management Decision Support System (HARM-DSS).  
The framework is divided into two successive phases: 1) asset category priority assessment and 









4.1.1 Asset Category Priority Assessment 
The asset category priority assessment phase of the framework involves the process of 
identifying the asset categories or hazards an agency considers critical or at risk.  As such, the 
number, and type of asset categories or hazards can vary from one agency to the other, due to 
organizational goals, objectives, and even resource availability.  Similarly, they can vary within 
the same agency from one region or district to another.  The process starts with the establishment 
of context, identification of goals and objectives, and the definition of risk or criticality 
assessment procedures.  During this process, an agency first undertakes a self-assessment of their 
asset management practices and identifies the types of asset data, failure data, and failure 
consequence and impact data that exist.   Based on the existence of this data, a transportation 
organization can identify which asset category or hazard is highly susceptible to impact 
(negatively or positively) the performance of the transportation network and so the agency’s 
goals and objectives.  With such information, decision makers can then develop proactive 
policies to integrate these asset categories or hazards into a systematic framework for corridor-
level asset management.  
 Often, during the risk estimation process in this phase, required data may not be available 
to undertake a quantitative estimation of the elements that characterize risk.  Certainly, 
quantitative analyses usually possess a higher level of objectivity in decision making or analysis.  
Nonetheless, there are many important decision analyses that have benefited from the use of 
qualitative data.  Qualitative data is used when no objective data exists or analysts cannot 
develop an objective index for a given attribute.  In such situations, decision makers rely on 
subjective indices or scales developed by experts to evaluate decisions.  For example, Huber et 




important decisions (Huber et al., 1969).  For this reason, the framework provides decision 
makers or analysts with the flexibility of incorporating expert knowledge or judgment during this 
process.  Although these inputs may seem imperfect and subjective, the decision process will 
evolve over time as more objective data becomes available.  
The HARM-DSS framework suggests a number of elicitation methods that decision 
makers or analysts can employ to reach consensus on the behavior of asset categories, probable 
failure rates, and consequence or impacts of failure on agency goals and objectives.  
Undoubtedly, these techniques have advantages and disadvantages.  Generally, it is a common 
practice to find organizations using qualitative assessment and developing quantitative 
capabilities as data become readily available.  When an analyst uses qualitative expert judgment 
in an analysis, it is important to document and communicate the rationale behind the information 
to decision makers.  Documenting such information helps decision makers to determine the level 
of confidence they place in their decisions based off this information.  Ultimately, this process 
will enable decision makers and analysts to identify critical asset classes and hazards that will go 
into the corridor-level risk assessment and prioritization phase of the framework.  
4.1.2 Corridor-level Risk Assessment and Prioritization  
Following the initial screening and identification of an agency’s critical asset categories 
and hazards, the corridor-level risk assessment and evaluation phase commences.  This phase of 
the framework enables decision makers to undertake a holistic and comprehensive assessment of 
individual corridors that make up the transportation network.  This assessment process is similar 
in steps to the processes in phase one.  However, the second phase of the assessment process 
involves detailed valuation procedures.  First, the agency has to identify the types of risk that are 




fall under one of these categories: social, environmental, or economic.  Second, one has to 
identify and screen a comprehensive set of risk factors that are good indicators of the criteria 
decision makers or analysts are considering in the multi-criteria analysis part of the assessment 
process.  Subsequently, one has to establish how the risk will be measured, by determining the 
elements that will characterize risk.  Many forms of risk characterization techniques are available 
in the risk literature.  Each one has its own advantages and disadvantages and the circumstances 
under which one can employ them.  
 The HARM-DSS framework employs a two-dimensional risk characterization method.  
The two dimensions or elements are defined here as the corridor criticality and hazard exposure-
vulnerability indices.  Each dimension is estimated using a multi-criteria approach.  Since each 
dimension may have a different impact on an agency’s decision, one can develop weights for 
each of the risk elements.  For example, a decision maker may be highly concerned about highly 
critical corridors and, therefore, will assign higher weights to the corridor criticality index, and 
vice versa.  Another decision maker will be indifferent between the two risk elements and, 
therefore, will assign equal weights to the two risk elements.  Similarly, one can develop weights 
for each of the risk evaluation criteria to indicate the level of importance of a criterion to a 
decision maker.   
The number and type of criteria one employs in estimating the indices (i.e., corridor 
criticality and exposure-vulnerability) can vary among decision makers and agencies.  
Regardless, analysts and decision makers must ensure they do not under- or over-model the 
indices.  That is, one has to be cautious in the selection of criteria.  Generally, one should select 
criteria for a modeling process based on their applicability to choices between the existing 




drop old ones as new alternatives are considered or excluded.  The process is essentially about 
establishing significant interaction between objectives and alternatives.  As such, decision 
makers can undertake a thorough investigation and screening of criteria to develop robust criteria 
that capture multiple risks simultaneously.  The final steps of the framework involve the 
combining of the risk elements to estimate the ultimate risk score of each corridor, performing 
sensitivity analysis, ranking of risk alternatives, and finally selecting programs for prioritization. 
4.2 Proposed Method 
Almost every management, policy, or business decision involves multiple elements.  Similarly, 
transportation policies or management decisions can benefit from the consideration of multiple 
elements.  In fact, due to the diverse goals and stakeholders involved in transportation investment 
decision making or planning, it is imperative that decision makers consider multi-criteria 
analysis in their decision processes.  Acknowledging the importance of decision analysis 
involving transportation asset management, this dissertation proposes the use of an integrated 
multi-criteria decision analysis and risk analysis approach, adopting value functions, to 
systematically manage agencies’ ancillary highway assets or hazards.  The method integrates 
different risk criteria based on an additive weighting formula.  The following sections discuss the 
concepts behind the methodology applied to estimate the elemental indices used in the risk 
characterization and estimation process.  The MCDA concept is used to estimate the overall 
scores of the risk components (i.e., corridor criticality and exposure-vulnerability).  To 
standardize the decision attributes of the risk problem used in the multi-criteria functions, 




4.2.1 Multi-criteria Decision Analysis  
Decision analysis (DA) is a formal way of integrating philosophy, theory methodology, 
and professional practices that are relevant to a topic in making important decisions through a 
structured format.  Keeney (1982) defines DA intuitively as “a formalization of common sense 
for decision problems which are too complex for informal use of common sense” and technically 
as “a philosophy articulated by a set of logical axioms, and a methodology and collection of 
systematic procedures, based upon those axioms, for responsibly analyzing the complexities 
inherent in decision problems.”  Ultimately, a DA process guides a decision maker or an analyst 
to make decisions in a better structured and formal environment.  An example of a DA method is 
the MCDA, which is one Operations Research tool decision makers or analysts frequently use 
when multiple stakeholders with competing and conflicting goals are involved in the DA 
process.   
The goal of the MCDA process is to help decision makers evaluate different alternatives 
through a process of minimizing or maximizing certain preferences of stakeholders while 
achieving several objectives simultaneously.  Due to the analytic capability of the MCDA, 
researchers, decision makers, and professional management journals have recognized its 
importance in decision-support application (Saaty, 1999).  In fact, analysts and researchers are 
applying the concept in diverse engineering fields and other applications, such as environmental 
planning and management, forest management, and water regulation.  Likewise, in infrastructure 
management decision analysis and decision making, multi-criteria decision making has emerged 
as a valuable tool.  Consequently, researchers have developed and implemented a variety of 




Generally, two broad examples of MCDA techniques exist, under which individual tools 
can belong: multi-attribute utility analysis and multi-objective programming method.  In multi-
attribute utility analysis, a decision maker is explicitly aware of the set of available alternatives 
within which one selects the most preferred alternative.  For example, one can evaluate the safety 
performance of alternative highway corridors by assessing available alternatives on elements 
such as the number of fatalities, number of serious accidents, or number of head-on collisions.  
Essentially, an analyst or a decision maker specifies a set of attributes that describes the value-
relevant properties of outcomes, assesses single-attribute value functions over the levels of each 
attribute, and evaluates attribute weights that indicate the rate of substitution of value across 
attributes (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976).  Conversely, in multi-objective programming, decision 
makers employ mathematical programming using objective functions.  These mathematical 
algorithms enable a decision maker implicitly find a solution or alternative that is feasible within 
a decision maker’s constraints as well as satisfy the objective function.   
In decision analysis, analysts and decision makers have applied different methods of the 
multi-attribute utility theory to support decision making.  Examples of these methods are the 
simple additive weighting (SAW), technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution 
(TOPSIS), analytical hierarchy process (AHP), and the multiplicative utility method (MUM).  
Detail exploration of these methods is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  For detail 
discussion of these and other MCDA techniques, see Figueira, et al., 2005.  Fundamentally, each 
of these methods accomplishes the same goal except that they are different in approach.  
Admittedly, the SAW method is the most popular and widely used approach among policy 




information.  Accordingly, this dissertation employs the SAW method to combine the 
consequence, impact, and vulnerability attributes in characterizing risk.   
Generally, the SAW problem can be formulated as follows: consider a decision maker 
having a finite set of alternatives (i.e., solutions or, in the context of this dissertation, finite set of 
corridors), say 𝐶𝑖(𝑖 = 1, 2, … … … . . , 𝑛), for which the decision maker evaluates risk using a finite 
set of risk criteria, say 𝑅𝑗(𝑗 = 1, 2, … … … , 𝑚), each representing the rating (consequence, 
vulnerability, or impact) on objectives, and 𝑊𝑗(𝑗 = 1, 2, … … … , 𝑚) representing the relative 
importance of each risk criterion.  The rating scale is computed using value functions or through 
the construction of scales for the attribute that represents the risk.  The purpose of the SAW 
problem is to identify the alternative/corridor that contributes the most risk, consequence, or 
impact to agency’s objectives or goals.  As such, the alternative, 𝐶𝑖, that shows the highest 
disutility in Equation 4.1 with respect to all the risk criteria, is the most preferred alternative. 
𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑛,𝑚
𝑖,𝑗=1                                                (4.1) 
Where 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟 
𝑊𝑗 = 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 
4.3 Criterion Weighting in Decision Analysis 
In DA that involves multiple criteria or elements decision makers assign weights to individual 




criterion or an element.  Criteria or elements with higher importance or criticality are assigned 
larger weights whereas relatively less important or critical criteria or elements receive lower 
weights.  For example, decision makers considering two criteria—say safety and air quality—in 
their decision analysis process may choose to assign a larger weight to safety and a lower weight 
to air quality if they find safety to be higher priority for their system compared to air quality.  
Similarly, in multi-dimensional risk characterization, decision makers may be more critical about 
some components of the risk than others and will, therefore, assign weights accordingly to 
impact the overall risk score of alternatives.  To illustrate this, consider that the risk of alternative 
solutions is characterized by three dimensions: vulnerability, exposure, and consequence.  That 
is, the overall risk is an aggregate (for instance, using SAW) score of these components.  
However, if a decision maker is more concerned about reducing the consequence than reducing 
vulnerability, accordingly, the decision maker can propose to assign a higher weight to the 
consequence component.  Consequently, most likely, the weight assignment will impact the 
overall risk score of the alternatives that result in higher consequences. 
 The process of assigning weights to individual criteria or elements in decision analysis 
can be challenging.  However, the literature presents a number of techniques that are available to 
decision makers, analysts, and practitioners: ranking, direct weighting, pairwise comparison, and 
trade-off analysis methods (Shepard, 1964).  In dealing with simple cases though, decision 
makers can accomplish this process by simply dividing and assigning the weights among the 
criteria or elements such that they sum to 1.0.  This procedure uses expert judgment.  In such a 
case, the assignment of weights can be based on heuristics or on specific preferences of decision 
makers and can be used to justify a priori preference.  To illustrate this, assume that decision 




𝑤 = (𝑤1,   𝑤2,   𝑤3, … … … … . , 𝑤𝑛)                (4.2), and  
∑ 𝑤1 = 1                                             (4.3). 
4.4 Defining Decision Attributes 
In transportation investment, decision makers are confronted with several alternatives as 
potential projects or programs.  To make the most informed decision, decision makers evaluate 
the benefits, or in risk management, the risk reduction capabilities, of each alternative by 
defining a set of attributes (criteria) that reflect the performance of the factors (e.g., 
environmental, economic, or social) under consideration.  Similarly, in corridor risk assessment, 
decision makers have to define attributes in assessing the risk each corridor poses to the 
objectives and goals of an agency.  Currently, there are no standardized metrics available to 
assist decision makers or risk analysts.  Nonetheless, in the literature, researchers discuss some 
desirable properties of a good attribute.  Specifically, Keeney and Gregory specify five desirable 
properties of a good metric or attribute as: unambiguous, comprehensive, direct, operational, and 
understandable (Keeney & Gregory, 2005).  Typically, these attributes should reflect: 
 The criticality of the corridor to the operation of the transportation network 
 The vulnerability of the corridor to failure with respect to the individual asset categories  
 The economic and environmental characteristics of candidate corridors 
 The geographic location of a corridor 
 The emergency rehabilitation and recovery cost of corridor upon failure 
The criticality of a corridor can impact the overall operation or performance of a 
transportation network.  As such, identifying and improving the performance of each individual 




network.  One can assess the criticality of a corridor using indicators such as the average annual 
daily traffic (AADT), functional class of the corridor, the number of redundant routes and the 
reliability of those routes.  In practice, AADT drives many decisions in transportation investment 
decision making.  At both the local and state levels, decision makers are always trying to reduce 
the impact of negative results or consequences.  As such, in improving operational levels of 
transportation networks, corridors, or routes with relatively higher AADT are always attractive 
alternatives for decision makers.  Equally important, vulnerability drives the relative importance 
of alternatives for investment.   
On a corridor level, depending on the level of assessment, a corridor’s vulnerability to 
failure is an aggregation of the vulnerability to failure of each asset category (i.e., integrated 
asset management).  Consequently, alternatives with more vulnerable asset categories will 
generate higher attribute scale increasing the relative importance of the corridor.  The economic, 
environmental, and geographic characteristics of a corridor can all contribute to the relative 
importance of an alternative for possible improvement.  Examples of attributes an analyst can 
identify for use in an integrated corridor-level risk assessment may include: AADT; functional 
class of road; percentage of trucks plying the corridor; percentage of asset category considered 
vulnerable; number of exits on corridor leading to commercial, industrial, or residential area; 
county population, etc. 
4.5 Scaling Decision Attributes or Criteria 
It is imperative that decision makers or analysts—in the process of evaluating alternatives 
against a set of defined attributes or criteria—ensure that each decision criterion or attribute is 
standardized for scaling uniformity.  In theory, variety of measuring scales exists on which 




characterized under four categories (Kirkwood, 1997): nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio 
scales.  Nominal scaling involves the assignment of numbers or names to some defined 
categories.  Nominal scales are simply labeling categories without giving any numerical 
significance to each level or without any order of significance.  On the other hand, ordinal 
scaling involves assigning order of importance to different alternatives without any significance 
to how much each of the alternatives differs from the others.  For instance, given three 
alternatives with low, medium, or high ordinal scales, a decision maker will be willing to 
prioritize the alternative with high ordinal scale without knowing specifically how much the 
medium-scaled alternative differs from the high- or low-scaled alternative.  Ratio scales have 
absolute zero, which allows for a wide range of both descriptive and inferential statistical 
analysis.  Finally, in the interval scale, attribute scales are measured on an interval between 0 and 
1, or 0 and 100.  Accordingly, zero represents the least preferred and 1 or 100 most preferred.  
This type of scaling gives more significant meaning to decision making.   
The performance of each attribute is transformed so that each factor is positively 
correlated with decision makers’ preference.  Interval scales give us the order of values and the 
ability to quantify the difference between competing alternatives.  As such, alternatives with 
higher scales represent the most likely alternatives a decision maker will favor.  Voogd reviews a 
variety of options for scaling decision attributes (Voogd, 1983).  The HARM framework 
provides flexibility for analysts to adopt and utilize a scaling method that is appropriate and 
practical regarding their unique circumstances.  The models presented in this dissertation utilize 
the interval and ordinal scaling methods: the exponential value function and the direct scaling or 
preference rating approach.  The advantages of these methods are 1) exponential value functions 




between two scaled attributes gives a relative indication of the amount of preference difference; 
as such, increasing the objectivity of model results and 2) ordinal scaling alleviates the struggle 
and difficulty to acquire data that is not readily available to decision makers.  Direct rating or 
preference rating offers decision makers the flexibility of converting stated preferences into 
vulnerability likelihoods.  This analytical transformation enables semi-objective estimation of 
failure rates and consequences based on expert judgment. 
4.5.1 The Exponential Value Function 
“A value function is a real-valued mathematical function defined over an evaluation 
criterion (or attribute) that represents an option’s measure of “goodness” over the levels of the 
criterion” (Garvey, 2009).  Among a set of competing alternatives, the value function offers 
decision makers the ability to assess the attractiveness of each alternative.  An exponential value 
function allows an analyst to assign values ranging from zero to one representing the 
performance of each attribute.  Practically, decision makers or analysts prefer alternatives that 
score higher in attribute value (representing higher-risk alternative) to alternatives with least-
scored attributes (representing lower-risk alternative).  The exponential value function is similar 
to the piecewise linear single dimensional value functions; however, the exponential value 
function is more useful because of its capability to handle numerous level scores.  The 
exponential value function is capable of representing either increasing or decreasing values 
(preferences) for continuous range of criteria scores (Kirkwood, 1997).  For monotonically 
increasing scores for a given criterion 𝑋, the exponential value function is represented 







 ,     𝜌 ≠ ∞
𝑥−𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
,       𝜌 = ∞,
                                                      (4.4) 
Where 
𝑢𝑋(𝑥) = Score of a given value 𝑥, for criterion 𝑋, 0 ≤ 𝑢𝑋(𝑥) ≤ 1 
𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 = Minimum value of criterion 𝑋 
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 = Maximum value of criterion 𝑋 
𝜌 = Exponential constant  
 
Figure 4.2 Families of Monotonically Increasing Exponential Value Functions 
 (Garvey, 2009)  
Conversely, for monotonically decreasing scores for a given criterion 𝑋, the exponential value 
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𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑥
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
,       𝜌 = ∞,
                                           (4.5) 





Figure 4.3 Families of Monotonically Decreasing Exponential Value Functions 
(Garvey, 2009)  
4.5.2 Direct Attribute Scales 
Direct attribute scaling is a member of the ordinal scaling methods.  In direct scaling, 
decision makers or analysts assign ordinal scale levels as a measure of attainment or preference 
of an evaluation criterion.  As already stated, in ordinal scaling, the difference between scales 
does not measure the relative preference of a decision maker with respect to an evaluation 
criterion.  Assigned scales only offer a sense of ordering that indicates that one alternative is 
preferable to the other.  As such, alternatives A and B with criterion scores 2 and 4, respectively, 
do not imply alternative B is twice as preferable or beneficial than A.  That is, the two scales do 
not inform a decision maker how much one alternative is more valuable or preferable to the 
other.  However, it offers decision makers the ability to make an informed decision that B is 
preferable to A. Table 4.1 is an example of a von-Neumann-Morgenstern direct scale constructed 






Table 4.1 von-Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Scale 
Utility Scale Ranking  Probability/Consequence 
Scale 
0-0.2 1 Low 
0.2-0.4 2 Medium 
0.4-0.6 3 Moderate 
0.6-0.8 4 High 
0.8-1 5 Extreme 
  
4.5.3 Surrogate Attributes 
Oftentimes, analysts or decision makers encounter data availability problems in decision 
modeling and analysis.  In such circumstances, practitioners are compelled to assess 
performance, conditions, or benefits of engineering systems using substitute attributes.  The lack 
thereof of impeccable and quality data for the assessment of a particular risk attribute requires 
analysts or decision makers to give meaning to surrogate attributes relying on imprecise data.  
When decision makers do not have reasonable data that sufficiently capture the attribute under 
consideration, they measure surrogate attributes.  Decision makers and analysts must understand 
that overcoming data problems in asset management, and most especially ancillary highway 
asset management, will require the use of surrogate attributes until data become available as their 
management systems mature.  For example, consider a decision maker assessing an attribute, 𝐶𝑖, 
the vulnerability of failure, of a given structure 𝑗.   
In the absence of deterioration models, historic condition data, and failure data on this 
structure, a decision maker or analyst cannot explicitly define the decision attribute 𝐶𝑖𝑗, the 
vulnerability scale of attribute 𝑖 for alternative 𝑗.  Consequently, an analyst or a decision maker 
can depend on surrogate attributes defined using remaining expected useful life of the structure if 




investigation.  In this case, one can observe that an analyst or a decision maker does not directly 
capture the vulnerability to failure of the structure; however, all things being equal, the surrogate 
attribute indirectly reflects the state of reliability of the given structure.  Similarly, decision 
makers can establish surrogates for other decision attributes with incomplete or imprecise data.  
In fact, Keeney and Raiffa assert that it is arguable that all attributes are surrogates attributes 
since practitioners are not capable of absolutely measuring all things (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993).  
In other words, nothing can be measured absolutely.  This assertion buttresses the fact that there 
is value in depending on surrogate attributes in decision making as long as one can justify the 
reasoning behind the use of such attributes.   
4.6 Formal Consensus Building Methods 
In scaling attributes using the direct preference and surrogate methods, decision makers and 
analysts need to reach a consensus on the scales or possible levels of each attribute.  Since these 
methods are subjective in nature, the tasks involved require a better understanding of the system.  
For this reason, expert knowledge becomes very critical in assessing surrogate attribute levels.  
For example, consider that decision makers want to assess the risk of failure for a given asset 
category.  However, the analyst does not have complete data to model the probability and 
consequences of failure.  This situation will require the modeler to assign some levels of scale 
that represent the probability scale as well as the consequence scale.  To obtain a reflective scale 
of the situation and establish a consensus, the modeler can elicit collective information from 
experts of the infrastructure or system.  Although the HARM framework is not prescriptive with 
which consensus building approach to adopt, the dissertation discusses one of the consensus 
methods (Delphi method) most commonly used in the transportation industry.  This approach is 




In the past, decision and policy makers have routinely relied on expert opinions to make 
decisions.  However, gathering these opinions in a structured format did not start until after 
World War II (Ayyub, 2001).  Ayyub defines expert opinion elicitation as “a heuristic process of 
gathering information and data or answering questions on issues or problems of concerns” 
(Ayyub, 2003).  In eliciting expert opinions, analysts can rely on a variety of elicitation 
techniques that can be classified under three broad methods: indirect elicitation, direct method, 
and parametric estimation (Ayyub, 2001).  The complexity of the problem can influence the 
choice of method analysts use to elicit required information.  In addition, each method has its 
own strengths and limitations.  As such, acknowledging the limitations of a method and 
addressing them accordingly can improve the quality of information experts provide.  In general, 
the method one selects depends on one’s comfort level, experience, complexity of the problem 
under investigation, and resources availability.  For a review and discussion of eliciting 
techniques, readers can consult Burgman, et al. (2006).   
4.6.1 The Delphi Method 
One of the early elicitation strategies, the Delphi method, was originally developed and 
used by the Rand Corporation in the 1950s (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963).  The purpose of the 
method is to achieve a consensus or a convergence on a specific problem.  Through the use of a 
series of questionnaires, the Delphi method elicits experts’ opinions on a real-world complex 
problem until a consensus is reached, or their responses reach equilibrium.  In the literature, 
researchers have used this method to solve a wide range of problems, including resource 
allocation, policy selection, and program planning (Delbecq et al., 1975).  During the process, a 
facilitator administers several rounds of questionnaires to a group of experts until a consensus or 




By conducting several iterations of a survey, prior comments or results serve as feedback 
for the next iteration.  After the first survey and subsequent iterations, respondents are provided 
with the results and follow-up questions to verify if they may want to modify their responses due 
to others’ opinions while keeping the participants’ identity concealed.  The required number of 
iterations depends on how quickly the panel of experts reaches a consensus or equilibrium.  In 
some cases, respondents may not reach a consensus.  When this situation ensues, the survey can 
be terminated if the same responses are received following a previous iteration.  In theory, 
researchers have determined that at most between three and five iterations are practically 
sufficient to gather meaningful thoughts on a given problem (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). 
Even though the overarching objective of the consensus-building approach is to explore 
reliable and creative ideas or produce suitable information for decision making, some of the 
methods have stronger advantages than others.  The Delphi method offers a number of 
advantages making it appropriate to adopt for this framework.  For example, the Delphi method 
eliminates the “bandwagon effect” (i.e., respondents are not gratuitously influenced by an 
outspoken respondent on the panel) due to the anonymity of participants.  As a result, this 
method offers a means of gathering unbiased information from a panel of experts.  In addition, 
the Delphi method allows one to work with a group of people in different geographical locations, 
i.e., participants need not be assembled at one location, as compared to the brainstorming or 
workshop technique. 
4.6.2 Establishing a Panel of Experts 
The panel of experts’ experience and knowledge regarding the research problem 
determine the quality of information the researcher gathers through the Delphi process. 




consists of practitioners who have worked in the field of study and understand the problem under 
investigation.  First, the investigator must establish some basic criteria that each member must 
meet and narrow the selection down to reliable individuals willing to participate in all the 
required iterations of the survey. Since the Delphi method involves a number of iterations, the 
investigator must initially inform the panel and encourage them to participate fully. 
To accomplish the selection of the panel, Pill suggests a number of guiding principles 
that investigators can employ.  The author considers individuals eligible to contribute to the 
Delphi process to have fairly related backgrounds and experiences concerning the research 
problem, to be capable of contributing helpful inputs, and to be willing to modify their initial or 
previous judgments for the purpose of reaching or attaining consensus (Pill, 1971).  The selection 
process can be challenging; however, the literature offers diverse ways of selecting qualified 
individuals to form the panel (Jones, 1975).  The optimum number of individuals required to 
constitute the panel is arguable.  That is, the size of the panel is determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  There is extensive literature on the criteria one uses to select the panel of experts.  
Ultimately, the investigator must be convinced that the results represent general opinions on the 
specific problem. 
4.6.3 Application of the Delphi Method in the Transportation Sector 
In the literature, researchers have pervasively demonstrated the strengths of the Delphi 
method in decision analysis, planning, and policy development; especially, gathering complete 
information on systems, or assessing the impacts of successes and failures of systems.  
Specifically in the transportation sector, researchers, transportation analysts, and decision makers 
have successfully employed the Delphi method in different dimensions of decision analysis when 




expert opinions to develop guidelines for appraising bridge improvement needs.  More 
specifically, the authors used the gathered information to establish relationships between 
subjective bridge condition ratings and FHWA’s numeric ratings.  This allowed the authors to 
assess relationships between the subjective rating and the severity and extent of distress, and also 
find relationships between the numeric condition rating and the expected remaining service life 
of bridges.  Finally, they estimated the effect of improvements upon the numeric condition rating 
and expected remaining service life of bridge components (Saito & Sinha, 1991). 
Further, Boadi and Amekudzi demonstrated that the Delphi method is a practical 
approach for decision makers to prioritize critical asset classes that are under the jurisdiction of a 
transportation agency for inclusion in formal asset management programs.  The authors showed 
that in the absence of complete data, a Delphi study can be conducted to identify asset classes 
that pose the highest levels of threat to the goals of a transportation agency and to rank the 
relative likelihoods of occurrence of these threats.  The paper demonstrates that the Delphi 
method can be used to gather expert opinion to identify and prioritize high-risk ancillary 
transportation asset classes within a transportation network (Boadi & Amekudzi, 2014). 
 Additionally, researchers have used the Delphi method in seeking consensus from experts 
in developing meaningful indicators that measure both pre-disaster resilience and post-disaster 
recovery of infrastructure.  In one such case, Jordan and Javemick-Will conducted multiple 
rounds of Delphi survey to gather expert opinions on recovery indicators (Jordan & Javernick-
Will, 2013).  Although the study achieved consensus on several of the indicators, the results also 
showed some disparities in importance ratings.  Overall, the outcome of the study shows that 
practitioners can use condensed opinions of experts in the field of disaster recovery and 




infrastructure provision.  Since transportation infrastructure and land use pattern are correlated, 
decision makers can assess the effects of land use patterns on transportation infrastructure (i.e., 
utilization and performance).  Although some modeling techniques exist in land use forecasting, 
Cavalli-Sforza and Ortolano used the Delphi approach to predict the impacts of three alternative 
transportation programs in San Jose, California (Cavalli-Sforza & Ortolano, 1984).  The study 
yielded a set of forecasts of land use, commute patterns, and choice of transit mode for three 
different transportation investment programs.   
 Similarly, Robinson used the Delphi method to assess the economic impacts of different 
road infrastructure investments programs (Robbinson, 1990).  This method helps asset owners to 
make economic justification to decision makers for additional funding in times of budget 
shortfalls.  The author conducted three rounds of Delphi survey to elicit expert opinions on the 
subject.  Finally, the author concluded that the Delphi technique is capable of achieving the goals 
set for it as well as serving as a tool for building a solid framework for more quantitative 
economic impact forecasts.  The study also provided an ideal framework for strategic planning 
by public agencies and private firms.  Although the results of the Delphi study are subjective, 
they tend to rely on observable phenomena, trends, or facts.  Therefore, analysis resulting from a 
Delphi study can provide valuable information that serves as a point of departure in strategic 
planning.  These studies demonstrate that the Delphi method is beneficial when other methods 
are not adequate or appropriate for data collection.    
4.7 Problem Formulation 
In transportation operations, corridor failures—resulting from an infrastructure failure—can 
potentially give rise to different types of risks.  Depending on an agency’s goals and objectives, 




risks arise from the possibility of deviation from an expected outcome or event.  Some risks an 
agency will be interested in addressing include strategic, physical infrastructure, safety, or 
agency reputation.  The overall risk of failure of a corridor considered in this model incorporates 
different attributes to estimate each type of risk an agency is considering to manage.  As a bulk 
indicator, the bulk risk score is defined as including: (1) the corridor criticality index, i.e., the 
impact a failure will have on an agency and users of the corridor, i.e., the consequence of failure; 
and 2) hazard exposure-vulnerability index, i.e., the likelihood or vulnerability of the corridor to 
failure.   
The hazard exposure-vulnerability index is very important in the risk assessment process 
because infrastructure vulnerability to failure or the degree of exposure of a hazard to society is 
the most important risk source in corridor operations.  Generally, failure rates increase as the 
conditions of the infrastructure deteriorate due to aging and continual usage.  Preserving the 
transportation network and operating it at acceptable levels of performance will require the 
management of risk.  Most importantly, managing these risks in a group or integrated context 
increases the chances of a network performing highly or meeting its goals.  Figure 4.4 illustrates 























Figure 4.4 Definition of Risk Elements and their Main Attributes 
 
4.7.1 Hazard Exposure-vulnerability Index (HVc) 
The hazard exposure-vulnerability index, which is denoted as a surrogate for the 
probability of failure, is determined by a number of criteria.  The different criteria used capture 
the criticality of a given asset category, the density of assets indicating the number of plausible 
failure points, public exposure to the hazard or vulnerability over a finite period of time 
(agency’s planning horizon) indicating the rate of usage, and vulnerability of a corridor to 
failure, as a result of a failing asset or imminent hazard.  Equation (4.6) represents the general 
functional form of the exposure-vulnerability index.  This index informs decision makers about 
the likelihood of an unfavorable incident occurring over the corridor. 
𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, 𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑗 = ∫ 𝑓
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𝑊𝑖 =Weight factor for asset category i, 
𝐸𝑖 =Exposure factor for asset category i,  
𝑉𝑖𝑗 =Vulnerability factor for asset category i within corridor j, 
𝑈𝑖𝑘 =Interdependence vulnerability effect factor of asset category i on asset category 
k,𝑋𝑗 =Traffic growth factor for corridor j,  
𝐾𝑗 =Network effects vulnerability factor for corridor j, and 
𝑡1, 𝑡2 = Analysis periods. 
4.7.1.1 Estimating the Asset Category Exposure Factor, 𝑬𝒋   
As mentioned earlier, the exposure factor for each asset category captures the number of 
assets or hazards per mile of road segment (i.e., threat density).  To estimate this risk criterion 
factor, this dissertation employs a monotonically increasing exponential value function; i.e., 
equation (4.4).  As an illustration for an asset category or hazard 𝑖,  𝑥𝑖 represents the number of 
assets or hazards per mile of road segment.  In this scenario, the road segment, 𝑟, represents an 
alternative.  Therefore, the variables for the value functions are estimated as follows:  
𝑥𝑖𝑟 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟
                    𝑟 = 1, 2, 3, … … … 𝑘                  (4.7) 
𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚(𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, 𝑥𝑖3, … … … … … … , 𝑥𝑖𝑘)                                                             (4.8) 
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚(𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, 𝑥𝑖3, … … … … … … , 𝑥𝑖𝑘  )                                                                  (4.9) 
The constant 𝜌 represents the risk appetite of a decision maker and is dependent on the 𝑧0.5 −
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, which is computed using equations (4.10) and (4.11).  The 𝑅 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 corresponding to a 




computed using equation (4.12).  The midpoint value corresponds to the preference value such 
that the value difference between the lowest and highest score is the same.  The shape of the 
exponential value function depends on the magnitude of the midpoint value.  The multiplicative 
factor in equation (4.11) depends on the risk attitude of the decision maker.  A risk-averse 




                                                                                                   (4.10) 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = (0.15 ∗ 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛                                                                       (4.11) 
𝜌 = 𝑅 ∗ (𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)                                                                                                     (4.12) 
4.7.1.2 Estimating Asset Category Vulnerability Factor, 𝑽𝒊 
There are several definitions of vulnerability depending on the context and industry of 
use.  For example, in climate change adaptation analysis, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) defines it as “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to 
cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes” (IPCC, 
2007).  In systems analysis, “vulnerability is the manifestation of the inherent state of the system 
(e.g., physical, technical, organizational, cultural) that can be exploited to adversely affect (cause 
harm or damage to) that system” (Haimes,  2006).  In risk analysis or management, vulnerability 
assessment is imperative.   
Generally, vulnerability assessment requires information about the current condition, 
maintenance history, deterioration trend, or exposure of the system to threats.  In fact, in practice, 
vulnerability assessment is data intensive if a decision maker seeks to make objective decisions 




the model presented in this dissertation make efforts to gather quality data that can inform the 
vulnerability assessment process.  However, in situations where actual condition data or a 
deterioration model is not available, decision makers can employ other surrogates that are able to 
capture an asset’s vulnerability or probability of failure.  Although the use of surrogates becomes 
a reasonable approach to vulnerability assessment, these variables often do not comprehensively 
capture inherent uncertainties.  As such, the use of actual asset or system deterioration models is 
mostly recommended in the application of this framework.  In effect, users of this framework can 
acknowledge that using deterioration models in the assignment of vulnerability scales will be 
more effective compared with the use of surrogates.       
Surrogates that one can use to assess vulnerability in the absence of actual condition data 
or a deterioration model may include, but are not limited to, the remaining useful service life of 
the asset.  The assumption is that, all things being equal, the further an asset is into its useful 
service life, the more its vulnerability to failure increases as well.  With this premise, analysts or 
decision makers can construct different vulnerability to failure levels for an asset category under 
consideration.  In the case study implementation section (Chapter 5), the dissertation presents 
some of the surrogates adopted in assessing the vulnerability of failure for each asset category 
that does not have actual condition data.  
4.7.2 Corridor Criticality Index 
The corridor criticality index is a proxy for the consequence element in the risk 
definition.  The estimated index captures the impact or severity of losing a corridor taking into 
consideration the functional importance, economic importance, safety risk, and route usage.  
Equation (4.13) shows the general functional form of the corridor criticality index.  Some of the 




(AADT), percentage of truck traffic, highway functional characteristics, detour length, and 
response time to recovery of the corridor. 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟 𝑗, 𝐶𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑊𝑖, 𝑅𝑖 )            𝑗 = 1, 2, … … … … , 𝑚          (4.13) 
Where  
𝑊𝑖   =Weight of criticality element i,  
𝑅𝑖   = 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 factor for criticality criteria i, 
𝑛 = Number of criticality factors, and  
𝑚 = Number of alternative corridors under consideration. 
4.7.3 Corridor Risk Score Estimate 
Risk analysts estimate risk using many and diverse approaches.  Usually, the experience 
and background of an analyst, data availability, time, and resource availability determine the 
approach one adopts (Hubbard, 2009).  Once an analyst assesses the basic elements of risk, 
probability/likelihood and consequence, or its proxies, one can combine these elements to 
estimate the risk.  Using this risk score, analysts or decision makers can rank alternatives under 
consideration.  Most often, decision makers may prioritize alternatives that score high in the 
ranking process.  However, in practice, decision makers consider other factors, such as costs, 
benefits, and effectiveness of risk reduction measures, in making risk management decisions 
(Ayyub, 2003).   
In this research, Equation (4.14) shows the relationship between the overall risk score and 
the risk elements (𝐶𝑗 , 𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑗).  Equation (4.14) aggregates the risk elements into a mono-criterion 
function that defines the level of risk of a particular corridor.  This transformation enables 




Risk Score of corridor j, 𝑅𝑆𝑗 = 𝑤1𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑗 + 𝑤2𝐶𝑗, and  𝑤1 + 𝑤2 = 1                         (4.14) 
That is, the parameters 𝑤1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤2 are the respective weights assigned to the risk elements.  For 
instance, a decision maker may need to emphasize vulnerability; as such, one can assign higher 
weights to reflect this preference. 
4.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
Generally, sensitivity analysis in any decision analysis process involves the variation of model 
input(s) to determine the resulting relative variation in model output(s).  One value that this 
framework and model offer is the flexibility and transparency in controlling model inputs to 
evaluate outcomes and alternatives.  The ability to manipulate input variables allows decision 
makers to identify the variables that most influence model output.  This process is known as 
sensitivity analysis.  Sensitivity analysis allows decision makers to ask “what-if” questions.  In 
risk assessment, sensitivity analysis allows decision makers to systematically investigate how the 
variability of input factors influences risk estimates and thus risk-based decisions.  If this 
information is presented quantitatively, it helps decision makers to understand different scenario 
analysis and the outcomes that could result.  The complexity of the sensitivity analysis depends 
on the dependency of the input variables.  Overcoming the complexity can require sophisticated 
modeling tools.  However, with proper software, these sophistications can be implemented very 
easily.   
In practice, practitioners and researchers have used different types of sensitivity 
techniques.  Studies have shown that all techniques tend to produce similar level of sensitivity 
results (Hamby,1995).  These techniques can be categorized as either “local” or “global”.  A 




examines the effect on output parameters of range variation of input variable(s).  A simple 
quantitative and intuitive sensitivity analysis approach is the method of varying parameter values 
one-at-a-time (Hamby, 1994).  This method can be easily conceptualized as evaluating the risk 
estimates of alternatives twice, each time using different plausible weighting, priority, or 
criticality scales or factors.  From these estimated values, a sensitivity ratio (SR) is computed 
(using Equation 4.15) to determine the relative sensitivity of the risk estimate to each of the 
varied variables.  The input variables that yield the highest absolute SR values are considered as 
the most sensitive variables.  These are the key variables decision makers can pay attention to in 
mitigating any risk or making risk-based decisions.  Information resulting from this kind of 
investigation guides decision makers in targeting additional resources in areas that offer the most 
improvement.  
Mathematically, the SR, also known as the elasticity equation, is formulated as follows: 









                                  (4.15) 
Where,          
𝑂1 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
𝑂2 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
𝐼1 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 




4.9 Model Assumptions 
It has been previously established that mandates enforcing the systematic management of 
ancillary highway assets are often lacking.  As such, attempting to incorporate this DSS in any 
decision making process will face some challenges: lack of standards; lack of performance 
metrics and targets; limited data, such as installation year, asset dimensions and condition data; 
and the lack of deterioration models.  For these reasons, analysts and decision makers will need 
to make assumptions that require input from experts.  The framework developed by this research 
makes a number of assumptions in constructing scales for the criteria used in estimating the risk 
elements: hazard exposure-vulnerability and criticality indices.  These assumptions enable 
analysts to relatively simplify and replicate the method for different agencies with different data 
challenges.   
Adopting this framework and using more detailed and localized inputs, where available, 
improves the estimation of risk components.  It is important to note that these assumptions are 
not static and may change as more information becomes available.  However, these 
modifications do not reduce the efficacy of this model because they represent the best knowledge 
that decision makers have at any point in time, and continue to be refined as more data is 
collected.  Generally, decision makers may have different risk appetites.  Therefore, the model 
allows for analysts or decision makers to modify the assumptions to meet their objectives.  
Essentially, once this initial model is constructed, decision makers or analysts can adjust the 
criteria and scaling constants to reflect changes in priorities and situations.  Since each situation 
or DOT is different in terms of data availability, the assumptions are not generalized, but are 
tailored to each DOT used in the case study.  As such, the dissertation presents the assumptions 




Chapter 5 FRAMEWORK APPLICATION AND DISCUSSION OF CASE STUDY 
RESULTS 
5.1Framework Application 
To better understand the applicability of HARM-DSS, the developed framework and models 
were applied to three DOT cases.  In this chapter, the dissertation integrates different asset and 
hazard data with notable differences in the data completeness and extent of coverage.  This data 
was gathered from three different State DOTs.  This chapter describes the framework 
application, the approach used to collect and analyze independent data to support the model, and 
the subsequent results.  Specifically, the following sections thoroughly explain the practical 
implementation of the framework, case study results, and the application of the results in policy 
development, budgetary planning, and effective resource allocation and utilization.  In addition, 
the sections elaborate upon the assumptions adopted in implementing the framework.  Areas of 
interest include the conversion of inventory and performance or condition data to vulnerability 
measures, development of quantitative risk factors from subjective qualitative measures, and 
evidence of decision makers’ ability to effectively identify, distinguish, and prioritize among 
corridor alternatives with different vulnerabilities to failure and similar potential consequences.  
 5.1.1 Applying Phase One: Asset Category Priority Assessment 
The framework proposed by this study (see Chapter four) consists of two phases.  The 
ultimate objective of the first phase is to support or complement asset management activities of 
DOTs that are in the process of identifying the most critical category or categories of ancillary 
assets to prioritize, beyond pavements and bridges, for systematic management.  This process 




phase one of the framework was not explicitly implemented because the fundamental premise for 
the selection of case study DOTs was based on data availability.  Specifically, the fundamental 
guiding principle in selecting case study DOTs was to identify DOTs that have already gathered 
data on some categories of ancillary assets.  This implies that if a DOT has already started 
gathering data on a particular ancillary asset or hazard class, then the assumption is the agency 
has already undertaken phase one of the framework and identified those asset or hazard 
categories as their critical assets or hazards.  Consequently, data on asset vulnerability to failure 
would be available.  However, for datasets with no vulnerability data, practical surrogates can be 
deduced from the data.  On the other hand, a DOT starting to identify highly critical asset or 
hazard categories can start by implementing the first phase of the framework.   
Due to the study constraints, it was assumed that the case study agencies have performed 
a systematic assessment (similar to what is proposed by this study) leading to the identification 
of those asset systems the DOTs currently have in place.  Accordingly, the emphasis of this case 
study analyses is on the second phase of the framework.  To demonstrate the validity and 
practical value of the first phase of this framework, Boadi and Amekudzi (2014) have 
demonstrated and presented the results of a case study in the paper titled “Risk-based 
Management of Ancillary Transportation Assets: Applying the Delphi Method to Estimate the 
Risk of Failure”. 
5.1.2 Selection of Case Study DOTs and Data Acquisition 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the case study was to apply the concepts, framework, 
and models discussed in chapter four to specific data and ascertain the expediency of the results 
in policy development and resource allocation and utilization.  Fulfilling these goals would 




ancillary highway assets or hazards.  The first task was to identify DOTs undertaking any 
activities involving the systematic collection or management of data related to ancillary highway 
assets through a literature review.  In addition to reviewing the literature on ancillary asset 
management, interviews were conducted with asset management representatives, data specialists, 
the information technology offices, and lead engineers at DOTs to identify plausible data.   
The overarching objective was to identify DOTs that maintained information systems for at 
least two different categories of ancillary highway assets.  The second task was to determine 
which of these DOTs were willing to share this data for the analysis.  Initially, six DOTs were 
identified to be maintaining information systems for at least two of the interested ancillary 
highway asset categories.  However, three of the six were willing to share their data.  The DOTs 
that agreed to offer data were: 
 Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) 
 New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT), and 
 Oregon State Department of Transportation (ODOT) 
5.1.3 Data Limitations 
Despite the comprehensiveness and robustness of the framework in accommodating wide-
ranging data types, there are some key limitations with the data that reduce the potential benefits 
this framework can offer decision makers in policy analysis and development.   As noted earlier, 
DOTs were identified based on their efforts in gathering and maintaining information on 
ancillary assets.  Therefore, the data was not purposely gathered to conform to the requirements 
of the model input data.  Hence, the data has some inherent weaknesses that can affect the 




and completeness of the data varied significantly from one system to the other as well as from 
state to state.  Specifically, the main data issues encountered include: 
 lack of standards for assessing the condition of ancillary assets and consequently 
vulnerability assessment 
 lack of complete asset data collected for all state highways and regions  
 incomplete or missing condition data on assets in the database 
 lack of meaningful documentation explaining codes used in the asset data base 
 lack of geographic information associated with individual assets  
 the use of different referencing systems to locate assets 
Although addressing these issues is not the objective of this study, investing resources to 
address these issues can benefit DOTs to capture the full potential benefits this decision-support 
tool offers.  For the purpose of these case studies, several assumptions were made to simplify the 
process.  These assumptions are documented in the latter sections of this chapter. 
 5.1.4 Available Data Systems 
  In general, the data provided by the selected DOTs varied in asset category and extent of 
coverage.  Nonetheless, culvert data was common among all the participating DOTs, although 
the type of information the individual systems contained varied significantly.  This observation 
can be attributed to the fact that many DOTs gather culvert data as part of their bridge inventory 
system.  Since Federal mandates require DOTs to maintain and report bridge data through the 
National Bridge Inventory (NBI), it has become commonplace for DOTs to gather data on larger 
culverts that meet certain standards.  However, this practice is undertaken without a common 




 Another reason for culverts being a common asset class among DOTs can also relate to 
the fact that many of these DOTs consider culverts to be the most critical ancillary asset class.  In 
fact, a study by Boadi and Amekudzi found that survey respondents—to a Delphi study 
identifying and prioritizing high risk ancillary highway assets for incorporation into a systematic 
management system—ranked culverts as one of the highly critical ancillary asset among eight 
categories of ancillary assets and other hazards (Boadi & Amekudzi, 2014).  The remaining 
classes of assets varied among the participating DOTs. 
Table 5.1 shows the DOTs, available data, data extent, and the information used in 


















Table 5.1 Data Availability and Extent 







Culverts Statewide Overall condition on 
a point scale (0-4) 
Overhead Sign 
Structures 
CSAH: About 30,600 
miles of roadway 
covering 87 counties 
Three qualitative 
descriptions (Good, 
Review, or Damage) 
transformed to assess 
vulnerability  
Plate-beam Barrier Elemental conditions 




Culverts Statewide  Utilization of 
remaining service life 





routes in 3 regions 
Estimation of 
likelihood of failure: 





routes in 3 regions 
 Utilization of 
remaining service life 




Culverts Statewide Overall condition on 
a point scale (0-9)  
Guardrails Region 5 Elemental conditions 





Region 5 (Very 
limited) 
 Assignment of 
numerical ratings  
 
5.1.5 Data Extent and Asset Vulnerability Assessment  
As previously mentioned, there exists a correlation in the collection of culvert data and 
that of bridge data.  As such, the culvert data DOTs provided covered the entire state highways 
that the DOTs are responsible for.  Beyond culverts, the case study DOTs provided different 




the type of information systems, extent of data coverage, and vulnerability assessment 
procedures adopted for each of the case study DOTs. 
5.1.5.1 Minnesota Department of Transportation  
5.1.5.1.1 Data Extent 
In addition to the culvert information system (referred to as HydInfra System), MnDOT 
provided systems data for overhead-sign structures and plate-beam guardrails.  The HydInfra 
system consists of condition and inventory data on culvert and storm drainage assets.  Whereas 
the HydInfra system covered the entire state of Minnesota, overhead-sign and plate-beam 
guardrail systems were limited to County State-Aid Highways (CSAH).  The CSAH system is a 
network of key highways under the jurisdiction of Minnesota’s counties.  The network covers 
roughly 30,600 miles of roadway throughout all 87 counties, comprising over two-thirds of all 
county highway miles.  Counties receive money from the state to assist in the construction, 
improvement, and maintenance of those highways included in the state-aid system. 
5.1.5.1.2 Asset Vulnerability to Failure Assessment  
The information systems differed significantly in the type of data fields and information 
gathered and recorded.  For the purposes of this research, the aim was to identify information 
that can be used to assess an asset vulnerability to failure.  For their culvert information system, 
MnDOT assigns an overall condition index that is based on a point scale of 0 to 4, in which 1 is 
assigned to a culvert in excellent condition and 4 assigned to a culvert in very poor condition.  
Zero is used to describe culverts that are not accessible for rating.  Using this information, three 
vulnerability scales were developed and used in assessing culvert asset vulnerability.  For 




5.2 represents the different rating schemes, their corresponding meaning, and the related 
assigned vulnerability ratings.  This subjective vulnerability assignment allows for the 
assignment of quantitative factors that can be conveniently used in the model.  It is important to 
understand that the results of the analysis will be sensitive to the vulnerability scales that will be 
developed.   
Table 5.2 Culvert Condition Rating Codes and Vulnerability Ratings 
(Adapted from MnDOT HydInfra Inspection Manual) 
Condition Rating* Rating 
Description* 
Explanation* Vulnerability Scale** 
1 Excellent Like new 1-low  








4 Very Poor Serious deterioration 
0                              Not able to rate, not visible           No rating assigned 
*MnDOT classification; **HARM-DSS classification 
 MnDOT uses qualitative descriptions in assessing overhead-sign structures.  Although a 
field in the database assigns a condition state description to individual signs, there was no 
detailed explanation about this assignment.  The three condition state descriptions included 
Good, Review, or Damage.  These qualitative descriptions were transformed into vulnerability 
ratings of low, medium, or high, respectively.  Finally, plate-beam asset vulnerability was 
estimated through the combination of individual component conditions assessment.  The plate-
beam barrier databases rates individual run of guardrail using five main descriptions.  Table 5.3 
summarizes the descriptions and their corresponding meaning.  Using these qualitative 




Table 5.4 explains how vulnerability was assigned to the runs of plate-beam barrier.  
Table 5.5 also shows the qualitative descriptions of overhead-sign structures and the 
corresponding vulnerability scales.  These assumptions were made to extract meaningful data 
from these information systems to validate the framework.  
Table 5.3 Plate-beam Barrier Condition Assessment 
(Stefanksi, 2014) 
Condition Description Explanation 
Functional Hit that needs to be fixed 
Non-functional Open Guardrail 
Cosmetic Hit or rust that does not need to be fixed 
End Treatment Broken End treatment either hit or on the ground 
 
Table 5.4 Plate-beam Barrier Vulnerability Assignment 




3-high End Treatment Broken 
 
Table 5.5 Overhead-Sign Structure Vulnerability Assignment 













5.1.5.2 Oregon Department of Transportation 
5.1.5.2.1 Data Extent 
ODOT maintains information systems for unstable slopes (i.e., including rockfall and 
landslide locations) and earth retaining structures (ERS/Walls).  These systems covered selected 
critical routes identified by ODOT in three different regions (i.e., regions 1, 2, and 4). 
5.1.5.2.2 Asset Vulnerability to Failure Assessment  
ODOT’s systems provided different asset information that was useful in determining the 
vulnerability of each asset to failure.  For example, culverts and walls systems had a data field 
designated as the installation date for each culvert.  Since no general condition data was provided 
for both culverts and walls, the remaining service life concept was used to determine the 
vulnerability level of each culvert and wall in the system.  First, service life for each culvert and 
wall type was determined using data from the literature.  Second, the current age of each culvert 
and wall was estimated using the installation year and analysis year.  The age of the asset was 
then compared to the service life established for each type of culvert and wall.    
The percentage remaining service life was determined for each culvert and wall.  Culverts 
and walls that had exceeded 70% of their service life were considered to be highly vulnerable to 
failure.  This data was used to determine all the highly vulnerable culverts and walls in the 
system.  The 70% threshold adopted in this analysis was just an arbitrary number chosen and 
deemed subjective.  A DOT performing this analysis could consider other numbers depending on 
their comfort level and experiences in dealing with the behavior of these assets.  The most 
objective approach in determining the vulnerability of these assets is the use of deterioration 




absence of these mathematical models, reasonable expert opinion as well as surrogates that 
capture performance will suffice for this purpose.  
5.1.5.3 New York State Department of Transportation 
5.1.5.3.1 Data Extent  
NYSDOT provided two additional datasets (i.e., unstable slopes and guardrails) beyond 
culvert data.   With the exception of the culvert data that had statewide coverage, the unstable 
slopes and guardrails data were only for one region (region 5).  However, unstable slopes data 
was only available for limited sections of four different highways in three counties.  Due to this 
data limitation, unstable slopes data from NYSDOT was not utilized in the analysis since it was 
not very representative of unstable slopes in the region.  Consequently, NYSDOT case analysis 
was restricted to two classes of ancillary highway assets (i.e., culverts and guardrails). 
5.1.5.3.2 Asset Vulnerability to Failure Assessment  
NYSDOT’s culvert system provided an overall general recommendation (using a point 
scale of 1 to 7) for culvert structures.  This general recommendation is based on different 
individual items that are rated using a rating scale established by the NYSDOT culvert inspection 
field guide.  The items rated include three broad categories: roadway items, structure items, and 
channel items.  The roadway items consist of pavement condition, shoulders, guide railing 
performance, settlement around the location of the culvert, and embankment performance.  The 
structure items include abutment and pier performance, span of barrel, and headwall and 
wingwall conditions.  Appendix D shows the typical components of a culvert.  The last item, 
channel items, include opening of the culvert, alignment, scour/erosion, silt, debris, and 




NYSDOT uses in assessing individual items of a culvert.  The potential influence of the items on 
the overall recommendation scale depends on the importance of a given item.  As such, the 
general condition of a culvert may or may not match the worse performing element in the list.  
Table 5.7 shows the rating scales used in making the general recommendations for the entire 
culvert structure.  
Table 5.6 NYSDOT Culvert Components Numerical Rating Scale  
(NYSDOT, 2006) 
Numerical Scale Explanation 
9 Condition and/or existence unknown 
8 Not applicable. Used to rate an item the culvert does not have 
7 New condition. No deterioration 
6 Used to shade between ratings of 5 and 7 
5 Minor deterioration but functioning as originally designed 
4 Used to shade between ratings of 3 and 5. Functioning as originally 
designed 
3 Serious deterioration or not functioning as originally designed 
2 Used to shade between ratings of 1 and 3 











7 Like new condition. No repairs required 
6 May require very minor repairs to pavement, guiderail, shoulders, etc. 
5 May require minor repairs to the headwalls or wingwalls. May require removal 
of light vegetation growth around culvert openings. 
4 Pavement may require replacement with the addition of backfill material to 
correct minor roadway settlement problems yet the structure shows no signs of 
deformation or settlement. Wingwalls and headwalls may require significant 
repair work. Some minor work to the channel may be required. 
3 Significant repairs to the pavement are required due to settlement. Slight 
deformation and settlement of the structure exists. Significant deterioration of 
wingwalls and/or headwalls exists. Extensive work on the culvert is required. 
Replacement could be considered a better long term option. 
2 Replacement of the structure is necessary due to serious deformation and 
settlement of the structure. Short-term, remedial action such as pavement 
replacement or installation of additional backfill material is required. 
Temporary shoring may be needed or already exist. A vehicle load restriction 
is probably posted. Replacement of wingwalls and/or headwalls is required. 
Alignment of waterway is such that significant, measurable and progressive, 
general and /or localized scour is occurring. Constriction or obstruction of the 
culvert opening greatly restricts water flow. 
1 Pavement has settled as a result of significant structure deformation or 
settlement. Structure has collapsed or collapse is likely. Culvert opening is 
closed or nearly closed due to embankment soil failure, structure deformation, 
channel sedimentation, debris accumulation, or vegetation growth. Roadway 
should have traffic restrictions or be closed to traffic entirely. 
 
Since the culvert recommendation description offers innate overall condition of the 
culvert, this information was used in assessing culvert vulnerability to failure.  The assumption is 
that, all things being equal, a highly rated recommendation on the scale suggests the culvert 
structure is less likely or less vulnerable to fail (catastrophically or in performance sense).  
Likewise, a culvert with a low rating on the recommendation scale will be highly vulnerable to 




scale of low, medium, and high.  Table 5.8 explains the asset vulnerability scales implemented to 
assess the culverts. 
Table 5.8 NYSDOT Culvert Vulnerability Assessment 
Culvert Recommendation Scale* Vulnerability Scale** 
5, 6, and 7 1-low  
3 and 4 2-medium  
1 and 2 3-high  
 *NYSDOT classification   **HARM-DSS classification 
Similarly, NYSDOT Guiderail Asset Management System (GRAMS) provides inventory 
and inspection information for the purpose of guiding guardrail maintenance and replacement 
programs.  The inspection information includes condition assessment of guardrail components: 
rails, posts, and terminals.  NYSDOT assesses the conditions of each of these components based 
on the degree of physical deterioration, damage, and non-hardware issues.  Physical deterioration 
in this sense refers to components physical effects ensuing from guardrail aging and corrosion or 
decay resulting from components exposure to the weather.  Component deterioration tends to be 
consistent for a given run of guardrail.  However, some localized deterioration can also be 
observed.  Also, damage conditions refer to component defects resulting from impacts to the 
guardrail; for example, vehicle impacts caused by accidents or during snow removal.    
These types of damage tend to be localized.  The final issue assessed is non-
hardware/safety issues.  This assessment is undertaken to determine the functional performance 
of the guardrail with respect to design and surrounding conditions.  For example, the height of a 
guardrail and the presence of fixed objects within the proximity of a guardrail that can affect the 
performance of the guardrail are assessed and rated using a numerical scale rating system 




consistent with other rating systems NYSDOT uses in assessing culverts and bridges (see Table 
5.6).  
Table 5.9 shows an example of rated cable guardrail components.  A similar procedure 
was adopted from Table 5.8 to assign ordinal vulnerability levels to individual guardrail runs.  In 
order to deduce the overall vulnerability of each run of guardrail, the ratings of each component 











5.1.6 Applying Phase Two: Corridor-level Risk Assessment and Prioritization  
Following the data acquisition, asset category prioritization, and individual asset 
vulnerability assessment, the second phase of the framework can be implemented.  The goal of 
the second phase is integrating asset data from phase one to perform corridor-level risk analysis 
and prioritization.  The implementation of phase two of the framework requires detailed and 
extensive data on individual asset vulnerability and corridor alternatives, explicit strategic 
objectives of an agency, and the overarching purpose of the analysis.  Assessing the risks of 
failure of a corridor entails determining the likelihood of failure of individual classes of assets or 
hazards (i.e., the likelihood of occurrence of a threat) located along the corridor, and the severity 
of potential consequences in losing a corridor to any threat.  That is, the likelihood of occurrence 
of any threat to a corridor is dependent on the vulnerability of individual asset classes to failure.  
Consequently, as the density of vulnerable assets increases over a corridor, it is more likely the 
corridor may experience a loss to any of these assets failing.  In these case studies, different 
approaches were adopted in assessing assets vulnerability to failure, detailed for each case study 
in previous sections.   
This approach was adopted because 1) currently, there are no standards for determining 
ancillary highway assets vulnerability to failure and 2) the data available varied significantly in 
terms of the elements available to determine asset conditions and likelihood of failure.  To 
implement the second phase of the framework, different risk types were emphasized: strategic 
(budget planning) and operational (safety, delay, economic development, etc.) risks.  In effect, 
addressing these risks enables a DOT to address its institutional/organizational risk as well.  
Each risk type was assessed using different criteria.  The list of criteria or attribute factors 




process for identifying these measures is recommended to ensure the replicability and 
transparency of the process.  While there are no standard risk criteria for decision making, there 
exist few reasonable criteria decision makers and DOTs consistently adopt in policy 
development and decision analysis.  Accordingly, accomplishing this process will require 
brainstorming techniques or peer-to-peer workshops among decision makers and analysts, with 
inputs from system users, to develop improved criteria.  Next is to categorize, combine the risk 
factors or criteria, and rank each element used in characterizing risks. 
Primarily, with regard to corridor-level assessment, each corridor (based on the definition 
one adopts) is classified as a potential alternative to consider for investment, improvement, or 
monitoring.  In this research, each corridor was defined as a collection of different road 
segments.  This road segment definition was used because the Shapefiles secured for each DOT 
were already segmented by unique IDs.  Consequently, it was reasonable to assume that DOTs 
assessed their network based on these available segments.  Each road segment was identified 
with a “begin” and “end” milepost allowing for the estimation of segment miles, alignment, and 
identification of assets or hazards (threats) within these mileposts.  Each segment was then 
assessed to estimate its criticality, as a measure of potential consequence upon failure, and 
exposure-vulnerability to the threats, as a measure of the road segments likelihood to experience 
a loss.     
5.1.6.1 Assessing Corridor Criticality 
Corridor in this sense is defined as a road segment from a beginning milepost to an 
ending milepost, as presented by a DOT’s highway Shapefiles.  These segments can be 
aggregated to form longer and continuous corridors depending on the purpose for which the 




requires few assumptions.  For simplicity, similar assumptions were used in assessing corridor 
criticality index for all the case studies.  For example, similar weights were assigned to each of 
the risk attributes used in assessing the level of corridor criticality across case study DOTs.  
However, for each DOT with different attitude towards priorities, different weighting scales can 
be developed and assigned to reflect the preferences of decision makers.  For instance, a DOT 
may be more interested in addressing corridors that have higher potential in traffic growth over a 
specified period of time compared to the functional class of the corridor, since the amount of 
traffic is more likely to affect the rate of deterioration of assets over the corridor.  Accordingly, a 
decision maker may assign higher weight to the traffic growth risk attribute relative to the 
corridor functional class risk attribute.  Table 5.10 shows the risk criteria and weights used in 
estimating the criticality of each corridor.  It is important to mention that these risk factors 
employed in the study are not exhaustive.  In fact, additional or new risk items can be evaluated 
and added when a DOT strongly believes that their priorities warrant this action.  
Table 5.10 Corridor Criticality Criteria and Weights 
Criticality Criteria Assigned Weight 
Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) 0.2 
Percentage of Truck Traffic (TTP) 0.2 
Functional Classification of Road 0.2 
Detour Length 0.2 
Expected Traffic Growth 0.2 
Total 1.0 
 
After creating the risk criteria in Table 5.10, the individual criteria were rated on a four-
point scale to allow for a quantitative analysis.  To avoid classifying a corridor to have zero 
criticality, zero was avoided on the rating scale.  Consequently, the scales ranged from 0.1 to 1: 




criticality.  For example, if a failure occurs, a corridor with relatively higher truck traffic will be 
highly impacted when assessing freight throughput (economic development).  Accordingly, a 
relatively higher rating on the scale is assigned.  Likewise, a corridor with relatively lower truck 
traffic is assigned relatively lower rating on the scale.  Similar assignments are generated for the 
remaining risk criteria.  This process allows one to estimate corridor criticality indices that are 
relative among available alternatives under consideration.   For instance, a corridor’s criticality 
index can only be compared to other corridors within the pool of alternatives under 
consideration.  Table 5.11 to Table 5.13 show examples of criticality attribute scales used in the 
case studies. 
Table 5.11 Annual Average Daily Traffic and Truck Traffic Criticality Scale 
AADT TTP (%) Criticality Rating Criticality 
Scale 
Less than 10000 Less than 10 Low 0.1 
10000<=AADT<50000 10<=%<20 Medium 0.3 
50000<=AADT<100000 20<=%<25 Moderate 0.5 
Greater or equal 100000 Greater or equal 25 High 1.0 
 
Table 5.12 Detour and Traffic Growth Criticality Scales 
Detour (d mins) Traffic Growth (p%) Criticality Rating Criticality 
Scale 
Less than or equal 25 Less than or equal 10 Low 0.1 
25< d <= 60 10< p <= 30 Medium 0.3 
60< d <= 120 30< p <= 50 Moderate 0.5 
Greater than 120 Greater than 50 High 1.0 
 
Table 5.13 Road Functional Class Criticality Scales 
Highway Functional Class Criticality Scale 
Local 0.1 
Collector 0.3 
Arterial but not NHS 0.5 




5.1.6.2 Assessing Corridor Exposure-vulnerability  
Fundamental to effective risk management are the concepts of vulnerability and 
exposure.  Primarily, decision makers conscious about risk management are interested in 
knowing how exposed and vulnerable they are to a certain looming threat.  As such, analyzing 
risk without effectively accounting for these terms weakens the credibility of the risk results.  For 
this reason, corridor exposure and vulnerability to threats (asset failure) were estimated as one 
element of the terms characterizing risk.  Due to the significant differences in data completeness, 
different approaches were established for each case study to assess this index.  Reasonable 
assumptions were adapted to complement the available data.   
Each corridor was assessed for its exposure and vulnerability to failure for a given threat.  
Individual threat vulnerability was then combined with the corridor’s exposure factor to obtain 
the overall exposure-vulnerability index for the corridor.  In effect, a DOT can evaluate a 
network by first assessing a corridor’s vulnerability with respect to a single threat or a 
combination of all the threats within the corridor.  Table 5.14 and Table 5.15 explain the 
exposure-vulnerability descriptions and the scale factors used in assessing corridor vulnerability 
to individual threats.      
Some of the categorizations were used across all case studies while other scales were 
developed uniquely for case studies due to data restriction.  For instance, Table 5.14 was 
employed for assessing ODOT culverts and ERS.  Due to the absence of overall condition or 
deterioration information, the reasonable information available to assess culvert and wall 
vulnerability to failure was the date of installation.  As such, it was established that a corridor 
which has more than 70% of its culverts exceeding 70% of their service life will have higher 




for different levels of vulnerability.  For DOTs that provided general asset conditions, it was 
assumed that corridors that have higher percentage of worse-conditioned assets are likely to have 
high vulnerability to failure.  Consequently, using the threat (asset or hazard) vulnerability 
previously developed in phase one, corridor vulnerability scales were assigned.  In practice 
however, decision makers can employ dissimilar vulnerability range classification to emphasize 
their attitude towards risk.      
Table 5.14 Corridor Vulnerability Scales: Assets with Installation Year 
Vulnerability Description Vulnerability Factor 
Less than 30% of walls/culverts has passed 70% of 
service life 
0.1 
Between 30 and 50% walls/culverts have passed 70% 
of service life 
0.3 
Between 50 and 70% walls/culverts have passed 70% 
of service life 
0.5 




Table 5.15 Corridor Vulnerability Scales: Assets with Condition Information 
Vulnerability Description Vulnerability Factor 
% of low vulnerable assets is greater or 
equal to70% 
0.1 
% of low plus % of medium vulnerable 
assets is greater or equal to 70% 
0.3 
% of low plus % of high vulnerable assets is 
greater or equal to 60% 
0.5 
% of high vulnerable assets is greater than 
50% or % of medium plus high vulnerable 




For all the corridor alternatives in the pool, after the corridor criticality and exposure-
vulnerability indices were assessed, the two indices were combined into a single overall risk 
score.  Again, in this aggregation process, one may emphasize one component more by assigning 




Following this process, all the alternative corridors were relatively ranked and the results 
analyzed.  Section 5.2 presents a discussion of the results and the implications of the results to 
policy development and decision making.  
5.2 Discussion of Case Study Results 
This section presents the three case study results ensuing from the application of the HARM-
DSS framework described in chapter four, and the developed risk criteria factors in section 5.1.  
The subsections detail results on asset vulnerability, corridor vulnerability to individual threats 
(asset failure or hazard occurrence), corridor criticality, corridor exposure-vulnerability, and 
corridor overall risk score.  It is imperative to note that these results are only relative for a given 
DOT.  Consequently, there is no intention or value in comparing results among case study DOTs.  
Three overarching deductions emerged from analyzing the case studies.   
 There is the need for Federal commitments or mandates to develop standards for 
gathering highway ancillary assets inventory and inspection data, and assessing 
asset vulnerability.  Such commitments and mandates can help with comparisons 
of DOTs among each other; especially, for the purpose of identifying potential 
states for federal funding allocation similar to the benefits the NBI system offers.   
  In the absence of quality and complete data, if DOTs can find reasonable means 
to assess threat vulnerability to implement the HARM-DSS, the results from the 
analysis can provide valuable information for better maintenance prioritization as 
well as asset and corridor monitoring that can offer greater cost savings by 




 An integrated approach to highway asset management, addressing the needs of 
ancillary highway assets, promises to enable DOTs continue to offer 
uninterrupted operations to network users. 
5.2.1 Minnesota Department of Transportation 
 Generally, the outcome of the overall risk score was consistent with the anticipated 
results.  Figure 5.1 shows that for corridors with comparable criticality index, the overall risk 
score was driven by the exposure-vulnerability index.  Similarly, for corridors with comparable 
exposure-vulnerability index, the overall risk score was differentiated by the criticality of 
corridors.  
 
Figure 5.1 MnDOT Distribution of Corridor Risk Elements 
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of asset category vulnerability.  The results show that 
MnDOT has very high performing overhead-sign structures.  In other words, only 3% of 




































































































none of the sign structures has a high vulnerability level.  This observation implies that 3% of the 
sign structures were under “review”.  The remaining 97% of sign structures in the study area 
were categorized as having low vulnerability.  Again, majority of the sign structures were 
classified as “Good”.   
This observation can be attributed partially to Federal mandates that require DOTs to 
maintain minimum standards for sign infrastructure.  Although the mandate emphasizes 
retroreflectivity of signs, many DOTs are similarly concerned with the structural integrity of 
signs as well.  In the case of culverts and plate-beam barriers, 11% and 20%, respectively, were 
found to have high vulnerability.  This observation implies that 11% of MnDOT culverts within 
the study area were ranked as poor or very poor.  These culverts are deteriorated or have serious 
deterioration and need consideration for repairs.   
Figure 5.2 also shows that 73% of culverts were categorized as medium vulnerability 
(i.e., these culverts have fair conditions with some wear, but are structurally sound) and the 
remaining 16% as low vulnerability (i.e., like new).  Finally, 53% and 27% of plate-beam barrier 
were categorized as medium and low vulnerability, respectively.   That is, 53% of the items in 
the database have experienced some hits and need to be fixed but are still functional.  Whereas 
27% of the barriers only had cosmetic defects (hits or rust that does not need to be fixed), the 





Figure 5.2 MnDOT Asset Category Vulnerability Performance 
 Figure 5.3 shows the percentages of corridors vulnerable to a given asset category or 
threat.  The general observation is that very small percentages of corridors are highly vulnerable 
to any given threat.  In fact, only 5, 4, and 2% of the corridors were identified to be highly 
vulnerable to culverts, plate-beam barriers, and overhead-sign structures, respectively.  This 
observation was not surprising since very small percentages of assets were identified to show 
high vulnerability in Figure 5.2.  For instance, more than 50% of the corridors were identified to 
show low vulnerability to plate-beam barriers.  Similarly, 68% of the corridors were identified to 
have medium vulnerability to culverts failure.  This observation shows that most of MnDOT 
culverts were ranked as low or medium vulnerability, which is consistent with the observations 






























Figure 5.3 MnDOT Corridor Vulnerability Based on Asset Category 
 Further, Figure 5.4 shows percentage categorization of corridors based on corridor risk 
elements: corridor criticality, exposure-vulnerability, and overall risk score.  Over 90% of the 
corridors were categorized between low and medium risk.  This observation is attributed to the 
fact that almost 80% of the corridors were ranked between low and medium corridor exposure-
vulnerability.  It was not surprising to see only 1% of the corridors classified as high risk.  
Notably, even though 30% of the corridors were identified to be highly critical due to high 
functional classification, high truck volume and expected traffic growth, and long detours, a very 
small percentage (7%) of the corridors was identified to exhibit high corridor exposure-
vulnerability scores.  Figure 5.5 to Figure 5.7 show corridor locations and their relative 
performances in criticality, exposure-vulnerability, and overall risk scores.  Appendices E.1 to 
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Figure 5.4 MnDOT Corridor Risk Elements 
 



































Figure 5.6 MnDOT Corridor Criticality Index 
 




5.2.2 New York State Department of Transportation 
 This section discusses the results ensuing from NYSDOT’s analysis.  The section 
includes graphs and maps showing the relative performance of corridor alternatives that may be 
targeted for investment or monitoring.  Figure 5.8 shows the distribution of corridor criticality, 
exposure-vulnerability, and risk scores.  The general observation is very intuitive.  Generally, 
corridors with relatively high criticality index and exposure-vulnerability index consequently 
exhibit relatively high risk.  Primarily, the risk score of corridors with no exposure-vulnerability 
is directly proportional to the criticality of the corridor.  This prevents DOTs from categorizing a 
corridor as having zero risk.   
 
Figure 5.8 NYSDOT Distribution of Corridor Risk Elements 
 Figure 5.9 shows the percentages of asset category (threat) vulnerability levels.  Figure 
5.9 indicates that 58% of culverts within the study area have medium vulnerability to failure.  
This observation suggests that 58% of the culverts in the study area were classified to have 













































































































pavement or may require extensive work due to deterioration of wingwalls and/or headwalls (see 
Table 5.7).  Furthermore, 13% of the culverts were classified to have high vulnerability to 
failure.  The implication of this observation is that these culverts were assigned a culvert 
recommendation scale of 1 and/or 2.  As such, these culverts may require replacement due to 
serious deformation and settlement of the structure.  These culverts may also show signs of 
imminent collapse.  Additional unfavorable conditions may also exist (see Table 5.7).   
 Finally, 29% of culverts were classified as exhibiting low vulnerability of failure.  This 
classification indicates that close to 30% of the culverts were assigned a numerical 
recommendation scale of 5, 6, and/or 7 during the culvert inspection and rating process.  These 
culverts are identified as requiring no repairs, requiring minor repairs to pavement or shoulder, or 
requiring minor removal of light vegetation (see Table 5.7).   
 Similar insinuations can be made from Figure 5.9 for guardrails.  Over 60% of the 
guardrails were identified to have high vulnerability to failure.  This implies that over 60% of the 
guardrails were classified in the scale rating of 1 to 3 (see Table 5.9).  On the other hand, 28% 
and 9% were classified as low and medium vulnerable, respectively.  These observations imply 





Figure 5.9 NYSDOT Asset Category Vulnerability Performance 
Figure 5.110 and Figure 5.121 compare the percentages of corridor vulnerability levels 
attributed to a given threat or asset category and percentage of corridors identified for each level 
of risk element, respectively.  Figure 5.10 shows that 85% of the corridors have low vulnerability 
to culvert asset failure and 12% have medium vulnerability to culvert failure.  This observation 
suggests that more than 70% of the culverts on these corridors were classified to have a medium 
vulnerability to failure.  This inference is consistent with the observation made in Figure 5.9.  
That is, 87% of the culverts were identified to have low to medium vulnerability to failure.  This 
means that majority of culverts on these corridors had a general condition of numerical scale 3-7 
(see Table 5.7).   
Only 3% of the corridors were identified to have moderate to high vulnerability to culvert 
failure.  This suggests that, the 13% of culverts classified to have high vulnerability to failure in 
Figure 5.9 were widely-spread over the study area.  Accordingly, this limited the percentage of 


























corridors to failure.  In fact, only 1% of corridors were identified to exhibit high vulnerability to 
failure.  This implies that, for this 1% of corridors, the sum of culverts with high and medium 
vulnerability to failure is greater than or equal to 70%, or more than 50% of the culverts located 
on these corridors have high vulnerability to failure.  In the case of guardrails, the majority of the 
corridors were identified to have low vulnerability to failure.   
This finding was not consistent with what was observed in Figure 5.9, in which about 
60% of guardrails were identified to have high vulnerability to failure.  Nonetheless, it can be 
concluded that these highly vulnerable guardrails were not concentrated, but widely spread out 
over corridors in the entire region.  That is, there were very few corridors that had 50% or more 
of the guardrails located on them to have a categorization of high vulnerability, or there were 
very few corridors that had 70% of all guardrails to fall within medium and high vulnerability.  
These results demonstrate the importance of the spatial component in integrated corridor analysis 
as the spatial distribution of the asset and hazard conditions and influence system performance in 





Figure 5.10 NYSDOT Corridor Vulnerability Based on Asset Category 
 Figure 5.11 illustrates the percentage of corridors within each category scale of the risk 
elements.  Over 70% of the corridors were classified as being of moderate to high criticality.  
This classification signifies that most of the corridors are of higher functional class, and have 
high traffic growth, or longer detour lengths.  Majority (86%) of the corridors were classified to 
have low exposure-vulnerability index.  This scenario is consistent to the observation made in 
Figure 5.10.  Since nearly 85% of the corridors were identified to have low vulnerability to 
culvert and guardrail failures, it is not a surprise to have 86% of the corridors falling in the lower 
category of corridor exposure-vulnerability index.  Consequently, over 60% of the corridors were 
classified as low and medium risk, and only 7% classified as high risk which is mostly influence 
by the 7% corridors that were classified as having high corridor criticality.  Figure 5.12 shows 
corridors with highly ranked exposure-vulnerability to culverts and guardrails.  This figure 
enables decision makers to quickly identify highly vulnerable corridors for further analysis, 
intervention, or better budget planning.  Figure 5.13 to Figure 5.15 show corridor locations and 





























Appendices F.1 to F.3 show geographic locations of corridors and their relative vulnerability to 
failure for each threat category. 
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Figure 5.12 NYSDOT Corridor Exposure-Vulnerability Distribution 
 
 















































































































Figure 5.14 Section of NYSDOT Region 5 Corridor Criticality Index 
 




5.2.3 Oregon Department of Transportation 
 This section presents some outputs resulting from analyzing data from ODOT.  The 
outputs are route criticality, exposure-vulnerability, overall risk indices, and percentage of 
corridors vulnerable to a given threat, for each vulnerability level.  Figure 5.16 shows the 
distribution of corridor risk elements.  The graph shows that the key driver factor to the overall 
risk score was corridor criticality.  This is because in this case study, most of the corridors 
exhibited low exposure-vulnerability scores (see Figure 5.18).  In fact, Figure 5.17 shows that 
majority of the corridors have low vulnerability to failure with respect to all asset categories 
(threats).  In addition, 5% of the corridors were identified to have high vulnerability to wall 
failure.  This observation implies that 70% of the walls located on these alternative corridors 
have reached or exceeded 70% of their service life.   
 



















Figure 5.17 ODOT Corridor Vulnerability Based on Asset Category 
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 Figure 5.19 gives DOTs a tool to quickly identify corridors exhibiting unusual 
performance relating to vulnerability to an asset or hazard class failure.  For instance, an agency 
can quickly identify the corridors in the network showing high vulnerability to ERS failure in 
Figure 5.19.  Having this information, such as about 70% of ERS located on these corridors have 
reached or exceeded 70% of their service life, informs an agency in their emergency 
preparedness plan if such information is not readily used in budget planning.  In addition, Figure 
5.20 and Figure 5.21 show heat maps of the study area indicating how relative scores of corridor 
exposure-vulnerability and risk are distributed.  These geographic representation outputs offer 
decision makers the sense of spatial distribution of problem areas.   Appendices G.1 to G.3 show 
geographic locations of corridors and their relative vulnerability to failure for each threat 
category. 
 


































Figure 5.20 ODOT Corridor Exposure-Vulnerability Index Heat Map 
 




5.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 As discussed in Chapter four, sensitivity analysis provides decision makers and analysts 
the ability to vary data inputs and analyze the effects on outputs.  This procedure allows decision 
makers to identify key driving variables (e.g., asset or hazard category or segment of a corridor) 
in the decision analysis process.  For instance, if after the completion of risk assessment process, 
decision makers want to identify the most influential category of asset that will help reduce the 
overall exposure-vulnerability index of a corridor, it is possible to vary the inputs (corridor 
vulnerability to failure index with respect to a given asset class), observe the outputs (corridor 
overall exposure-vulnerability index), and identify the most influential class of assets or hazards.   
Figure 5.22 exemplifies a sensitivity results for MnDOT data.  Figure 5.22 shows the 
effect that each asset category has on the overall exposure-vulnerability of a corridor.  The 
results show that, for a given corridor, increasing corridor vulnerability to sign failure to the next 
worse vulnerability level will result in the greatest exacerbation of the overall exposure-
vulnerability.  With this information, decision makers can develop policies that ensure that 
corridor vulnerability to sign failure does not increase above the current condition.  Similarly, in 
reducing corridor vulnerability to any asset class failure, culverts offer the greatest improvement 
benefits to the overall exposure-vulnerability.   
The figure shows that any change in the vulnerability level for platebeam will not notably 
increase the overall corridor vulnerability.  This confirms that platebeam vulnerability is at its 
worst performance currently.  As such, this is an asset class area that will require immediate 
attention.  However, reducing its vulnerability does not return significant benefits to the overall 
corridor exposure-vulnerability.  This information helps decision makers to free up resources for 




corridors with highest risks in the event that the exposure-vulnerability of these corridors 
increases by 50%.  The sensitivity analysis shows that the corridor with a 0.3493 SR will 
experience the greatest risk.  Consequently, decision makers can emphasize this corridor in 
policy development and budgetary planning.     
 
Figure 5.22 Sensitivity Analysis: Asset Class Vulnerability Influence on Overall Corridor Exposure-
Vulnerability 
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Table 5.16 Sensitivity Analysis: Different Corridor Alternatives 
 
For given corridor alternatives (Increase Exposure-Vulnerability by 50%) 








SR Corridor Initial Final Initial Final 
US Highway 10_seg1 0.013 0.020 0.452 0.454 0.0077 
US Highway 169 0.033 0.050 0.339 0.344 0.0296 
US Highway 10_seg11 0.018 0.027 0.453 0.529 0.3493 
State Highway 65 0.009 0.014 0.388 0.389 0.0071 
 
5.2.4 Policy Implication 
 The introduction, implementation, and enforcement of some aspects of MAP-21will lead 
to risk-based planning and programming in State DOTs.  DOTs will need to establish this formal 
planning procedure to meet the requirements of the 2012 surface transportation bill.  Primarily, 
DOTs will need to develop and implement pragmatic risk frameworks and models that can assist 
them in achieving their objectives.  The framework and models presented in this research are 
mainly practical examples of decision-informing tools for capital budgeting, not necessarily 
asset-specific assessment tools for prioritizing assets.  However, the tools make provision for this 
task to be accomplished with limited assumptions.  If a DOT can successfully implement this 
risk-based decision-support management system, the agency will not only position itself to fulfill 
the requirements of MAP-21 and avoid any undesirable actions from the Federal government, 
but will also benefit from utilizing the approach as a platform for identifying imminent risks in 
the transportation network.  These actions can lead to making optimal investment decisions, 
providing better accountability to the public, and monitoring resulting effects, which serve as a 




 As a result of other factors (challenging to account for) that affect the outcome of risk 
assessment procedures, the resulting outputs in a risk analysis program may not reflect accurate 
estimates of true network vulnerability and risk; however, the ensuing outcome can still generate 
useful information for decision-makers in policy development and selection.  Similarly, decision-
makers can improve organizational business and operational procedures through the use of such 
results.  Further, the benefits of this research include, but are not limited to: converting DOTs’ 
asset information systems into a decision-support or asset management system, identifying 
corridors with high vulnerability to failure with respect to a given category of asset, estimating 
corridors’ exposure-vulnerability, corridors’ criticality, and corridors’ overall risk score.  This 
information is useful in scoping and budgeting future investment programs based on 
infrastructure condition and future federal or state funding, allowing for better planning of 
maintenance and preservation activities. 
 Consequently, with the results presented in the previous section (section 5.2) available to 
DOTs or decision makers, the risk of failure of a corridor—due to asset categories selected by a 
DOT for systematic management—can be reduced by adopting specific risk mitigation 
strategies.  With the aforementioned information, a corridor’s risk to failure can be mitigated if a 
DOT or decision makers adopt one of the following risk reduction strategies: 
 Identify corridors with highest overall risk scores and prioritize for risk reduction.  This 
action may target corridors with both highest criticality and highest exposure-
vulnerability scores. 
 Identify corridors with highest exposure-vulnerability scores for programming.  This 
prioritization process gives priority to corridors that are highly exposed and vulnerable to 




 Identify corridors with greatest risk reduction as a result of reducing all corridor 
vulnerability by a certain percentage (sensitivity analysis).  This action targets corridors 
that show highest risk reduction ensuing from investing similar amounts of resources in 
all available alternative corridors to address corridor exposure-vulnerability (see section 
5.2.3). 
 Identify asset categories that offer the greatest vulnerability reduction, for a given 
corridor.  This strategy gives decision makers the ability to identify an asset category that 
is most influential in reducing the vulnerability of a corridor to failure (see section 5.2.3). 
 Identify corridors with highest criticality scores.  This programming strategy basically 
directs resources to corridors with higher functional classification, higher AADT and 
TTP, longer detours or limited existing redundancy, and higher expected traffic growth.  
Adopting this strategy enables decision makers to monitor and preserve relatively 
important or critical corridors in the network, although these identified corridors may not 
have a relatively higher exposure-vulnerability score.  If the corridor is identified as 
having no or little vulnerability, resources can be freed up for other corridors.  On the 
other hand, monitoring such corridors will be beneficial since assets on these corridors 
may tend to deteriorate faster due to the initial characteristics enumerated. 
 Use sensitivity results to set targets for asset category vulnerability.  The sensitivity 
results help decision makers to identify asset categories vulnerability levels that will drive 
the entire corridor vulnerability.  This information allows decision makers to set tolerable 








Risk-based transportation asset management is becoming a common practice among 
DOTs with the introduction of MAP-21, which mandates all DOTs to undertake and establish a 
risk-based asset management system for the NHS.  In the past, practitioners have practiced risk-
based decision making though they have not called it such.  This is due to the lack of 
documentation and consistency in the processes.  Prior to MAP-21, the majority of risk-based 
decision making in TAM was restricted to the project level.  Basically, DOTs were more 
concerned with assessing and addressing agency’s risks to project cost overruns, project 
schedule, and safety.  In the aftermath of the passage of MAP-21 though, international practices 
have shown that risk-based decision making at program and organizational levels have great 
value.  While some agencies have taken proactive steps in addressing risk at the program level, 
often, their actions are restricted to individual assets, programs, or systems.  This approach to 
asset management is typically referred to as the silo, standalone, or stovepipe management.  This 
process results in suboptimal decision making in the wake of limited funds and aging 
infrastructure.   
This silo form of treating risk within a transportation network gives rise to unwanted risks 
that may emanate from unmanaged subsystems or hazards.  Accordingly, a more unified 
framework that comprehensively and holistically considers critical subsystems and addresses 




dissertation develops a framework, the HARM-DSS, which adopts the concept of a system-of 
systems approach in analyzing and addressing risk.  The framework demonstrates that dominant 
transportation highway features (core assets), such as pavements and bridges, are not the only 
sources of risk to a transportation network.  However, possible failures resulting from supporting 
features or hazards, such as culverts, walls, guardrails, or unstable slopes (rockfall/landslide) can 
also contribute to an organization’s risks.  Hence, the need to consider these features 
simultaneously in addressing sources of risk within a transportation network.   
In addition, the framework emphasizes that agency risks are usually multi-dimensional.  
As such, the most effective approach to alleviate an agency’s risks requires the inclusion of 
multiple criteria in the risk assessment process.  The consideration of multiple attributes in the 
risk assessment process enables the framework to capture important facets of risk that an agency 
may be dealing with at any given time.  To assess the effectiveness and adoptability of the 
framework, this dissertation implements the HARM-DSS in different contexts, developing case 
studies with dissimilar data availability and quality.  The results of the case studies demonstrate 
the strength and flexibility of the framework.  Most noticeably, pertaining to the framework’s 
applicability to different scenarios of asset data exhibiting dissimilar maturity levels, the results 
are encouraging.  The results further confirmed that the framework is an effective means of 
providing important decision information to decision makers; especially, when dealing with 
limited data.   
Precisely, the following conclusions can be deduced from the results of the HARM-DSS 
methodology case studies: 
 The case study modeling validates the concepts of the framework: systematically 




descriptive and intuitive results that decision makers can use in allocating resources 
during the decision-making process.  
 The proposed methodology has the capability of analyzing all the individual components 
of the risk score and their combined effects on specific alternatives under different 
criteria. 
 Objectivity and confidence in the analysis results can be improved through the collection 
of asset data, such as complete asset inventory and condition data that best represent the 
state of the transportation infrastructure. 
 The use of expert judgment or knowledge in supplementing available data remains the 
viable direction in implementing the framework as more and better-quality data become 
available.  
6.1.2 Implementing the HARM-DSS 
As DOTs continue to establish and implement their risk-based asset management, 
opportunities exist for decision makers to benefit from the different risk management programs 
that have been implemented throughout the United States and overseas.  Certainly, many of these 
programs may vary, based on the needs and priorities of the implementing agency.  Most 
especially, the geographical configuration of a DOT’s network and data availability can greatly 
influence the approach to implementing the HARM-DSS in a decision making process.  
Essentially, there is certainly no one-size-fits-all approach to implementing this framework and 
model.  However, if properly adopted as part of a decision analysis process, the framework can 
offer potential benefits to DOTs: for instance, preparing informed budget plans, preserving asset 
conditions, and mitigating the risks these assets may present to the management of the 




In fact, the flexibility of this framework is pertinent to assessing the performance and 
vulnerability of ancillary highway assets.  Notably, there is no current standard approach in 
assessing the conditions of highway ancillary assets (except the retroreflectivity of signs).  As 
such, adopting the HARM-DSS will require establishing clear and simple directions, clarified 
and documented by decision makers, to assess asset conditions when clear standards are lacking.  
The need for a condition assessment allows decision makers to distinguish between critical and 
highly vulnerable asset types in the preliminary stages of the framework.  This vulnerability 
assessment goes on to inform the detailed corridor analysis.  Asset vulnerability is a fundamental 
input to risk analysis since it relates to the susceptibility of an asset to damage or failure.  On the 
other hand, asset criticality relates to the importance or the need for an asset to be included in a 
systematic framework.  Specifically, asset or corridor criticality drives the priority of data 
collection for the given asset or corridor.  
6.1.3 Considering the Synergies between Systems and Silo Analysis  
One of the main objectives of this dissertation is to address the shortcomings that the silo 
approach to risk management presents.  In effective, addressing system risks in a holistic 
manner.  Any attempt for decision makers to address these risks from a SoS approach requires a 
comprehensive understanding of the system.  Understanding a system thoroughly includes 
knowledge on how each of the categories of assets competes, conflicts, or complements others in 
the operation of the transportation network.  Understanding these synergies enables decision 
makers and analysts to better identify and eventually reduce inherent risks.  Regardless of the 
strengths and effectiveness of an integrated risk-based framework, such as HARM-DSS, one 




However, acknowledging that both approaches are needed to complement each other can result 
in a more transparent, effective, and comprehensive risk management process.   
Fundamentally, the results from the silo risk assessment should be used as inputs to the 
integrated framework and vice versa.  For instance, if an integrated analysis indicates that a 
corridor requires urgent attention due to its vulnerability to failure, a meticulous analysis of the 
asset classes along the corridor will require a silo analysis.  This further analysis allows one to 
identify the most vulnerable assets to failure and/or critical features.  Analysts and decision 
makers can accomplish this procedure through a process of iterations between the integrated- and 
silo-risk analysis processes.  Consequently, this decision-support system provides a reasonable, 
flexible, replicable, and defensible analytical approach for decision makers to make informed 
budget planning and resource utilization decisions. 
6.1.4 Assessing Asset Vulnerability 
The literature reveals a variety of contextual approaches in assessing vulnerability.  
Vulnerability measures a system/agency’s susceptibility to incident occurrence or threat (usually 
with a negative implication).  Vulnerability in a larger risk assessment process provides analysts 
with a sense of how likely it is that a system can be impacted.  A systems vulnerability measure 
is an important element in the risk analysis process.  The risk measure or estimate of a system or 
infrastructure is partly dependent on the susceptibility to failure of a system or infrastructure.  
Through the vulnerability assessment, one can estimate how likely a system or infrastructure will 
fail as well as the consequence resulting from the failure.   
A transportation system can be vulnerable to a diverse number of threats, including the 
failure of individual AHA, or occurrence of rockfalls or landslides.  Similarly, a transportation 




first assess the vulnerability of the threats pertaining to the system or agency.  The vulnerability 
assessment process involves several tasks.  First, one has to understand the system or agency’s 
mission and objectives.  Second is to identify any threats to the mission and objectives of the 
system or agency and determine how vulnerable the system or agency is to the identified threats.  
To properly estimate system vulnerability, one has to have a thorough knowledge of how the 
system is designed, operates, and deteriorates.     
6.1.5 Scaling Attributes Preference 
The foundation of the model used in this unified decision-support framework is the 
preferences of decision makers or stakeholders.  Accordingly, preference scaling is an inevitable 
step in the framework.  The ability of the framework to scale and amalgamate all relevant criteria 
in the decision process enables decision makers to make informed decisions in selecting 
alternatives.  An analyst employing the HARM-DSS framework must adopt a strategy to scale 
the preferences of stakeholders with respect to each criterion considered in the multi-criteria 
problem.  The scaling approach one adopts depends on many factors: data availability, 
experience of the analyst, value of the analysis, or available resources.  This dissertation adopts 
the exponential value functions and direct assignment method to scale the attributes considered 
in the multi-criteria problem.   
These two approaches are very useful in the current study because the exponential value 
function offers a quantitative and objective uniform scale on which individual alternatives are 
compared.  Conversely, the direct construct or assignment process of attribute scaling adds value 
to the assessment process in areas of the problem in which objective data is not available.  
Although this may introduce subjective judgment (i.e., expert judgment) in the analysis process, 




decision-making process allow for adjustments to be made as more and quality data become 
available.  For decision makers to effectively benefit from this DSS framework, one must 
understand the advantages the HARM-DSS provides, as well as the limitations that inhibit the 
attractiveness and potential benefits of the framework. 
6.1.2 Selecting a Risk Characterization Method 
The risk characterization step in the proposed framework involves the identification of a 
structured format that combines risk elements to obtain a quantitative expression of risk.  The 
literature presents traditional forms and emerging strategies in the characterization of risk.  
Further, there are additional studies that document the strengths and weaknesses of methods 
researchers and practitioners have used.  This work adopts a strategy that is a hybrid of 
traditional methods and emerging strategies.  The traditional method uses probability and 
consequences of failure elements to characterize risk.  In this method, the same concept of 
probability and consequence is employed; however, the method for assessing these risk elements 
is based on a multi-dimensional perspective.  This method does not only allow decision makers 
to address multiple risks, but also allows analysts to employ surrogates for hard-to-come-by 
probability of failure, cost, and consequence data.  For instance, to estimate the consequence of 
failure (which is referred to in the HARM-DSS as corridor criticality), the DSS uses attributes, 
such as AADT, TTP, and the length of detour.  Similarly, to estimate the probability of failure 
(which is referred to in the HARM-DSS as corridor exposure-vulnerability), the vulnerability to 
failure of each asset category is considered, the density of features indicating the number of 





6.2 Recommendations  
This dissertation has identified a few areas that can help DOTs and decision makers to maximize 
their potential benefits from the application of this framework.  These areas include, but are not 
limited to, addressing data needs, developing better procedures and measures for vulnerability, 
developing targets, and receiving support and guidelines from the Federal government.  The 
following sections elaborate on these areas of concern and make recommendations that can help 
improve the potential benefits associated with the application of this decision-support tool. 
6.2.1 Data Needs 
  It is quite telling from practical experience that, often, quality data can lead to better 
results from modeling, and essentially result in better investment decision making.  Although this 
correlation may not necessary be linear, one can reduce the level of subjectivity or uncertainty if 
an analysis is solely based on objective and quality data instead of surrogates.  This dissertation 
and other literature highlight data availability issues associated with the management of ancillary 
highway assets risk.  Mainly because of the lack of mandates and standards that require agencies 
to gather such data, it has become a voluntary practice among DOTs to maintain consistent and 
current data (condition, cost of failure, installation data, or location) for these asset categories.  
However, if any meaningful results are to be gained from using this framework, there needs to be 
some level of asset data upon which incremental data gathering can follow.   
Reasonably, from a resource perspective, it will be practically impossible for DOTs to 
have complete data on all of their ancillary highway assets.  Nonetheless, the level of data 
quantity and quality of most critical assets will influence the potential benefits this framework 
offers decision makers.  At the least, this dissertation recommends the following: first, identify 




help identify highly vulnerable segments of identified critical corridors.  And as resources 
become available, data collection can be extended to other sections or lower functional 
classifications of the transportation network, for system-wide analysis.  Most importantly, the 
requisite data must be collected with a common referencing system or the ability to integrate 
other systems to a common linear referencing system that enables spatial analysis.  This task 
allows for a better identification of possible failure points (infrastructure) within segments or 
alternative corridors under investigation.  
6.2.2 Target Setting 
Targets guide decision makers to measure progress or performance as well as avoid 
liabilities.  They frame performance objectives within selected timeframes and contribute to the 
foundation for making informed decisions.  Fundamentally, targets motivate decision makers to 
perceive a cause of action to eliminate an impending risk or capitalize on existing opportunity, 
within a designated timeframe.  Specific and achievable targets can drive executive and 
engineering decisions in risk-based transportation asset management.  However, setting targets in 
decision making is very challenging without rigorous analysis to justify a selected threshold.  
Currently, no such targets exist for estimating vulnerability of ancillary assets.  However, the 
framework presented offers decision makers a tool (sensitivity analysis) to investigate key 
driving factors driving vulnerability in various areas of study.  This tool provides a practical 
approach for decision makers to identify specific vulnerability levels that exacerbate corridor 
exposure-vulnerability, and thus identify where the highest expected returns are for investments.  
Thus the sensitivity report is recommended as a target setting tool for decision makers, and it can 




6.2.3 Federal Commitments 
 As mentioned previously, the lack of consistency in data collection process within or 
among DOTs makes it difficult for one to acquire better information for analysis.  Indeed, 
missing data in inspection database exacerbates data challenges that the framework faces.  
Addressing these issues sometimes requires mandates from the Federal government.  For 
example, databases such as the NBI and HPMS have continuously performed well and met their 
goals because of Federal requirements, oversight and guidelines.  As FHWA encourages DOTs 
to address network risks in a comprehensive manner, the need also arises for commitments and 
standards that will guide agencies in integrating additional management/information systems into 
their existing systems.  Therefore, there is the need for Federal commitments or mandates to 
develop standards for gathering ancillary highway assets inventory and inspection data, and 
assessing asset vulnerability.  Such commitments and mandates can help with the comparison of 
DOTs among each other; especially, for the purpose of identifying potential states in Federal 
funding allocation similar to the benefits the NBI system offers.       
6.2.4 Performance Assessment  
Performance modeling, measuring, and monitoring represent key aspects of any asset 
management system.  Similarly, a key component to the successful implementation and 
realization of the potential benefits of this DSS is the determination of appropriate performance 
measures and levels to use for assessing asset vulnerability to failure.  The ability to efficiently 
manage risks associated with the failure of these asset classes is partly dependent on the 
availability of better performance prediction models.  In basic terms, one can only properly 
manage the things that one is able to measure.  The lack of performance prediction models to 




better failure likelihoods or probabilities.  As such, it is important to have a consistent set of 
performance measures that communicate to an analyst or a decision maker the physical 
conditions of the asset one is assessing.  Currently, the management of AHA lacks consistent 
performance measures that one can use as a benchmark in assessing the vulnerability of 
infrastructure, but for one—retroreflectivity of signs.  Accordingly, it is recommended that 
decision makers rely on expert knowledge to develop an initial set of measures.  With time, other 
avenues of research can be explored to evaluate and refine these measures to improve their 
objectivity.  It is also recommended that future studies explore the development of performance 
prediction models that are specific to DOT’s geographic locations to study the behavior of AHA. 
6.3 Research Contributions 
Previous research has shown that risk management is a useful decision-support tool that 
enhances the practices of transportation asset management.  In addition, evidence in the literature 
shows that researchers and decision makers have made considerable effort to manage ancillary 
highway assets.  However, these combined efforts are usually limited to silo style of 
management.  The present research is designed to consider risk-based asset management in an 
integrated manner, considering mostly ancillary highway assets.  Primarily, the findings of the 
research add to the knowledge and understanding of the subject of risk and its application to 
transportation asset management. Specifically, this work demonstrates capabilities for integrated 
risks assessment of non-homogemous assets and hazards (natural and artificial hazards) in a 
transportation system, and the value added to risk-based investment decision making.  The work 
does not purpose to replace silo-ed risk management but has demonstrated the value of integrated 
and silo-ed risk management: while integrated risk management gives a breadth of view, silo-ed 




the system under consideration.  In addition, this study offers three main contributions to the 
state of practice of transportation asset management and decision making. 
First of all, the research provides a framework and methodological approach that helps 
decision makers to identify and prioritize classes of ancillary assets for systematic management.  
The HARM-DSS is a flexible tool that is able to accommodate a variety of asset data (i.e., 
quantitative or qualitative) to yield reasonable results.  That is, the framework demonstrates the 
possibility of assessing risk through modified approaches.  Traditionally, assessing risk requires 
quantitative or probabilistic functions that are not in existence or challenging to develop for 
ancillary highway assets.  This research provides other means of addressing these challenges 
through the use of expert knowledge and a different characterization of risk.   
Secondly, the common practice in asset management among DOTs has focused mainly 
on pavements and bridges, offering less attention to ancillary highway assets.  This research 
bridges this gap by enabling DOTs and decision makers to collectively manage these assets on a 
corridor level.  This unified corridor-level approach to risk management allows decision makers 
to understand the factors associated with risk decision context.  In effect, the method can enable 
decision makers to assess the relative exposure-vulnerability of a corridor to a particular asset 
class failure, the relative criticality of a corridor, and the combined relative risk effect of a 
corridor.   
Finally, the method provides additional benefits in operating and monitoring 
transportation network.  Specifically, the flexibility provided by the method allows transportation 
operation managers to assess network risk on a time specific basis.  Primarily, the framework is 
typically for policy development and budgetary planning purposes.  However, this additional 




identify areas of the network that may be susceptible to an imminent threat.  Largely, this 
research provides a unique practical contribution to e transportation agencies implementing the 
requirements of MAP-21, which mandates all DOTs to develop risk-based TAMS for the NHS.   
6.4 Future Research 
This section summarizes and suggests additional research that can further enhance the potential 
benefits offered by this research.  It is important to appreciate that there should not be an end to 
the investigation of integrated risk-based asset management; especially, as DOTs continue to 
investigate reasonable ways to incorporate other classes of assets into their asset management 
system.  It is clear from the research results, conclusions, and recommendations that much more 
can be done to add to the potential benefits of this dissertation.  Integrated risk-based 
management is an effective tool when addressing highway network vulnerability to ancillary 
assets failure.   
A major contribution of this research is the ability to incorporate the vulnerability of 
ancillary assets to failure into the risk-based decision process.  Most of the methods used in 
assessing asset vulnerability and, subsequently, corridor vulnerability were based on past 
condition data.  Though past condition data can offer good insight to future performance of an 
asset, it does not really capture other uncertainties.  For this reason, it is recommended that future 
research should investigate and develop deterioration models for ancillary assets that can capture 
these uncertainties.   
Other research areas that will help augment this study include the investigation of other 
external threats (systemic threats—built into the framework but not implemented in the case 
study) that can influence the vulnerability of an asset to failure.  For instance, the effect of 




great information in the risk-informed decision process.  In addition, a large number of the 
criteria used in assessing asset vulnerability were subjectively characterized.  There is no doubt 
that subjectivity is inherent in any decision making process.  Nonetheless, research that can 
develop criteria scales supported by established evidence or empirical data can greatly refine the 
results presented in this study.   
Furthermore, it may be worthwhile to explore and develop additional risk criteria that are 
very reflective of the risks DOTs are keen to assess.  Generally, this research has incorporated 
different risk measures.  However, these measures are not exhaustive or prescribed.  Further 
research that can define a set of measures reflective of agency’s risks will improve the benefits of 
these initial efforts of this dissertation.  Finally, decision makers are always seeking to optimize 
their benefits for every investment they make.  As such, research that can extend this initial effort 
to integrate an optimization tool that considers both economic measures and decision makers 
preferences in selecting programs can improve the overall effectiveness of the decision making 











APPENDIX A Examples of Ancillary Assets and Highway Hazards 
 
Figure A.1 Overhead Road Signs and Sign Structures 
 





Figure A.3 Example of a Thrie-Beam Steal Guardrail (FHWA) 
   






Figure A.5 Examples of Pavement Markings and Traffic Signs 
 
 




APPENDIX B LOCATIONS OF UNSTABLE AND MITIGATED SLOPES ALONG 
WASHINGTON STATE ROUTES
 
Figure B.1 Unstable Slopes along State Routes in Washington State (WSDOT, 2010) 
 




APPENDIX C EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL AND AGENCY STANDARD RISK 
FRAMEWORK 
 




















Figure C.3 Australian-New Zealand Standards Risk Framework (AS/NZS, 4360:1999) 
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